These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
Viewing entries tagged
robbery
The Eighth Circuit has vacated a felon-in-possession sentence enhanced based on a prior Texas robbery conviction, holding that the offense does not qualify as a crime of violence because it can be committed with a reckless mental state.
The full text of United States v. Benavidez can be found here: https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/26/09/252497P.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a Trinidadian lawful permanent resident found ineligible for cancellation of removal based on a Florida robbery-by-sudden-snatching conviction, holding the offense categorically matches generic theft as an aggravated felony.
The Court held that generic theft requires only an intent to deprive someone with a superior possessory interest, not a title-owner, and that Florida's statute and standard jury instructions require exactly the same showing even where the direct victim is not the property's ultimate owner. The Court also held the statute's coverage of temporary as well as permanent deprivations does not create a mismatch, since generic theft likewise reaches less-than-permanent deprivations, and that the statute's requirement that the victim be unaware of or unwilling to permit the taking supplies the functional equivalent of a lack-of-consent element.
The full text of Ramdial v. U.S. Attorney General can be found here: https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202510093.pdf
The Seventh Circuit has vacated a felon-in-possession sentence enhanced based on a prior Indiana conspiracy-to-commit-armed-robbery conviction, holding that Indiana's conspiracy statute, which permits conviction even where the only other "conspirator" is an undercover agent, sweeps more broadly than the generic conspiracy offense incorporated into the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of a crime of violence.
Resolving a question left open in its earlier decision in United States v. Pemberton, the Court held that the generic meaning of "conspiring" must be assessed as of 1989, when the Sentencing Commission first added inchoate offenses to the crime-of-violence definition, and that federal law, a majority of states, and contemporaneous legal dictionaries all required a genuine, bilateral agreement at that time despite the Model Penal Code's earlier shift toward a unilateral approach. Because Indiana's statute does not require a genuine co-conspirator, the defendant's conviction cannot serve as a Guidelines crime-of-violence predicate.
The full text of United States v. Lloyd can be found here: https://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/OpinionsWeb/processWebInputExternal.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2026/D08-12/C:25-1967:J:Taibleson:aut:T:fnOp:N:3590005:S:0
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction for use of a firearm during robbery does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines. The Court was bound by its precedent holding that Virginia robbery can be committed by threats that do not necessarily require violent physical force.
The Court rejected the government’s argument that the firearm-use element cured the defect in the robbery predicate. Because the predicate offense still did not categorically require violent force, the Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. Although the case arose in the sentencing context, the categorical approach analysis may be useful in immigration cases involving Virginia robbery-related convictions.
The full text of United States v. Scott can be found here: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/254048.p.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has determined that North Dakota’s robbery statute matches the definition of an attempted theft aggravated felony, rejecting the claim that the statute covers crimes of deceit.
The full text of Banyee v. Bondi can be found here: https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/26/01/243590P.pdf
The Third Circuit has determined that a New Jersey robbery conviction does not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude under the pre-Diaz-Lizarraga standard because New Jersey’s definition of theft does not include an intent to permanently deprive others of their property. The Court further concluded that the force required to commit robbery is only that which is necessary to wrest the object from the victim, and does not require the infliction of any type of bodily harm.
The full text of Diaz Almanzar v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Seventh Circuit has determined that a Kentucky conviction for complicity to robbery in the first degree is a crime of violence. In so doing, the court concluded that Kentucky’s complicity statute is a categorical match for generic aiding-and-abetting liability; that Kentucky’s first-degree robbery statute requires sufficient force to overcome the victim’s will; and that the robbery statute requires that an individual use force with the specific intent to accomplish theft.
The full text of Mwendapeke v. Garland can be found here: https://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/OpinionsWeb/processWebInputExternal.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2023/D12-07/C:22-2383:J:Brennan:aut:T:fnOp:N:3140778:S:0
The Ninth Circuit has determined that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence because aiding and abetting is simply a form of accomplice liability and does not change that the statute involves the actual or threatened use of violent force.
The full text of United States v. Eckford can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/08/15/17-50167.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Virginia conviction for common law robbery does not qualify as a violent felony because it does not include an element of the use of violent force. Instead, it can be committed by threatening to accuse the robbery victim of committing sodomy.
The full text of US v. Williams can be found here:
The Fifth Circuit has determined that a Texas conviction for aggravated felony qualifies as either a theft aggravated felony, an attempted theft aggravated, or a crime of violence aggravated felony.
The full text of Rodriguez Gonzalez v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/22/22-60091-CV0.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that an Ohio robbery statute does not necessarily require the intentional infliction of violence force, and therefore, does not match the definition of a crime of violence. Specifically, the court noted that the reckless use of force can still result in injury to a victim.
The full text of US v. Butts can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/22a0163p-06.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that Hawaii’s second-degree robbery statute is divisible. Subsection (b), which requires the defendant to “threaten[] the imminent use of force against the person of anyone who is present with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property” matches the definition of a crime of violence.
The full text of US v. Tagatac can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/10/21-10133.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that Washington convictions for second degree robbery and attempted second degree robbery are not theft-related aggravated felonies because Washington defines accomplice liability in a broader fashion than federal law. The concurring opinion by Judge England suggests that no Washington conviction may qualify as an aggravated felony because of this overbroad definition of accomplice liability.
The full text of Alfred v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/09/22/19-72903.pdf
The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc in this case on 6/3/22:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/03/19-72903_enbanc_order.pdf
The Third Circuit has determined that a New Jersey conviction for second-degree robbery is a theft-related aggravated felony because the statute always requires that property be obtained without the owner’s voluntary and intelligent assent. Notably, the court includes various of forms of theft-by-deception in this definition of crimes committed without voluntary and intelligent assent.
The full text of K.A. v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has concluded that an Oregon conviction for third-degree robbery is not a theft aggravated felony because it incorporates consensual takings via theft by deception, and the force elements do not impose a requirement that the defendant engage in a nonconsensual taking. “Because it is possible to commit theft by deception with the consent of the owner, Oregon’s theft statute expressly includes conduct outside of the generic definition.” “A force element generally implies a lack of consent—the force can be used, for example, to overcome resistance or otherwise compel behaviors. But the statute here expressly contemplates that such force may be used to compel another person, rather than the property owner, to deliver the property or to engage in other conduct which might aid the commission of the theft.”
“Consequently, even with the additional robbery elements, the text of the statute expressly includes situations involving consensual takings. Under subsection (b), a defendant could be convicted if she threatened force against a third party to compel that third party to convince a property owner, by deception, to give the property to the defendant consensually. In that scenario, the property would have been taken with the consent of the owner, and the force used would not negate the owner’s consent because the force was used against a third party without the owner’s knowledge.”
“Similarly, under subsection (a), a defendant could be convicted if the taking was consensual (although deceptive), but force was used against a third party to prevent that person from retrieving the property right after it was received by the thief.”
The full text of Lopez-Aguilar v. Barr can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/01/28/17-73153.pdf
The Second Circuit has determined that a Connecticut first-degree robbery conviction qualifies as a crime of violence. It requires the threatened use of physical force because even the mere display of a firearm during a larceny or immediately thereafter necessarily implies a threat to commit violence.
The full text of Wood v. Barr can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has granted a motion for panel rehearing and withdrawn its opinion in Lopez-Aguilar v. Barr, in which it determined that an Oregon third-degree robbery conviction is a theft offense.
My original blog post on Lopez-Aguilar can be found here:
The order granting the motion for rehearing can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/08/29/17-73153.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for aiding and abetting simple robbery is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the statute requires the defendant to use the amount of force necessary to overcome a victim’s resistance. Given the similarity between the definition of a violent felony under the ACCA and a crime of violence in the immigration context, this decision could have persuasive value in immigration litigation.
The full text of Ward v. United States can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/09/03/17-35563.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that Ohio convictions for robbery and complicity to commit aggravated robbery are crimes of violence under the sentencing guidelines because they require the actual or threatened infliction of physical harm, which is defined as “any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration.” The court concluded that for “physical harm” to result, one must have deployed “physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury,” and thus a conviction under either statute qualified as a crime of violence. Given the similar definitions of a crime of violence in the sentencing law and the immigration law, this case could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of United States v. Johnson can be found here:
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/19a0182p-06.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has concluded that an Arkansas aggravated robbery conviction is a crime of violence because it requires sufficient force to overcome a victim’s resistance and does not criminalize mere snatching of property.
The full text of United States v. Smith can be found here:
