Ninth Circuit Finds English-Language Notice of Address Obligations Satisfies Due Process

The Ninth Circuit has determined that DHS is not constitutionally required to translate a Notice to Appear into a respondent's native language in order to advise the respondent of the obligation to update her address. The petitioner argued that her in absentia removal order should be reopened because the English-language notice did not adequately advise her, in Spanish, that she had to update her address with the immigration court.

The Court rejected that argument, finding that English-language written notice can satisfy due process when it is reasonably calculated to inform the respondent of her obligations. Because the petitioner moved without updating her address, the later hearing notice mailed to her last known address was sufficient.

The full text of Urquia-Yanez v. Blanche can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/05/08/25-1136.pdf

Ninth Circuit Applies Substantial Evidence Review to Persecution Determination

The Ninth Circuit has determined that substantial evidence review applies to the agency's conclusion that undisputed facts do not rise to the level of persecution. The Court explained that, under Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, the agency's application of the INA to established facts is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard, abrogating any prior Ninth Circuit precedent that may have applied de novo review.

Applying that standard, the Court upheld the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection to a Sikh man from Punjab who supported the Mann Party. The Court found that the record did not compel a conclusion that threats, two beatings, and a one-night police detention amounted to past persecution. The Court also held that the agency reasonably found that the petitioner could relocate within India, and rejected the argument that the agency was required to apply a special Mann Party relocation rule to all Sikh applicants from Punjab.

The full amended text of Singh v. Blanche can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/05/15/24-815.pdf

Ninth Circuit Finds Marriage Fraud Bar Applies Even Without Filing for Immigration Benefits

The Ninth Circuit has determined that the marriage fraud bar applies when a non-citizen attempts or conspires to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws, even if no immigration benefit is ever sought based on that marriage. The court rejected the argument that 8 USC 1154(c)(2) requires the filing of an immigration application or petition, explaining that “if a noncitizen attempts or conspires ‘to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws,’ then the marriage fraud bar applies, full stop. Whether the noncitizen takes any further actions, such as marrying and filing for immigration benefits, is immaterial.”

The Court also determined that USCIS did not violate due process by relying on the non-citizen’s ex-wife’s sworn statement without producing her for cross-examination. Unlike in Ching v. Mayorkas, the ex-wife’s statement was not the only adverse evidence, the petitioners had multiple opportunities to respond, there was a dearth of evidence of the bona fides of the marriage, and the record contained independent evidence that the non-citizen had admitted paying his ex-wife to marry him “in order to get a green card.”

The full text of Hanan v. USCIS can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/04/27/24-6193.pdf

Ninth Circuit Recognizes First Amendment Rights of US Citizen when Non-Citizen Spouse is Denied Visa

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that a U.S. citizen’s First Amendment rights made be implicated when her non-citizen spouse is denied a visa. “Mandel’s central holding—that the government must offer a facially legitimate and bona fide reason when its inadmissibility determination implicates a U.S. citizen’s First Amendment rights—remains good law.” The court then concluded that “the consular officer’s belief that Sanchez is a member of a known criminal organization is sufficient to establish a facial connection to the statutory ground in question.”

“At no point has the government conceded that Sanchez’s tattoos played any role in the visa denial. Appellants would like us to assume that the tattoos were the true justification due to Sanchez’s lack of a criminal record and the consular officer’s alleged focus on his tattoos during the interview. But we are not privy to the full breadth of information available to the officer, as ‘information provided by law enforcement”’can encompass details not located in a formal record. For us to delve further into the particulars of the officer’s investigation would subvert the purpose of the facially legitimate and bona fide standard—a standard that affords even more deference to the government than rational basis review. In sum, the consular officer cited 3A2 and concluded that there was ‘reason to believe’ Sanchez is a member of a criminal organization after reviewing interview statements, law‑enforcement information, the immigration record, and all other submissions. For the purposes of our limited inquiry, the government has proffered a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.”

“Although this case presents some troubling allegations, there is not enough to conclude that the consular officer’s visa denial, which was reviewed by both a supervisor and the Department of State’s Visa Office, was made in bad faith. Appellants again point to the officer’s alleged focus on Sanchez’s tattoos during the interview, the government’s failure to identify a specific gang to which Sanchez belongs, and Sanchez’s lack of a prior criminal record. Greater detail about the basis for the consular officer’s determination would have satisfied our native curiosity, but Appellants have offered no direct evidence that the officer ignored contrary findings or relied on clearly erroneous facts, and we have no license to require further explanation from the State Department. For us to demand greater explanation would improperly interfere with the consular officer’s discretion over visa denials and subvert the design of the consular nonreviewability doctrine.”

The full text of Sanchez Gonzalez v. U.S. Department of State can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/04/30/23-4205.pdf

Ninth Circuit Finds Notice of Appeal Insufficiently Specific

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a Notice of Appeal that states that an Immigration Judge’s decision was “wrongfully made” was insufficient to put the Board of Immigration Appeals on notice that the appellant was raising a due process claim.

The full text of Santana-Gonzalez v. Bondi can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/04/08/16-70793.pdf

Ninth Circuit finds CA Definition of Rape Matches Aggravated Felony Ground

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that California permits rape through non-physical duress - such as through threatening to release a sex tape - but has determined that the federal definition of rape also includes such non-physical duress.

The full text of United States v. Gonzalez can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/04/15/23-3532.pdf

Ninth Circuit Finds no Jurisdiction to REVIEW Negative Reasonable Fear Determination Absent Challenge to Reinstatement Order

The Ninth Circuit has determined that lacks jurisdiction to review the agency’s negative reasonable fear determination related to a non-citizen subject to reinstated removal order, unless the non-citizen is challenging the reinstatement order as well.

The full text of Navarette v. Bondi can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/03/23/24-2776.pdf

Ninth Circuit Finds Oregon Attempted Assault Conviction to be Crime of Violence

The Ninth Circuit has determined that Oregon convictions for first third degree assault are crimes of violence. “Oregon courts have explained that attempted first-degree assault under Oregon law requires showing that a defendant took a substantial step toward causing serious physical injury to another.”

The full text of United States v. Chavez-Echeverria can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/03/25/24-4723.pdf

Ninth Circuit Finds that NV Sale of a Controlled Substance Conviction is Indivisible

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a Nevada conviction for sale of a controlled substance under Nevada Revised Statute § 453.321(1)(a) is indivisible with respect to the various actus rei criminalized.

The full text of United States v. Casildo can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/03/31/23-35483.pdf

Ninth Circuit Requires Prejudice to Show Counsel-Related Due Process Violation During Reinstatement

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a non-citizen undergoing the reinstatement of a prior removal order can only show that deprivation of counsel violated his due process rights if he can establish prejudice.

The full text of Verduzco Ruiz v. Bondi can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/04/01/18-71787.pdf

Ninth Circuit Again Blocks Review of U-Visa Waiver in District Court

The Ninth Circuit has again foreclosed an APA challenge to the denial of waiver under 8 USC 212(d)(14) requested in connection with a U visa, finding that the waiver application is necessarily one committed to the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security.

“In rejecting his constitutional challenge to the INA, we emphasize that we do not decide today whether, or to what extent, Plaintiff can raise his claims in removal proceedings. Nor do we decide whether, if the immigration courts cannot review his claims, such a result would violate the Constitution. What we do decide is that, to the extent Plaintiff has a viable challenge to the discretionary decisions of the immigration authorities, the only place he can advance that claim is in removal proceedings and a subsequent petition for review in the court of appeals.”

The full text of Chairez v. Mayorkas can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/03/05/24-4137.pdf

Ninth Circuit Concludes that Honduran Government was Unable or Unwilling to Protect Victim of Gender Violence

The Ninth Circuit has determined that an evidentiary record compels the conclusion that the Honduran government is unable or unwilling to protect a woman from violence perpetrated by her partner, who was also a gang member.

“The IJ observed that did not necessarily suggest the police would do the same if they arrested Oscar after beating Petitioner. Yet the record in this case strongly suggests that if the government took no meaningful action in that instance, when Oscar’s victim was a man, it was even less likely to take meaningful action when the victim was a woman. The conclusion compelled by Petitioner’s testimony concerning the danger she faced from Oscar, his violent outbursts when she sought refuge at church, and his death threats deterring her from reporting him, as well as by the country conditions report documenting uncontrollable violence against women in Honduras, is that an attempt to report would not only have been futile, it would also have been likely to result in further harm to Petitioner. Because the record compels the conclusion that the government of Honduras would be either unable or unwilling to protect Petitioner, this element of the asylum and withholding inquiries is satisfied.”

The full text of Guevara-Serrano v. Bondi can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/01/20/23-4420.pdf

Ninth Circuit Rejects Per Se Rule that Traffic is Never Exceptional Circumstance

The Ninth Circuit has rejected a per se rule that traffic can never be an exceptional circumstance that excuses missing a hearing in immigration court.

“We have never adopted a rule that traffic (or any other circumstance) is per se unexceptional. And we reject any bright-line rules about what can or cannot qualify as an exceptional circumstance because the statutory test depends on the totality of the circumstances in each petitioner’s case.”

“And more to the point, the fifteen-minute cushion petitioners gave themselves did not cause their failure to appear. Petitioners were two hours late for their hearing, and it was the two major accidents causing a ten-mile backup that caused them to be late. Even if they gave themselves an extra ninety minutes to get to court, they still would have been late because of the severe traffic that morning. Exercising diligence does not mean a petitioner must predict the very ‘extraordinary circumstance’ they contend caused their failure to appear. The BIA must consider petitioners’ diligence based on what a reasonable person would do under the circumstances, without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.'“

The full text of Montejo-Gonzalez v. Bondi can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/02/05/21-304.pdf

Ninth Circuit Certifies Questions about Drug Conviction to CA Supreme Court

The Ninth Circuit has certified the following questions to the California Supreme Court: when a defendant is charged with possession of a listed controlled substance under California Health & Safety Code § 11378, must the state prove, and must the jury unanimously agree, that the defendant possessed the actual listed controlled substance, and not an analog of that substance as defined under California Health & Safety Code § 11401? Or may the jury convict if it finds the state has proven the defendant possessed either the actual controlled substance or an analog of that substance, without unanimous agreement as to which?

“If the California Supreme Court concludes that the state may prove a § 11378 charge for possession of a specified listed controlled substance (e.g., methamphetamine) by showing the defendant possessed either the actual specified listed substance or an analog of that substance, then Defendants would prevail. We would conclude that § 11378 is “both overbroad and indivisible” at step two, and “a prior conviction under that statute will never qualify as a predicate . . . offense under the federal sentencing guidelines.” But if the California Supreme Court concludes that the state must prove a § 11378 charge for possession of a specified listed controlled substance by showing the defendant possessed that actual substance and not an analog of that substance, then we will affirm the sentences.”

Thus, the resolution of this question could impact the immigration consequences of many different California drug convictions.

The full text of United States v. Soto can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/01/08/24-3903.pdf

Ninth Circuit Denies DOJ's Motion to Dismiss Pro se PFR

The Ninth Circuit has denied the Department of Justice’s motion to dismiss a pro se petition for review that misstated the date of the agency decision and failed to include the decision with the petition. “Here, the imperfections in Kazarian’s petition did not deprive the government of sufficient notice of his claim or prejudice the government. Even though Kazarian misstated the date of the challenged order as ‘07/16/25’ rather than ‘06/17/25,’ and he did not attach a copy of that order, as § 1252(c) requires, his petition and accompanying stay motion make clear that he seeks review of the BIA’s June 17, 2025, decision upholding his removal order. The government had no trouble finding that ruling and filing it on the docket.”

The full text of Kazarian v. Bondi can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/11/18/25-4427.pdf

Ninth Circuit Reaffirms Jurisdiction to Review Exception to One Year Filing Deadline

The Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed that it has jurisdiction to review whether changed circumstances excuse the late filing of an asylum application. The Court also affirmed the denial of an administrative closure motion because the applicant had multiple DUI convictions, which weighed against a grant of discretion.

The full text of Ruiz v. Bondi can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/12/22/23-1095.pdf

Ninth Circuit Panel Berates Court's Stay Procedures

A three-panel judge of the Ninth Circuit has written a scathing criticism of the court’s internal policy of often delaying the assignment of an opposed motion for a stay of removal until the briefing on the merits of the case is complete.

“Here, the extended stay that Petitioners have already obtained flagrantly violates these principles. Once the stay motion in this case was fully briefed in February 2025, “the court [was] equipped to rule,” and “its obligation to apply the Nken factors [was] triggered.” Id. But rather than present Petitioners’ stay motion to the next available motions panel for decision, the Clerk’s Office (consistent with our general internal practices) held the motion until it could be presented to a merits panel together with the fully completed merits briefing. As a result, by the time that the stay motion was presented to us for decision, the ostensible “administrative stay ha[d] effectively become a stay pending appeal,” but without any consideration of the Nken factors. Id. at 800. Indeed, the 10-month stay that Petitioners obtained with their barebones motion was accomplished without any involvement of an Article III judge.

It is manifestly unlawful to allow a temporary administrative stay to be continued for such an undue length of time after an opposed stay motion has been fully briefed, much less to do so without any case-specific judicial involvement. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 433–34 (holding that granting an opposed stay motion requires application of the traditional stay factors in “an exercise of judicial discretion” (emphasis added)); Doe #1, 944 F.3d at 1223 (holding that a temporary administrative stay “is only intended to preserve the status quo until the substantive motion for a stay pending appeal can be considered on the merits” (emphasis added)); cf. United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that the settled principle that substantive judicial functions “cannot be delegated to nonjudicial officers for resolution” does not “prohibit courts from using nonjudicial officers to support judicial functions, as long as a judicial officer retains and exercises ultimate responsibility”). Moreover, the practice of generally holding stay motions until they can be presented to the merits panel together with the completed merits briefing squarely violates Nken’s instruction that courts may not “reflexively hold[] a final order in abeyance pending review.” 556 U.S. at 427. Under these principles, once the opposed stay motion in this case was fully briefed, it should have been presented by the Clerk’s Office to the next available motions panel. And, going forward, that is the practice that must be followed in disposing of fully briefed opposed stay motions.”

The panel decision in Rojas-Espinoza v. Bondi can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/10/24/24-7536.pdf

The panel agreed to stay its decision pending a vote on whether to rehear this case en banc and consideration of supplemental briefing from the parties:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/11/10/24-7536.pdf

An edited version of the panel decision can be found here - this amended opinion does not affect the stay of the decision: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/11/25/24-7536.pdf

A newly issued en banc decision denying the stay of removal can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/03/10/24-7536.pdf

Ninth Circuit Permits Adverse Credibility Determination based on Marriage Fraud

The Ninth Circuit has allowed an Immigration Judge to rely on an asylum applicant’s past marriage fraud to find his testimony regarding his asylum claim to be not credible.

The full text of Ani v. Bondi can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/10/16/24-2339.pdf

Ninth Circuit Remands CAT Claim for Mexican National, Declines to Apply Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

The Ninth Circuit has remanded an application for protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing the “extreme violence against individuals on the basis of perceived gang affiliation, deportee status, indigenous heritage, mental illness, and substance abuse. Petitioner has all of these characteristics, each of which would independently place him at risk of torture if he were removed to Mexico.” In addition, the Court declined to dismiss the petition for review under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, citing the government’s delay of over two years from the petitioner’s missed appointment with ICE to the filing of the motion to dismiss and the government’s own evidence that the petitioner was likely in criminal custody, and thus, his whereabouts were likely known to the parties and the Court.

The full text of Uc Encarcion v. Bondi can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/09/30/22-1601.pdf

Ninth Circuit Imposes Additional Notice Requirements on the Government in Removal Proceedings

The Ninth Circuit has determined that when the government becomes aware that notice of an upcoming removal hearing has been ineffective (i.e., notice has been returned), it must take additional steps, when practicable, to provide notice to the non-citizen. In this case, the Court found that personal service of the Order to Show Cause - which did not contain the date and time of the first immigration court hearing - was not sufficient on its own. Furthermore, even if a non-citizen has failed to update his or her address with the immigration court, they have not forfeited their constitutional right to notice.

The Court also suggested certain practicable steps that the government could take when a notice of hearing is returned as undeliverable. “One alternative is to consider whether the address in the A-file matched the address to which the Government sent the notice of hearing by certified mail. The record indicates that, when the approval of Rivera-Valdes’s employment authorization application was sent to the Cleveland address that included ’Ave.,’ he showed up to retrieve his authorization papers. It was only after subsequent mailings were sent without the word ‘Ave.’ in the Cleveland address that the OSC and notice of hearing were returned as ‘not deliverable as addressed’ and ‘unclaimed.’ The district court should consider if any discrepancy in the addresses was a basis for the unsuccessful mailings, and if so, whether the Government could have taken additional steps to correct it.

The dissent concludes that remand is unnecessary because Rivera-Valdes ‘confirmed’ or ‘corroborated’ that the address listed on the OSC—which omitted the word ‘Ave.’—was his current address. But the dissent misreads what the OSC actually states. The OSC did not prompt Rivera-Valdes to confirm the accuracy of the OSC. Rather, the OSC’s signature line prompted Rivera-Valdes’s ‘acknowledgment/receipt of this form.’ This stands in contrast, for example, to the signature line in Rivera-Valdes’s application for employment authorization, which required that the signer ‘certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the foregoing is true and correct.”’ In that document, Rivera-Valdes listed his N. Cleveland address with the word ‘Ave.’”

“Another alternative for the district court to consider may be whether sending the notice of hearing by first-class mail was a feasible option. In Yi Tu, we observed that first-class mail may be a reasonably calculated alternative because it can ‘be examined at the end of the day, [whereas certified mail] can only be retrieved from the post office for a specified period of time.’”

The full text of U.S. v. Rivera-Valdes can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/09/18/21-30177.pdf