The Supreme Count has determined that the a conviction may constitute an obstruction justice aggravated felony even if the offense does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending.
The full text of Pugin v. Garland can be found here:
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obstruction of justice crimes
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California conviction for witness intimidation is not an obstruction of justice aggravated felony because it is missing the element of a nexus to an ongoing or pending proceeding or investigation. The court also noted that the statute was broader than the federal witness tampering statute because it lacks the requirement that an individual “uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person,” or “engages in misleading conduct toward another person.”
The court did note that subsections (a) and (c) of Penal Code 136.1 required malice, but subsection (b) (at issue in this case) did not. Nonetheless, the court also analyzed a case interpreting 136.1(a), and determined that the definition of malice “was not the kind of intimidation, threat, corrupt persuasion, or misleading conduct that would give rise to liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).”
The full text of Cordero-Garcia v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/15/19-72779.pdf
The First Circuit has determined that a Massachusetts conviction for accessory after the fact is an obstruction of justice-related aggravated felony. In so doing, the court determined that the definition of obstruction of justice unambiguously “does not require a nexus to a pending or ongoing investigation or judicial proceeding.” This widens a circuit split, with the Ninth and Third Circuits requiring a nexus to an ongoing investigation, and the Fourth Circuit and First Circuit agreeing with the Board of Immigration Appeals that an ongoing investigation is not required.
The First Circuit further determined that even assuming a nexus to an investigation is required, the Massachusetts statute meets that requirement. “To be convicted under that statute, the accessory must act with specific intent to enable a felon to ‘avoid or escape detention, arrest, trial, or punishment.’ Absent an investigation, there can be no prosecution and no detention, arrest, trial, or punishment to avoid or escape.”
The full text of Silva v. Garland can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction for accessory after the fact is an obstruction of justice aggravated felony. In so doing, the court deferred to the agency’s definition of obstruction of justice, which does not require an ongoing investigation into the crime.
The full text of Pugin v. Garland can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California conviction for accessory after the fact to a felony is not categorically an aggravated felony related to obstruction of justice because it encompasses conducted related to crimes which are not the subject of an ongoing investigation or proceeding.
The full text of Valenzuela Gallardo v. Barr can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/08/06/18-72593.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals had determined that an “offense relating to obstruction of justice” under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,, encompasses offenses covered by chapter 73 of the Federal criminal code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2012), or any other Federal or State offense that involves (1) an affirmative and intentional attempt (2) that is motivated by a specific intent (3) to interfere either in an investigation or proceeding that is ongoing, pending, or reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, or in another’s punishment resulting from a completed proceeding. Therefore, a conviction for accessory to a felony under section 32 of the California Penal Code that results in a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year is a conviction for an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice.
The Board specifically noted that an ongoing investigation is not necessary. For example, acts of witness intimidation before an investigation has begun designed to prevent the reporting of a crime, would still qualify under the generic definition of obstruction of justice.
The full text of Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction for obstruction of justice is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it can be committed without fraud, deception, or any other aggravating element (such as the use of threats or force) that shocks the public conscience. In so doing, the court distinguished the statute at issue from the statute analyzed in Matter of Jurado-Delgado.
The court also clarified the requirement that a petitioner exhaust his arguments before the agency. "[T[he Government takes issue with appellate counsel citing certain cases for the first time on appeal in order to elaborate on the breadth of the Virginia statute. The Government has not provided any basis for applying the exhaustion requirement at this level of granularity. Indeed, such an approach would strip appellate counsel’s ability to bolster existing arguments—and limit the universe of available case law and precedent to those already cited below."
The full text of Ramirez v. Sessions can be found here:
The Third Circuit has determined that a Pennsylvania conviction for obstructing the administration of law or other government function is not a crime involving moral turpitude. The court noted that the intent to impair or obstruct governmental functions, standing alone, is not morally turpitudinous; the obstruction must occur by deceit, graft, trickery, or dishonest means. Nothing in the text of the statute requires fraudulent or otherwise deceptive conduct as a necessary element of committing the offense, and thus, it involves non-morally turpitudinous conduct.
The full text of Ildefonso-Candelario v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Third Circuit has determined that a South Carolina conviction for accessory after the fact does not qualify as an obstruction of justice aggravated felony. In South Carolina, accessory after the fact occurs where the defendant, knowing that a principal has committed a felony, “harbor[s] or assist[s] the principal felon . . . for the purpose of enabling the principal felon to escape detection or arrest.” The court noted that this offense focused not on a defendant’s intent and actions regarding a particular judicial proceeding, but on the principal of a crime. Because "there are infinite actions a defendant may undertake with the intent to aid the principal after the commission of a crime, but before the commencement of judicial proceedings," there is no causal nexus between the South Carolina statute and the federal conceptions of obstruction of justice.
The full text of Flores v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/161979p.pdf
It is not uncommon for the Ninth Circuit and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to disagree with one another about immigration matters. As a result, a back and forth often develops, where the Ninth Circuit interprets BIA precedent, and the BIA responds by saying the Ninth Circuit incorrectly interpreted its precedent. The definition of an obstruction of justice aggravated felony is a great example of this dialogue.
In May 2011, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, a case that looked to two prior BIA decisions (Matter of Batista-Hernandez and Matter of Espinoza-Gonzalez) and held, under the agency’s interpretation, that a crime constitutes an obstruction of justice crime “when it interferes with an ongoing proceeding or investigation.” The BIA responded with a published decision in Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, holding that obstruction of justice requires only "the affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice. While many crimes fitting this definition will involve interference with an ongoing criminal investigation or trial, we now clarify that the existence of such proceedings is not an essential element of an offense relating to obstruction of justice.”
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit invoked the doctrine of constitutional avoidance - that is, it found that deference typically owed to an agency interpreting the statute entrusted to it by Congress is limited if that interpretation would violate the Constitution. With respect to the new definition laid out by the BIA in Valenzuela Gallardo, the Court observed that while "the BIA has said that not every crime that tends to obstruct justice qualifies as an obstruction of justice crime, and the critical factor is the interference with the process of justice—which does not require an ongoing investigation or proceeding—the BIA has not given an indication of what it does include in 'the process of justice,' or where that process begins and ends." As such, its definition of an obstruction of justice crime raised serious concerns about unconstitutional vagueness.
"We do not hold that the BIA’s definition of 'obstruction of justice' must be tied to an ongoing proceeding; rather, we hold that the BIA’s new interpretation of obstruction of justice raises grave constitutional concerns because it uses an amorphous phrase—'process of justice'—without telling us what that phrase means. It is difficult to imagine a specific intent crime that could not be swept into the BIA’s expanded definition."
In light of this, the Ninth Circuit declined to defer to the BIA's decision in Valenzuela Gallardo.
The full text of Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch can be found here: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2016/03/31/12-72326.pdf