Ninth Circuit Holds Thuraissigiam Does Not Strip Due Process Protections From Asylum Seekers Detained Far From the Border

The Ninth Circuit has affirmed a district court's denial of the government's motion to dismiss a long-running class action brought by asylum seekers subject to mandatory detention under the expedited removal statute, holding on interlocutory appeal that the court has jurisdiction over the class's constitutional challenge and that Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam does not eliminate their due process rights. The certified class consists of noncitizens who entered without inspection, were placed in expedited removal, and established credible fear of persecution or torture, but who remain subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) without any opportunity for a bond hearing — a population DHS substantially expanded in January 2025 by designating virtually any inadmissible noncitizen apprehended anywhere in the country within two years of entry as subject to expedited removal.

On jurisdiction, the panel held that none of the four subsections of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) barred the district court from hearing the case, since the class challenged the constitutionality of the detention statute itself rather than any individual removal order, determination, or application of the statute to a particular case. On the merits of appealability, the court rejected the government's argument that Thuraissigiam forecloses the claim entirely. Writing for the majority, Judge Berzon distinguished Thuraissigiam, which involved a noncitizen apprehended 25 yards from the border moments after crossing, as limited to individuals at the "threshold of initial entry." The class here includes people apprehended tens or hundreds of miles from the border, months or up to two years after entry — well outside that narrow category. The court reaffirmed the longstanding rule that the Due Process Clause protects all persons in the United States regardless of immigration status and traced the distinction between the government's broad power over admission decisions and the much more constrained, centuries-old limits on its power to detain. Judge Friedland concurred in the judgment on the narrower ground that the class definition alone placed its members outside Thuraissigiam's scope, without reaching the admission-versus-detention analysis.

The full text of Padilla v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/09/21/24-2801.pdf

D.C. Circuit Vacates Stay of DHS Parolee Expedited Removal Policies for Lack of Standing

The D.C. Circuit has vacated a district court order staying two DHS actions that directed immigration officers to consider expedited removal for parolees, holding that immigrant-rights organizations lacked standing to seek that relief because a regulation independently authorizing the same expedited removal of parolees remained unchallenged and in full effect.

The Court held that even if the challenged memorandum and email caused an increase in expedited removals, staying only those two documents would not likely reduce the rate of expedited removal given the government's continued reliance on the separate, unchallenged regulation, so the organizations failed to show the redressability required for standing. The Court also held it had appellate jurisdiction over the stay order and that the government itself had standing to appeal despite the practical overlap in authorities.

The full text of Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. Mullin can be found here: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2026/08/25-5289-2187613.pdf

D.C. Circuit Vacates Stay of Expedited Removal Expansion

The D.C. Circuit has vacated a district court order staying DHS’s 2025 expansion of expedited removal. The challenged designation expanded expedited removal to the maximum statutory scope, covering unlawfully present noncitizens who cannot show at least two years of continuous presence in the United States.

The Court held that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their due process challenge. The Court rejected any argument that government officials must advise non-citizens about the two years presence requirement or that the failure to follow the law by individual immigration officers invalidates the expansion itself. The Court therefore vacated the district court’s nationwide APA stay. The Court left open the question of what, if any, remedy exists to address an officer who issues an expedited removal order even when a non-citizen can show two years of continuous presence, recognizing that the statutory scheme governing judicial review of expedited removal orders does not permit a court to examine if the non-citizen has been present for two years.

The full text of Make the Road New York v. Mullin can be found here: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2026/06/25-5320-2179963.pdf

BIA Subjects Applicants for Admission to Mandatory Detention

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that an applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and subsequently placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under section 236(a) of the INA.

“An ‘applicant for admission; is defined, in relevant part, as an alien ‘who arrives in the United States whether or not at a designated port of arrival.’ An alien, like the respondent, ‘who tries to enter the country illegally is treated as an ‘applicant for admission.’” The Board further noted that the only exception to mandatory detention of applicants for admission is parole, which suggests that anyone who meets the definition of an applicant for admission who is not detained is actually paroled in the United States. However, the parole is terminated by the service of a Notice to Appear, which in turn, permits later detention under section 235(b) of the non-citizen.

The full text of Matter of Q. Li is found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1400431/dl?inline

BIA Finds 8 C.F.R. § 1240.17 does not Apply to Applicant Whose Negative CFI was Overturned by IJ

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that the regulation contained at 8 C.F.R. § 1240.17 does not apply to an asylum applicant who initially received a negative credible fear determination which was overturned by an Immigration Judge. The Board noted that the regulation only applies to those applicants initially placed in expedited removal proceedings and whose asylum applicant was initially adjudicated by the asylum officer. “The respondent is not included in the category of individuals covered by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1240.17 because he was not initially placed in expedited removal proceedings and USCIS did not adjudicate his asylum application.”

Although USCIS did not adjudicate this individual’s asylum application in the first instance, the Board’s finding that he was not initially placed in expedited removal proceedings is curious, as the agency has long considered a person going through the credible fear process to be subject to an expedited removal order until a positive credible fear determination is made.

The full text of Matter of F-C-S- can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-03/4074.pdf

The Board of Immigration Appeals has issued an amended opinion recognizing that F-C-S- was placed in expedited removal proceedings, but reaffirming that the regulation at issue only applies to asylum applications initially adjudicated by USCIS:

https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-04/4074_amended.pdf

The Board of Immigration Appeals issued another amended opinion clarifying the procedural history of the case:

https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-04/4074_amended_2.pdf