A person commits second degree assault in Missouri if he:
(1) Attempts to kill or knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury to another person under the influence of sudden passion arising out of adequate cause; or
(2) Attempts to cause or knowingly causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument; or
(3) Recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person; or
(4) While in an intoxicated condition or under the influence of controlled substances or drugs, operates a motor vehicle in this state and, when so operating, acts with criminal negligence to cause physical injury to any other person than himself; or
(5) Recklessly causes physical injury to another person by means of discharge of a firearm; or
(6) Operates a motor vehicle, and when so operating, acts with criminal negligence to cause physical injury to any person authorized to operate an emergency vehicle, while such person is in the performance of official duties.
The Court assumed the statute was divisible, and proceeded to the modified categorical approach to determine under which prong the petitioner had been convicted. Having determined from the charging document that he had been convicted of violating subpart 2 (attempting to cause serious injury with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument), the Court concluded that the statute of conviction contained an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, and thus, qualified as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).
In light of the similarities between the definition of a violent felony under the ACCA and the definition of a crime of violence under 18 USC 16(a) (employed in the immigration context), a conviction under this subpart of the statute most likely also qualifies as a crime of violence in the immigration context.
The full text of United States v. Alexander can be found here: http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/151210P.pdf