BIA Says IJs are not Required to Accept Stipulations

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that immigration judges are not required to accept stipulations by the parties. “Immigration Judges have broad discretion in conducting immigration proceedings and admitting and considering evidence. While an Immigration Judge may accept the parties’ stipulations in lieu of evidence, he or she is not required to do so. Nor is an Immigration Judge bound by parties’ stipulations as to the legal issue of whether a respondent has satisfied his or her burden of proof for relief or protection because legal stipulations cannot be binding.”

The full text of Matter of J-H-M-H can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1415986/dl?inline

Ninth Circuit Permits Adverse Credibility Determination based on Marriage Fraud

The Ninth Circuit has allowed an Immigration Judge to rely on an asylum applicant’s past marriage fraud to find his testimony regarding his asylum claim to be not credible.

The full text of Ani v. Bondi can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/10/16/24-2339.pdf

Third Circuit Remands Fear-Related Claims

The Third Circuit has remanded a Nigerian man’s fear-related claims, finding the agency failed to properly analyze the elements of conviction before concluding it was a particularly serious crime and finding that the agency failed to employ the proper CAT analysis.

The full text of Amos v. Attorney General can be found here:

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/222095p.pdf

Second Circuit Remands CAT Claim

The Second Circuit has remanded a tattooed Salvadoran man’s CAT claim, which the IJ had originally granted, finding the BIA gave insufficient justification under the clear error standard for disturbing the IJ’s decision.

The full text of Villalta Martinez v. Bondi can be found here:

https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/1cc5b830-c675-4753-8a34-321a78bedcdc/3/doc/24-115_opn.pdf

First Circuit Remands for Agency to Determine if Police Report is Corroborated

The First Circuit has remanded an adjustment of status case for the agency to determine if the record included any corroboration for the allegations contained in a police report related to conduct that did not result in a conviction.

The full text of Maurice v. Bondi can be found here:

https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/21-1395P-01A.pdf

BIA Rejects Perceived Group Membership as a Basis for Asylum

The Board of Immigration Appeals has rejected the concept of perceived membership as a particular social group, finding that there were be no circumstances in which the perceived members of a group would be socially distinct from the actual members of the group. “[P]erceived membership in a group cannot itself be a cognizable particular social group. Rather, the underlying group is the true particular social group, and where that underlying group as defined is not cognizable, the perceived group is also not cognizable.”

The full text of Matter of L-A-L-T- can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1415356/dl?inline

BIA Reverses Bond Grant to Non-Citizen Recently Convicted of Statutory Rape

The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the grant of bond to a non-citizen recently convicted of statutory rape and oral copulation with a 14-year-old girl. “The respondent’s behavior reflects a willingness and ability to manipulate vulnerable persons into engaging in unlawful conduct to meet his own desires and to do so at great harm to them.”

The full text of Matter of Cotrufo can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1415166/dl?inline

BIA Finds that NJ Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance Statute is Divisible

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that New Jersey’s possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance statute is divisible with respect to the identity of the controlled substance.

The full text of Matter of Frias Ulloa can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1415141/dl?inline

BIA Overturns CAT Grant to Uzbek National

The Board of Immigration Appeals has overturned a grant of protection under the Convention Against Torture to an Uzbek national despite evidence that he is likely to be detained upon arrival in Uzbekistan, finding that evidence of “ill treatment” and anecdotes of torture in Uzbek prisons were insufficient to show a clear probability of torture.

The full text of Matter of J-A- can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1415011/dl?inline

BIA Overturns Discretionary Grant of Cancellation of Removal to Long-Time LPR

The Board of Immigration Appeals has overturned the discretionary grant of cancellation of removal to a lawful permanent resident who accompanied a 14-year-old girl to buy cocaine and to sell Xanax.

The full text of Matter of MacDonald can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1414981/dl?inline

BIA Permits IJ to Pretermit Asylum Claim without Evidentiary Hearing

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that an Immigration Judge may pretermit an asylum claim without an evidentiary hearing if the facts of the claim are undisputed and do not make out prima facie eligibility for relief.

The full text of Matter of. H-A-A-V- can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1413846/dl?inline

BIA Finds that IJ Exceeded his Authority in Discretionary Grant of LPR Cancellation of Removal

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that an Immigration Judge exceeded his authority when he determined that the two children who accused the respondent of the indecent acts were actually not credible. The Board then overturned the discretionary grant, starting that the respondent had not admitted his wrongdoing and thus, had not established rehabilitation.

The full text of Matter of Garcia-Flores can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1413661/dl?inline

BIA Finds IJs Lack Jurisdiction to Grant Bond to Non-Citizens who are not Admitted

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that Immigration Judges lack jurisdiction to consider the bond request of a non-citizen who entered the United States without admission and who has been present in the United States for at least two years. “Under section 235, Congress created three different categories of applicants for admission. The first two categories are covered by section 235(b)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A). They include: (1) arriving aliens inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7), and (2) aliens not admitted or paroled into the United States who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7), and “who ha[ve] not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that [they] ha[ve] been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of determination of inadmissibility.” “The third category of applicants for admission subject to the inspection, detention, and removal procedures set forth in section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, are those aliens who are seeking admission and who an immigration officer has determined are ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’ INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). This category is a ‘catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by [section 235(b)(1)].’”

“The respondent provides no legal authority for the proposition that after some undefined period of time residing in the interior of the United States without lawful status, the INA provides that an applicant for admission is no longer ‘seeking admission,’ and has somehow converted to a status that renders him or her eligible for a bond hearing under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a).”

“Aliens, like the respondent, who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer. Remaining in the United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not constitute an ‘admission.’ Likewise, being arrested pursuant to a warrant and placed into removal proceedings does not constitute an admission. Therefore, just as Immigration Judges have no authority to redetermine the custody of arriving aliens who present themselves at a port of entry, they likewise have no authority to redetermine the custody conditions of an alien who crossed the border unlawfully without inspection, even if that alien has avoided apprehension for more than 2 years.”

The full text of Matter of Yajure Hurtado can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1413311/dl?inline

BIA Denies Bond due to Absence of Letter from Sponsor

The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that the Department of Homeland Security met its burden of proving a non-citizen was a flight risk because the non-citizen submitted contradictory proof of the residence of his sponsor and did not submit a statement from the sponsor. “The Immigration Judge also clearly erred in finding that the proposed sponsor has a fixed address in Hallandale, Florida. The documents provide three different addresses for the sponsor, two in Hallandale, Florida, and another in Hopatcong, New Jersey. The documentation for a residential lease in Hallandale, Florida, provides a different address than the bill for electric services in the same location. There is no explanation from either the respondent or the sponsor as to which of the multiple addresses, if any, is Mr. G-’s fixed address, and whether the respondent will be residing with him at the address upon release from custody. Further complicating this factual analysis is the submission of a different address in New Jersey, without clarification by the respondent or Mr. G-. Thus, the Immigration Judge clearly erred in finding that the sponsorship documents reflected that the sponsor has a fixed address in Hallandale, Florida, and that the respondent would reside with him there.”

The full text of Matter of Dobrotvorskii can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1413266/dl?inline

Attorney General Again Overrules Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of A-B- III

The Attorney General has again overruled Matter of A-R-C-G-, as well as Matter of A-B- III, undercutting protections for survivors of domestic violence. “Although there may be circumstances when a government’s failure to control private conduct itself amounts to persecution, A-B- I was entirely correct to treat those circumstances as few and far between.

The full text of Matter of S-S-F-M- can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1412696/dl?inline

Attorney General Overrules Caselaw on Family-Based PSGs

The Attorney General has published a decision overruling Matter of L-E-A III’s recognition of family-based particular social groups. Instead, a family unit will only be considered a valid social group if it is both particularized and socially distinct.

The full text of Matter of R-E-R-M & J-D-R-M can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1412686/dl?inline

Ninth Circuit Remands CAT Claim for Mexican National, Declines to Apply Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

The Ninth Circuit has remanded an application for protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing the “extreme violence against individuals on the basis of perceived gang affiliation, deportee status, indigenous heritage, mental illness, and substance abuse. Petitioner has all of these characteristics, each of which would independently place him at risk of torture if he were removed to Mexico.” In addition, the Court declined to dismiss the petition for review under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, citing the government’s delay of over two years from the petitioner’s missed appointment with ICE to the filing of the motion to dismiss and the government’s own evidence that the petitioner was likely in criminal custody, and thus, his whereabouts were likely known to the parties and the Court.

The full text of Uc Encarcion v. Bondi can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/09/30/22-1601.pdf

Ninth Circuit Imposes Additional Notice Requirements on the Government in Removal Proceedings

The Ninth Circuit has determined that when the government becomes aware that notice of an upcoming removal hearing has been ineffective (i.e., notice has been returned), it must take additional steps, when practicable, to provide notice to the non-citizen. In this case, the Court found that personal service of the Order to Show Cause - which did not contain the date and time of the first immigration court hearing - was not sufficient on its own. Furthermore, even if a non-citizen has failed to update his or her address with the immigration court, they have not forfeited their constitutional right to notice.

The Court also suggested certain practicable steps that the government could take when a notice of hearing is returned as undeliverable. “One alternative is to consider whether the address in the A-file matched the address to which the Government sent the notice of hearing by certified mail. The record indicates that, when the approval of Rivera-Valdes’s employment authorization application was sent to the Cleveland address that included ’Ave.,’ he showed up to retrieve his authorization papers. It was only after subsequent mailings were sent without the word ‘Ave.’ in the Cleveland address that the OSC and notice of hearing were returned as ‘not deliverable as addressed’ and ‘unclaimed.’ The district court should consider if any discrepancy in the addresses was a basis for the unsuccessful mailings, and if so, whether the Government could have taken additional steps to correct it.

The dissent concludes that remand is unnecessary because Rivera-Valdes ‘confirmed’ or ‘corroborated’ that the address listed on the OSC—which omitted the word ‘Ave.’—was his current address. But the dissent misreads what the OSC actually states. The OSC did not prompt Rivera-Valdes to confirm the accuracy of the OSC. Rather, the OSC’s signature line prompted Rivera-Valdes’s ‘acknowledgment/receipt of this form.’ This stands in contrast, for example, to the signature line in Rivera-Valdes’s application for employment authorization, which required that the signer ‘certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the foregoing is true and correct.”’ In that document, Rivera-Valdes listed his N. Cleveland address with the word ‘Ave.’”

“Another alternative for the district court to consider may be whether sending the notice of hearing by first-class mail was a feasible option. In Yi Tu, we observed that first-class mail may be a reasonably calculated alternative because it can ‘be examined at the end of the day, [whereas certified mail] can only be retrieved from the post office for a specified period of time.’”

The full text of U.S. v. Rivera-Valdes can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/09/18/21-30177.pdf

Ninth Circuit Determines that Oregon Conviction for Unlawful Use of a Weapon is not Crime of Violence

The Ninth Circuit has determined that an Oregon conviction for unlawful use of a weapon, even when coupled with an enhancement that specifies the weapon is a firearm, is not a crime of violence because it does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.

“ The firearm enhancement statute applies to ‘the use or threatened use of a firearm, whether operable or inoperable, by a defendant during the commission of a felony.’ Although this language requires the use or threatened use of a firearm, it does not, on its face, require the use or threatened use of a firearm ‘against the person of another.’”

The full text of United States v. Keast can be found here:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/09/10/24-1253.pdf

Seventh Circuit Indicates that Doctrine of Consular Nonreviewability May Apply to Decisions Made by Non-Consular Officials

The Seventh Circuit has indicated that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability made extend to findings of inadmissibility made by officials in the United States.

“Muñoz describes the doctrine as one under which ‘the action of an executive officer to admit or exclude an alien’ is not substantively reviewable. We applied the doctrine to a decision by a non-consular officer in Matushkina v. Nielsen, 877 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2017). How far the doctrine extends to visa revocations at a port of entry need not be resolved today; we flag this subject only to ensure that no one thinks that the doctrine has been confined inadvertently to decisions by the Department of State at consulates outside our borders.”

The full text of Dubey v. Department of Homeland Security can be found here:

https://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/OpinionsWeb/processWebInputExternal.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2025/D09-26/C:25-1207:J:Easterbrook:aut:T:fnOp:N:3430723:S:0