BIA Holds Bad Advice From a Non-Lawyer Does Not Excuse a Missed Hearing

The Board of Immigration Appeals has sustained a DHS appeal and reversed an Immigration Judge's sua sponte rescission of an in absentia removal order, holding that a respondent's claim that a non-attorney misled him about the need to appear at his hearing did not amount to the "exceptional circumstances" required to reopen. The respondent, a native and citizen of Uzbekistan, argued he reasonably relied on the individual's assurances, but the Board noted that both of the respondent's own continuance motions listed him as proceeding pro se and bore his signature.

Consistent with Matter of Z-R-C-N-, the Board reiterated that bad advice from a non-lawyer does not excuse a failure to appear and emphasized that sua sponte authority to reopen a case must be reserved for truly exceptional situations, not invoked routinely. The motion to reopen was denied and the in absentia removal order reinstated.

The full text of Matter of K-K-U-J- can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1462356/dl?inline

Ninth Circuit Holds In Absentia Order Violated Due Process Where

The Ninth Circuit has granted a petition for review filed by a Mexican man ordered removed in absentia after the government's only hearing notice was mailed to a residential address his relatives provided on a bond form asking where he would "reside," not his mailing address, and the notice was returned undeliverable.

The Court held that the government violated due process by relying on an address obtained by asking the wrong person the wrong question, and by taking no further steps after the notice came back undeliverable, particularly where the petitioner's sworn, uncontradicted statement said he had told the court his address to receive notices. The Court found additional practicable alternatives were obviously available, such as calling the phone number on the bond form, and remanded without need for further factfinding. A dissenting judge argued the record did not actually show the petitioner gave the government a correct mailing address and would have remanded to the agency to determine in the first instance what alternative notice steps were practicable.

The full text of Meza Medina v. Blanche can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/09/18/20-70017.pdf

BIA Overrules Prior Precedent, Allows Notice to Appear to Be Mailed to an Address Provided Before Its Issuance

The Board of Immigration Appeals, sitting en banc, has overruled its own quarter-century-old precedent and held that DHS may serve a notice to appear by regular mail at the most recent address a noncitizen provided to the agency, even if that address was given before the notice to appear itself was issued.

The Board held that its prior decision had created an unworkable paradox by requiring an address to first be validated by a notice to appear's own advisals before it could be used to mail that very notice, an interpretation the Board found inconsistent with the statute's plain text permitting service by regular mail and with nearly all noncitizens' independent, ongoing obligation to keep their address current. Two members dissented, arguing the prior rule was faithful to the statute's specific in absentia provisions and that the majority's own cited statistics, showing dramatically rising numbers of in absentia orders over the past decade, undercut any claim that the old rule was unworkable.

The full text of Matter of Diji can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1460146/dl?inline

Ninth Circuit Holds Agency Cannot Demand Corroboration for a Credible Motion to Reopen an In Absentia Order

The Ninth Circuit has granted a petition for review filed by a Guatemalan man ordered removed in absentia after arriving five minutes late to his hearing because of a flat tire, holding that the agency erred by requiring him to corroborate his account with documentary evidence and by faulting him for not submitting a formal affidavit.

The Court held that pro se petitioners need not submit a formal affidavit, and that because motions to reopen are decided without a hearing, the agency must accept a petitioner's account as true unless it is inherently unbelievable, without requiring independent corroboration. The Court remanded for the agency to reconsider the motion under the correct evidentiary standard.

The full text of Trigueros Quizar v. Blanche can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/09/04/24-4847.pdf

BIA Holds the Motion-to-Reopen Number Bar Is Not Subject to Equitable Tolling

The Board of Immigration Appeals has denied a fourth motion to reopen filed by a Jordanian respondent, holding that the INA's limitation to a single motion to reopen, subject only to the narrow battered-spouse exception, cannot be equitably tolled based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Adopting the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Garcia Morin v. Bondi, the Board held that a numerical cap functions as a substantive res judicata rule rather than an ordinary limitations period, and that Congress's choice to write in only one express exception forecloses any judicially created equitable exception. The Board declined to treat the motion as warranting sua sponte reopening, noting the respondent's newly acquired marital equities arose years after his removal order became final.

The full text of Matter of M-M-L-J- can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1458296/dl?inline

Eleventh Circuit Holds an EOIR Disciplinary Complaint Satisfies the Lozada Bar Complaint Requirement

The Eleventh Circuit has granted a petition for review filed by a Guatemalan man whose motion to reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel was denied because he reported his attorney to the immigration court's own disciplinary counsel rather than to a state bar.

The Court held that nothing in Matter of Lozada limits the "appropriate disciplinary authority" requirement to state bars, and that a complaint filed with EOIR's disciplinary counsel, which now has robust sanction authority modeled on the ABA Model Rules, both strictly and substantially complies with Lozada's purposes of deterring meritless claims and policing the immigration bar. The Court joined the majority of circuits in holding that substantial compliance with Lozada is sufficient and vacated the BIA's denial of reopening.

The full text of Pasqual-Andres v. U.S. Attorney General can be found here: https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202212848.pdf

Eighth Circuit Invalidates Departure Bar on Statutory Motions to Reopen

The Eighth Circuit has granted in part a petition for review filed by a Filipino lawful permanent resident removed based on two since-vacated California convictions, holding that the regulatory "departure bar" cannot be used to deny a statutory motion to reopen filed after the noncitizen has already been removed.

Joining every other circuit to address the question, the Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) contains no geographic limitation on who may file a motion to reopen, and that the BIA's regulation barring post-departure motions conflicts with that statutory grant, especially now that Loper Bright forecloses deference to the agency's contrary interpretation. The Court remanded for the BIA to consider the merits of the motion, which is based on the vacatur of the petitioner's underlying criminal convictions, while confirming that courts still lack jurisdiction to review the separate denial of sua sponte reopening.

The full text of Lacsina v. Blanche can be found here: https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/26/08/243373P.pdf

Eleventh Circuit Holds an EOIR Disciplinary Complaint Satisfies the Lozada Bar Complaint Requirement

The Eleventh Circuit has granted a petition for review filed by a Guatemalan man whose motion to reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel was denied because he reported his attorney to the immigration court's own disciplinary counsel rather than to a state bar.

The Court held that nothing in Matter of Lozada limits the "appropriate disciplinary authority" requirement to state bars, and that a complaint filed with EOIR's disciplinary counsel, which now has robust sanction authority modeled on the ABA Model Rules, both strictly and substantially complies with Lozada's purposes of deterring meritless claims and policing the immigration bar. The Court joined the majority of circuits in holding that substantial compliance with Lozada is sufficient and vacated the BIA's denial of reopening.

The full text of Pasqual-Andres v. U.S. Attorney General can be found here: https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202212848.pdf

Eighth Circuit Invalidates Departure Bar on Statutory Motions to Reopen

The Eighth Circuit has granted in part a petition for review filed by a Filipino lawful permanent resident removed based on two since-vacated California convictions, holding that the regulatory "departure bar" cannot be used to deny a statutory motion to reopen filed after the noncitizen has already been removed.

Joining every other circuit to address the question, the Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) contains no geographic limitation on who may file a motion to reopen, and that the BIA's regulation barring post-departure motions conflicts with that statutory grant, especially now that Loper Bright forecloses deference to the agency's contrary interpretation. The Court remanded for the BIA to consider the merits of the motion, which is based on the vacatur of the petitioner's underlying criminal convictions, while confirming that courts still lack jurisdiction to review the separate denial of sua sponte reopening.

The full text of Lacsina v. Blanche can be found here: https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/26/08/243373P.pdf

First Circuit Grants Reopening Where BIA Misconstrued Sua Sponte Motion as Statutory

The First Circuit has granted a petition for review filed by a Cambodian former lawful permanent resident whose second motion to reopen was denied after a Rhode Island court vacated his 1996 drug conviction for a Rule 11 plea-colloquy defect, holding that the BIA mistakenly analyzed the motion under the statutory time-and-number bar rather than its own sua sponte reopening authority.

The Court held that the BIA's invocation of equitable tolling and the ninety-day statutory deadline revealed that it had misunderstood the petitioner's request, since sua sponte motions are not subject to any time bar and may be granted "at any time." The Court also held that the BIA erred on the merits by concluding the vacatur was not based on a procedural defect, since the state court's order expressly cited a Rule 11 violation implicating due process. The Court remanded for the BIA to exercise its sua sponte discretion under the correct legal framework.

The full text of Kim v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/24-2042P-01A.pdf

BIA Denies Reopening Where Respondent Convicted of Sexual Offenses Failed to Show Requisite Hardship

The Board of Immigration Appeals has denied a motion to reopen filed by a Jamaican respondent seeking to pursue adjustment of status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen, following approval of a family visa petition after his removal order became final.

The Board held that the respondent's convictions for sexual abuse and forcible touching might require him to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, rather than the ordinary extreme hardship standard, to obtain a waiver of inadmissibility, and that he failed to meet even the lower standard given that he was already detained before the marriage and identified no specific increase in hardship his wife would face from his removal. The Board also held that his substantial family equities were outweighed by the seriousness of his sexual offense convictions in the discretionary analysis, and denied reopening for lack of a realistic chance of success on the merits.

The full text of Matter of Y-S-P-T- can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1453536/dl?inline

Fourth Circuit Finds Due Process Violation Where Immigration Court Refused Timely VAWA Filing

The Fourth Circuit has granted a petition for review filed by a Jamaican domestic violence survivor whose motion to reopen removal proceedings under VAWA was denied as untimely, even though his attorney had tried to file it on the deadline both electronically and in person, only to be turned away each time by the immigration court itself.

The Court held that the INA's grant of a statutory right to file a motion to reopen creates a protected liberty interest, and that the record compelled the conclusion that the immigration court's own refusal to accept a timely filing rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair and prejudiced the outcome. The Court rejected the BIA's reasoning that the petitioner's failure to return to the courthouse the next day, or to have already filed his VAWA self-petition with USCIS, undermined his claim, since neither was required to establish timeliness or prejudice. The Court reversed and remanded, noting that filing a motion "should not be a game of gotcha."

The full text of Burey v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/251869.P.pdf

BIA Denies Reopening Where Forced-Abortion Claim Lacked Reasonably Available Corroboration

The Board of Immigration Appeals has denied a Chinese respondent’s motion to reconsider and motion to reopen after the denial of asylum and withholding of removal. The respondent claimed that she had been forced to undergo an abortion in China and argued that the agency improperly required corroboration.

The Board held that the Immigration Judge properly required corroboration of credible but unpersuasive testimony and properly found that corroborating evidence of the alleged forced abortion was reasonably available. The Board also rejected the respondent’s ineffective assistance claim, finding that counsel did not act unreasonably by relying on a certified translation of evidence submitted by prior counsel.

The full text of Matter of Y-H-L- can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1446391/dl?inline

Ninth Circuit Requires BIA to Treat Motion Based on New Evidence as Motion to Reopen

The Ninth Circuit has granted a petition for review where the BIA treated a motion to reopen as a motion to reconsider. The petitioner’s notice of appeal to the BIA was mailed by certified mail before the deadline but was not delivered for forty-two days, and the BIA dismissed the appeal as untimely.

The petitioner then filed a motion to reopen supported by new USPS tracking evidence showing the delay. The Ninth Circuit held that because the motion relied on evidence not before the BIA at the time of dismissal, the BIA was required to treat it as a motion to reopen, subject to the ninety-day deadline. The case was remanded for the BIA to apply the reopening standard to the equitable tolling request.

The full text of Garcia Corrales v. Blanche can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/06/24/24-6467.pdf

BIA Declines Sua Sponte Reopening Based on Post-Order Equities

The Board of Immigration Appeals has denied an untimely motion to reopen filed nearly ten years after a final removal order. The respondent relied on equities acquired after the removal order, including marriage to a U.S. citizen, a pending spousal petition, a U.S. citizen child, and hardship to his family.

The Board concluded that the respondent did not show an exceptional situation warranting sua sponte reopening. Relying on Matter of Yadav and related precedent, the Board emphasized that equities acquired years after a final order of removal generally do not justify reopening, especially where the visa petition remains pending rather than approved. The motion to reopen was denied, and the stay request was denied as moot.

The full text of Matter of Herrera-Nunez can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1445651/dl?inline

Tenth Circuit Denies Equitable Tolling for Untimely Motion to Reopen

The Tenth Circuit has denied a petition for review of the BIA’s denial of an untimely motion to reopen. The Salvadoran petitioner sought reopening based on additional evidence, including the detention of his partner in El Salvador, and argued that equitable tolling should excuse the late filing.

The Court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that the petitioner failed to show due diligence or extraordinary circumstances. General assertions about detention, limited access to counsel, limited English, and limited legal resources were insufficient, particularly where the petitioner had previously pursued administrative and judicial review while pro se. The Court denied the petition, while granting in forma pauperis status.

The full text of Bonilla-Espinoza v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010111444458.pdf

First Circuit Remands Ineffective Assistance Claim After Missed BIA Briefing Deadline

The First Circuit has determined that the Board of Immigration Appeals abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner’s attorney missed the BIA briefing deadline in her appeal from the denial of adjustment of status. The BIA found that the petitioner had not complied with Lozada (though it did not specify how she failed to comply) and faulted the petitioner for not filing her brief with her motion to reopen (even the BIA had previously denied a motion for a late filed brief and returned the brief to counsel).

The Court denied the petition for review of the underlying adjustment denial, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of relief. However, the Court granted the petition as to reopening, finding that the BIA failed to explain its Lozada ruling, failed to address a substantial prejudice argument, and failed to account for the fact that the late brief had been before the Board at several points. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

The full text of Buckley v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/24-1957P-01A.pdf

Fifth Circuit Finds Father-in-Law's Arrest Was Not a Changed Country Condition

The Fifth Circuit has determined that a Salvadoran respondent's untimely motion to reopen did not qualify for the changed country conditions exception. The respondent argued that he faced increased danger in El Salvador after his father-in-law, an alleged former MS-13 official, was arrested and extradited to the United States, causing MS-13 to believe that the father-in-law had cooperated with the FBI.

The Court found that the father-in-law's arrest and extradition were changes in the respondent's personal circumstances, not changed country conditions in El Salvador. Although the respondent may now face greater danger, the danger flowed from a family-specific development, rather than from a material nationwide change in conditions. The Court also rejected the respondent's request for equitable tolling, finding that he did not establish that former counsel's alleged ineffectiveness prevented him from timely filing the motion to reopen.

The full text of Prado-Majano v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/25/25-60040-CV0.pdf

Seventh Circuit Finds that Number Bar Applies to MTR Based on Lack of Notice

The Seventh Circuit has determined that the statutory limitation permitting a non-citizen to file only one motion to reopen applies even if the subsequent motion to reopen is based on a lack of notice.

The full text of Coatl-Chiquito v. Blanche can be found here: https://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/OpinionsWeb/processWebInputExternal.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2026/D04-30/C:25-1233:J:Kolar:aut:T:fnOp:N:3533378:S:0

Ninth Circuit Finds that Soviet Citizen Acted Diligently in Seeking Post-Conviction Relief and Reopening

The Ninth Circuit has determined that an ethnic Armenian who entered the United States as a Soviet citizen acted diligently in seeking post-conviction relief within a few months of being notified that Armenia was accepting certain Soviet citizens and therefore, that she was in danger of being removed. “Contrary to the government’s position at oral argument, it is unreasonable to expect a ‘stateless’ individual to take affirmative steps to challenge removability when they do not face an immediate threat of removability.” “Instead, for individuals born during the Soviet era or who are otherwise deemed ‘stateless’ for purposes of removability, we hold that it is reasonable to expect that an individual will begin to take action to challenge removability only once that individual learns that they can be removed to a country and thus are no longer ‘stateless.’”

The full text of Eskilian v. Bondi can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/04/02/20-72157.pdf