Comment

Eighth Circuit Finds that Arkansas Conviction for Aggravated Assault on a Family Member is a Violent Felony

The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for aggravated assault on a family member is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it requires the use of violent force.  Given the similarity between the definition of a violent felony under the ACCA and the definition of a crime of violence in the immigration context, this case could have persuasive value in the immigration context.

The full text of US v. Pyles can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/05/172116P.pdf

Comment

Comment

Eighth Circuit Finds that ND Unlawful Entry Into a Vehicle is an Attempted Theft Aggravated Felony

The Eighth Circuit has determined that a North Dakota conviction for unlawful entry into a vehicle qualifies as an attempted theft aggravated felony.  "The BIA correctly affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that Ahmed’s unlawful entry into the vehicle was a substantial step toward committing a theft."

The full text of Ahmed v. Sessions can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/05/172035P.pdf

Comment

Comment

Eighth Circuit finds that MN Criminal Sexual Conduct in Third Degree is Aggravated Felony

The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the third degree is a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony.  The Minnesota statute at issue makes it a crime for an actor to engage in “sexual penetration” with another when the other party is “at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is more than 24 months older.”  The Minnesota statute at issue here, however, requires a victim who is younger than sixteen, and thus, it still qualifies as an aggravated felony in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Esquival-Quintana.  

The full text of Garcia-Urbano v. Sessions can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/05/161571P.pdf

Comment

Comment

Eighth Circuit Find that Iowa Assault While Displaying a Dangerous Weapon Conviction is Crime of Violence

The Eighth circuit has determined that an Iowa conviction for assault while displaying a dangerous weapon constitutes a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines because intentionally pointing a firearm at another person and displaying a dangerous weapon toward another in a threatening manner constitute a threatened use of physical force.  Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence in the criminal context and immigration context, this decision could have persuasive impact in the immigration context.

The full text of US v. McGee can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/05/172080P.pdf

Comment

Comment

Seventh Circuit Addresses CAT Regulations

The Seventh Circuit has again granted a petition for review of a denied application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) involving gang violence.  The Court observed that "an escape from torture at the hands of the state or someone who the state cannot or will not control is strong evidence supporting a prediction of torture should the target be returned to that country. Such evidence is particular to the petitioner; it indicates the methods likely to be used; it identifies who the perpetrator(s) will be; and it sheds light on the state of mind of the potential torturer."

"The fact that Perez was the target of some near-misses, however, shows that MS-13 had Perez himself in its sights and was willing to take violent action against him. The threat of imminent death is one way in which torture by means of mental pain or suffering can be inflicted."

"The Board also erred when considering Perez’s evidence that he could not relocate safely within Honduras, by too narrowly focusing on his exposure to particular MS-13 members rather than the gang as a whole."

The full text of Perez v. Sessions can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D05-02/C:17-1369:J:Wood:aut:T:fnOp:N:2148837:S:0

Comment

Comment

Fifth Circuit Remands Gang Asylum Claim

The Fifth Circuit has remanded an asylum claim involving fear of gangs because the Immigration Judge erroneously required the petitioner to demonstrate past persecution in order to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution and because the Immigration Judge failed to analyze the cognizability of the particular social group put forth by the petitioner, instead evaluating (and rejecting) a social group of his own formulation.

The full text of Cabrera v. Sessions can be found here:

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-60711-CV0.pdf

Comment

Comment

Fifth Circuit Finds that Online Solicitation of a Minor is not an Aggravated Felony

The Fifth Circuit has determined that a Texas conviction for online solicitation of a minor is not categorically an aggravated felony in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Esquival Quintana.  "Given the structure of the Court’s reasoning regarding the age of consent and especially egregious crimes, Esquivel-Quintana’s generic definition of a minor as one under sixteen applies in the context of online solicitation of a minor."

The full text of Shroff v. Sessions can be found here:

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-60042-CV0.pdf

Comment

Comment

Fourth Circuit find that TN Drug Conviction is CIMT and Aggravated Felony

The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Tennessee conviction for manufacturing, delivering, selling, or possessing with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell a controlled substance is both a crime involving moral turpitude and a drug trafficking aggravated felony.  With respect to the aggravated felony ground, the Court found the statute to be overbroad because it criminalizes possession with intent to deliver one half-ounce, or approximately 14 grams, of marijuana and does not include any reference to remuneration.  Such conduct is punishable as a misdemeanor under federal law.  

However, the Court found the statute to be divisible because each subsection provides for a different punishment depending on the quantity and type of drug involved.  Examining the record of conviction, the Court determined that the petitioner was convicted of possession with intent to sell more than 4,000 grams of marijuana.  

In addition, because the statute requires a mens rea (knowingly) and involves reprehensible conduct (drug trafficking), it also qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).

Finally, the Court deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Balderas.  In Balderas, the BIA considered whether a CIMT that has been used as part of the basis for a "two or more CIMTs” charge of removability in an immigration proceeding that terminated with a § 212(c) waiver may later be used as part of the basis for a “two or more CIMTs” charge of removability if the petitioner in question commits another CIMT after the first immigration proceeding was terminated. The BIA held that such a previously found CIMT could be used with a new CIMT to support a charge of removability because a grant of section 212(c) relief waives the finding of excludability or deportability rather than the basis of the excludability itself."  Thus, because the petitioner was also convicted of a CIMT in 2000, a waiver of the 1995 CIMT under 212c would not prevent a finding that the petitioner was removable for two CIMTs.

The full text of Guevara-Solorazano v. Sessions can be found here:

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/162434.P.pdf

Comment

Comment

Second Circuit finds that NY Bail Jumping is an Aggravated Felony

The Second Circuit has determined that a New York conviction for bail jumping is a failure to appear related aggravated felony.  

"To determine whether a conviction for failure to appear is an aggravated felony, we must consider whether the statute of conviction satisfies the elements listed in § 1101(a)(43)(T), which requires (1) a “failure to appear” (2) “before a court” (3) “pursuant to a court order” (4) “to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony” (5) “for which a sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment or more may be imposed.  Perez’s conviction, under N.Y.P.L. § 215.57, satisfies the first four elements of § 1101(a)(43)(T) on its face.     The fifth element is also satisfied.    Considering the statutory scheme as a whole, we conclude that subsection (T)’s sentence requirement relates to the failure to appear and not, as the government suggests, to the sentence imposed on a petitioner’s underlying felony."  Because NY bail jumping can be punished by 7 years of incarceration, it qualifies as an aggravated felony.

The full text of Perez Henriquez v. Sessions can be found here: 

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/092aee45-a488-46dc-ab31-64b70ff44892/13/doc/15-3285_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/092aee45-a488-46dc-ab31-64b70ff44892/13/hilite/

Comment

Comment

Second Circuit Addresses Bond Jurisdiction for Petitioner Seeking Federal Court Review

The Second Circuit has determined that a petitioner seeking federal judicial review of a removal order, who has obtained a stay of removal from the federal court, is detained under section 236(c) of the INA, not section 241 of the INA.  Recognizing that the state of prolonged detention bond case law is in flux since the Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Court remanded the case to determine if the Constitution mandates providing the petitioner with a bond hearing.

The full text of Hechavarria v. Sessions can be found here:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/092aee45-a488-46dc-ab31-64b70ff44892/2/doc/16-1380_amd_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/092aee45-a488-46dc-ab31-64b70ff44892/2/hilite/

Comment

Comment

Second Circuit Construes Credibility Standards

In a pair of adverse credibility cases, the Second Circuit has determined that trivial inconsistencies or omissions cannot sustain an adverse credibility determination.  Omissions, in particular, are less probative of credibility.  This is especially true because applicants are not required to include every detail in their applications and written statements.  

The full text of Gao v. Sessions can be found here:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/092aee45-a488-46dc-ab31-64b70ff44892/1/doc/16-2262_16-2493_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/092aee45-a488-46dc-ab31-64b70ff44892/1/hilite/

Comment

Comment

Attorney General Restricts Administrative Closure

The Attorney General (AG) has greatly restricted the authority of Immigration Judges (IJs) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) to administratively close proceedings.  The AG determined that IJs and the Board have no independent authority administratively close proceedings, and as such, they may only do so when a statute or settlement agreement authorizes them to do so.

The decision in Matter of Castro Tum can be found here: 

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1064086/download

Comment

Comment

Eighth Circuit finds that Minnesota Simple Robbery is Violent Felony

The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for simple robbery is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it requires proof of the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent force.  Given the similar definition of a crime of violence in immigration proceedings, this case could have persuasive force in the immigration context.

The full text of United States v. Pettis can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/04/163988P.pdf

Comment

Comment

BIA Address DHS Motions and Asylum in Withholding Only Proceedings

The Board of Immigration Appeals has clarified that the Department of Homeland Security has the authority to file a motion to consider, and has also affirmed that a respondent subject to a reinstated order of removal, who is placed in withholding only proceedings, does not qualify for asylum.

The full text of Matter of L-M-P- can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1058201/download

Comment

Comment

Supreme Court Finds 16(b) Definition of Crime of Violence Unconstitutionally Vague

The Supreme Court has determined that the definition of a crime of violence contained in 18 USC 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.   In so doing, it relied heavily on its 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act on vagueness grounds.

The full text of Sessions v. Dimaya can be found here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/15-1498_1b8e.pdf

Comment

Comment

Fourth Circuit Finds that VA Conviction for Obstruction of Justice is not CIMT

The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction for obstruction of justice is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it can be committed without fraud, deception, or any other aggravating element (such as the use of threats or force) that shocks the public conscience.  In so doing, the court distinguished the statute at issue from the statute analyzed in Matter of Jurado-Delgado.

The court also clarified the requirement that a petitioner exhaust his arguments before the agency.  "[T[he Government takes issue with appellate counsel citing certain cases for the first time on appeal in order to elaborate on the breadth of the Virginia statute. The Government has not provided any basis for applying the exhaustion requirement at this level of granularity. Indeed, such an approach would strip appellate counsel’s ability to bolster existing arguments—and limit the universe of available case law and precedent to those already cited below."

The full text of Ramirez v. Sessions can be found here:

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/162444.P.pdf

Comment