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BIA Issues Decision on Unlawful Voting

In Matter of Fitzpatrick, the Board of Immigrations Appeals (BIA) determined that unlawful voting by a lawful permanent resident could render the individual deportable, even if the person did not know she was committing an unlawful act by voting.  The BIA found that Fitzpatrick had violated a federal statute that did not require any specific intent - that is, it did not require the government to prove that Fitzpatrick intended to commit an unlawful act by voting, only that she actually voted and that she knew she was not a United States citizen.  Fitzpatrick tried to argue that she was exempt from the cited federal provision, but the BIA rejected her argument.

As states contemplate laws that automatically register people to vote when they apply for driver's licenses, this decision becomes all the more worrisome.  How many non-citizens, having been automatically registered to vote by the Department of Motor Vehicles and having received mail about where and when to vote, will unwittingly lose their immigration status by unlawfully voting?

The full decision in Matter of Fitzpatrick can be found here: 

http://www.justice.gov/file/3835pdf/download

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Fourth Circuit Issues Fantastic Gang-Related Family-Based Particular Social Group Decision

Maydai Hernandez-Avalos was a Salvadoran woman.  In 2007, her husband's cousin, Augustin, was murdered by members of the Mara 18 gang.  She identified the body at the medical forensic lab.  After Augustin's funeral, heavily armed gang members came to Hernandez's home and threatened to kill her if she identified Augustin's murderers to the police. 

A few months later, five members of the Mara 18 gang came to her home and told her that it was time for her 12-year-old son Kevin to join the gang.  When Hernandez refused, the gang members put a gun to her and threatened to kill her if she opposed Kevin's membership in the gang.  On a third occasion, members of the Mara 18 again pointed a gun at Hernandez and threatened to kill her if she did not allow Kevin to join the gang within one day.  Hernandez testified that she did not report these threats to the police because gang members often learn the identity of those who report them and then retaliate against those individuals.

The Immigration Judge denied Hernandez's application for asylum, finding that she had not demonstrated that she would suffer harm on account of a protected ground or that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to protect her.  The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed this decision.

The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Hernandez was threatened on account of her membership in the particular social group comprised of her nuclear family.  "Hernandez’s relationship to her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened with death if she did not allow him to join Mara 18, and the gang members’ demands leveraged her maternal authority to control her son’s activities.  The BIA’s conclusion that these threats were directed at her not because she is his mother but because she exercises control over her son’s activities draws a meaningless distinction under these facts."  The court rejected the Government's argument that Hernandez was persecuted because she interfered with the gang's recruitment activities. "Because any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that Hernandez’s maternal relationship to her son is at least one central reason for two of the threats she received, we hold that the BIA’s conclusion that these threats were not made 'on account of' her membership in her nuclear family is manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion."

With regard to the issue of government protection, the court noted that "Hernandez, whom the IJ found to be a credible witness, provided abundant evidence that the authorities would not have been responsive to such a report. Hernandez’s affidavit, in combination with the other evidence presented in this case, suggests that the police in her neighborhood may be subject to gang influence."

The full text of Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch can be found here: http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/141331.P.pdf

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First Circuit Addresses Whether a Conviction for Third-Degree Assault in Connecticut is an Aggravated Felony

Last week, the First Circuit addressed whether a conviction for third-degree assault in California could be properly characterized as a crime of violence under 8. U.S.C. section 16(a).  Both parties agreed that a conviction under this statute could not be a categorical match to the definition of a crime of violence because it criminalized reckless and negligent conduct, as well as intentional conduct.  In the instant case, the Third Circuit determined that use of the modified categorical approach was not appropriate because the record of conviction did not establish under which prong of the statute the petitioner had been convicted.  Moreover, the plea colloquy demonstrated that the petitioner disagreed with the prosecutor's version of events, making it even more unclear what conduct the conviction necessarily rested upon.  Thus, it could not determine if the conviction rested upon intentional conduct.  

The full text of Villanueva v. Holder can be found here: http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-1217P-01A.pdf

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Eleventh Circuit Weighs in on the Immigration Consequences of a Florida Conviction for Uttering False Instruments

The Seventh Circuit determined that a conviction under a Florida statute criminalizing uttering a false instrument necessarily entails a knowingly deceitful act, and thus, qualifies as a fraud-based aggravated felony if the crime resulted in a loss to the victim in excess of $10,000.  For the same reason, the conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude.

The full text of Walker v. Attorney General can be found here: http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201412814.pdf

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Seventh Circuit Reverses an Adverse Credibility Decision Premised on an Airport Interview Conducted in a Language that the Immigrant did not Speak Fluently

Nadmid is a native and citizen of Mongolia.  He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.  Though he testified consistently with his declaration and with the testimony of an expert witness, the Immigration Judge still found his testimony to lack credibility.  This determination was premised on inconsistencies between Nadmid's in-court testimony and his statements during an airport interview conducted in Russian. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting the indicia of unreliability in the transcript of the airport interview, which clearly reflected that Nadmid was not a fluent Russian speaker and was having difficulty communicating the with the interviewer.

The full text of Nadmid v. Holder can be found here: http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2015/D04-21/C:14-1477:J:Williams:aut:T:fnOp:N:1538268:S:0

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Fourth Circuit Addresses Jurisdiction over a Denied I-130; Declines to Transfer Case to District Court

Ashton Leblanc, a U.S. citizen, employed an attorney to help him secure citizenship for his son, who was born outside of the United States.  The attorney filed a family-based immigration petition (known as an I-130) on behalf of Ashton's son, Robert.  The I-130 was eventually denied for failure to submit the necessary documents and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial.  All along, the attorney assured Ashton that all was proceeding as planned.  Ashton eventually spoke to a second attorney, who called the first attorney to inquire about the status of the case.  Because the second attorney was satisfied that the first attorney had everything well in hand (clearly not the case given that the case had been denied), he reassured Ashton.  Finally, Ashton hired a third attorney who discovered the first attorney's blunder, and moved to reopen the petition at the Board of Immigration Appeals.  This motion was denied, and subsequently appealed to the Fourth Circuit.

The Fourth Circuit determined that it had no jurisdiction over a denied visa petition.  Ordinarily, such a denial should be transferred to a District Court for review.  However, the Fourth Circuit declined to do so, finding that the interests of justice would not be served, as Ashton's goal was to establish Robert's citizenship, and the approval of the I-130 would be of no benefit to that process.

The full text of Leblanc v. Holder can be found here: http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/132474.P.pdf

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The BIA Addresses Administrative Closure for a Pending Criminal Appeal

In Matter of Montiel, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that in certain circumstances, administrative closure of a pending immigration court proceeding may be proper when a respondent is appealing his criminal conviction.  The BIA found such action appropriate in Montiel's case, in part, because the conviction was what made him removable, and a reversal on appeal would mean that he was not removable as charged.  Notably, the motion for administrative closure had been joined by the Department of Homeland Security.  The BIA reiterated the case-by-case analysis required for a motion for administrative closure and reaffirmed the factors outlined in Matter of Avetisyan.

The full text of Matter of Montiel can be found here: http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol26/3834.pdf

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Attorney General Withdraws Matter of Silva-Trevino

Attorney General Holder has withdrawn the decision in Matter of Silva-Trevino.  Though this has little impact in certain jurisdictions (such as the Ninth Circuit) where circuit court decisions have essentially overruled Silva-Trevino, the withdraw of the decision may bring some uniformity in the minority jurisdictions that were still following the decision.  Attorney General Holder has asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to create a new framework for determining how to evaluate whether a conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude.

The full text of the Attorney General's withdrawal of the decision can be found here: http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/AG-Order-Vacating-Silva-Trevino-2015.pdf

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Sixth Circuit Affirms Civil Denaturalization Finding

This week, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a District Court's order denaturalizing a man who obtained his lawful permanent residence through a sham marriage.  Notably, the immigrant failed to appear at the denaturalization hearing and presented no witnesses in his defense.  The government presented the testimony of his ex-wife (with whom he entered into a sham marriage) and several of her friends, who testified that the couple never lived together, that the U.S.-citizen spouse continued dating other people, and that the couple planned to divorce before they married.

The full text of US v. Al-Sibai: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0273n-06.pdf

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Fourth Circuit Addresses Eligibility for Cancellation of Removal for Non-Lawful Permanent Residents

The Fourth Circuit addressed whether an immigrant who had never been admitted to the United States, and who had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude that was punishable by no more than 1 year of imprisonment, could invoke the "petty offense" exception to qualify for cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents.  Deferring to the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in Matter of Cortez, the court determined that the immigrant was statutorily barred from seeking cancellation of removal.

The court noted that the cancellation of removal statute, unlike other statutes (i.e. cancellation of removal for battered spouses) refers to convictions that arise under section 237(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude that are punishable by at least 1 year imprisonment), as opposed to convictions that render an individual deportable under this section.  Thus, the fact that an individual has never been admitted, and thus, could never be charged with deportability under section 237(a)(2) of the INA, is irrelevant.  A crime involving moral turpitude punishable by 1 year imprisonment would still arise under section 237(a)(2) of the INA, and thus, render an immigrant (whether admitted or not) ineligible for cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents.

The full text of Hernandez v. Holder can be found here: http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/141148.P.pdf

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Eighth Circuit Addresses Particular Social Group Comprised of Individuals who Cooperate with ICE

Martinez-Galarza was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and pressured into giving them information about his nephew.  ICE later used this information to deport his nephew.  Martinez-Galarza applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.  His asylum and withholding of removal applications were based on his membership in the social group of consisting of "people who have provided information to ICE to enable that organization to remove individuals residing illegally in the United States" as well as a member of a second social group consisting of "witnesses for ICE." 

The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal, finding that any harm that Martinez-Galarza's nephew would inflict on him would be because of a personal vendetta, and not because of his membership in the proposed social groups.  

The full text of Martinez-Galarza v. Holder can be found here: http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/15/04/141436P.pdf

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Second Circuit Addresses Whether Misprision of a Felony is a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude

In 2006, in Matter of Robles-Urrea, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted the rational of an 11th Circuit decision and held that misprision of felony is a crime involving moral turpitude.  In 2012, the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA's decision in Robles-Urrea v. Holder.  The Second Circuit, faced with the question of whether a federal conviction for misprision of a felony, determined that remand to the BIA was necessary, to allow it to issue a precedential decision addressing the Ninth Circuit's more recent decision.  The remand would promote uniformity in the interpretation of the immigration laws.

The court also addressed whether the BIA's decision in Matter of Robles-Urrea, which was issued after the petitioner had been convicted, could be retroactively applied to her, given that the BIA, prior to the petitioner's conviction, had issued a precedential decision in Matter of Sloan determining that misprision of a felony was not a crime involving moral turpitude.  Whether an 14 agency decision may permissibly be applied retroactively is determined by looking at five 15 factors: (1) whether the case is one of first impression, (2) whether the new rule presents an abrupt departure from well-established practice or merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the degree of the burden which a retroactive order places on a party, and (5) the statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the old standard. 

The court determined that the first and fourth factors clearly favored the petitioner.  As to the other three factors, the court determined that the BIA should have the opportunity to address them in the first instance.  With regard to the second factor, the court observed that the BIA needed to address  whether its holding in Matter of Robles-Urrea was a departure from prior law.  As to the third factor, the court asked the BIA to consider whether a defendant should automatically be assumed to have relied on existing rules limiting deportation at the time she pled guilty to a crime where that guilty plea, because of a change in rules, subsequently becomes a basis for deporting her.  As to both the second and third factors, the court invited the BIA "should it find that these factors do not automatically favor the petitioner in a case such as this, to consider (A) whether Ms. Lugo in fact had notice that her guilty plea could lead to deportation, (B) whether she relied on the prior rule that it could not, and (C) whether such reliance was reasonable."  Finally, with respect to the fifth factor, the court invited the BIA to "consider the extent of the statutory interest in applying its ruling in Robles-Urrea retroactively to Ms. Lugo’s conviction and thus 16 rendering her ineligible for cancellation of removal."

This is a fabulous decision! Too often, immigrants plead guilty to crimes, only to have the immigration consequences of their convictions become much most severe at a later date.  The Second Circuit's decision recognizes, at least in certain narrow circumstances, that the retroactive application of this change in law may not be permissible.

The full text of Lugo v. Holder can be found here: http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/75856644-1af6-4927-a07b-549600bd0604/1/doc/13-1484_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/75856644-1af6-4927-a07b-549600bd0604/1/hilite/

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AAO Interprets Marriage Fraud Bar in 204(c) for an Employment-Based Visa Beneficiary

In Matter of Christo's, Inc., a restaurant sought to sponsor a cook for his permanent residence.  The beneficiary was also the beneficiary of a marriage-based petition.  However, he claimed that the marriage certificate submitted with that petition was false, and that he had never married or met the other party named in the certificate.  United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) revoked the previously approved employment-based petition, finding that the beneficiary had engaged in a fraudulent marriage for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit, and thus, was barred from being the beneficiary of any immigrant petition, such as the one submitted by the sponsoring employer.  The beneficiary's adjustment of status application was also denied.  Initially, the AAO agreed that the marriage fraud barred applied.

Upon additional review, the AAO determined that the marriage fraud bar was not implicated.  "An alien who submits false documents representing a nonexistent or fictitious marriage, but who never either entered into or attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage, may intend to evade the immigration laws, but is not, by such act alone, considered to have 'entered into' or attempted or conspired to enter into' a [fraudulent] marriage."  Such conduct, may, however, render an individual inadmissible for making a material misrepresentation for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit.

The full text of Matter of Cristo's, Inc. can be found here: http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol26/3831.pdf 

 

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AAO Construes "Doing Business" Requirement for Immigrant Multinational Managers and Executives

Another milestone, folks - the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) was busy this week and I'm blogging a lot about employment-based immigration (which is clearly a deviation from the norm!)  Now I will take up the AAO's decision in Matter of Leacheng International, Inc.

Certain multi-national executives and managers can apply for permanent residence if in the 3 years preceding the time of the executive/manager's application for classification and admission into the United States, he has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and the he seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive.  The implementing regulations require that the employer have been doing business for at least one year and define "doing business" as "the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or services by a firm, corporation, or other entity and does not include the mere presence of an agent or office."

In the instant case, the employer was essentially acting as an intermediary between a foreign subsidiary of its parent corporation and buyers and suppliers in the United States.  The District Director determined that the employer was not doing business because it was not transacting directly with an unaffiliated third party.  The AAO disagreed, finding that the fact that an employer "serves as an agent, representative, or liaison between a related foreign entity and its United States customers does not preclude a finding that it is doing business as defined in the regulations."  Since the petitioning company "established that it provides services to its foreign affiliate by marketing the foreign entity’s products, locating buyers, maintaining relationships with customers, and facilitating the completion of sales contracts and shipping arrangements in the United States," it had demonstrated that it was doing business.  The AAO sustained the petitioner's appeal.

The full text of Matter of Leacheng International can be found here: http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol26/3830.pdf

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AAO Issues Precedent Decision on Material Changes in an H-1B Worker's Employment

Today is a milestone - my first blog post about case law affecting nonimmigrant employment-based visas - hold your breath, folks and let's see if I can adequately explain the Administrative Appeals Office's (AAO) decision in Matter of Simeio Solutions.

The beneficiary was approved for H-1B status for work performed in Long Beach, California.  After a few months, he traveled to India an sought an H-1B visa at the consulate.  Upon further investigation, the consulate determined that the beneficiary was providing services outside the scope of the original petition.  It notified United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), who conducted a site visit to the beneficiary's workplace in Long Beach.  There, USCIS learned that the beneficiary was actually working from Camarillo, California and Hoboken, New Jersey.  Both of these locations were outside the geographic area covered the original labor certification filed in support of the H-1B petition.  USCIS determined that the changes in the beneficiary's places of employment constituted a material change to the terms and conditions of employment as outlined in the original petition.  

On appeal, the AAO agreed with USCIS's position, noting that the prevailing wage the employer was required to pay differed in the three geographic areas, and that the beneficiary's current salary did not meet the prevailing wage requirements in Camarillo or Hoboken.  As such, this change in locale required the filing of an amended petition along with a new labor certification.

You can find the full text of Matter of Simeio Solutions here: http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol26/3832.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Addresses a Hawaii Conviction for Second-Degree Escape

In the context of a federal criminal sentencing hearing, the Ninth Circuit determined that Hawaii's second-degree escape statute is not a crime of violence.  The statute does not include an element of the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, and does not present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.  

 

The full text of US v. Simmons can be found here: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/04/03/11-10459.pdf

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First Circuit Issues Tough Decision on Alien Smuggling

Dimova was a lawful permanent resident.  She worked at a hospital with a man named Mihaylov at a hospital in North Carolina.  Mihaylov eventually moved to Canada.  Later, he asked Dimova to help him by driving his family from Canada to the United States; he cited a back problem as the reason he couldn't make the long drive himself.  As the group approached the border, Mihaylov and his wife tried to leave the car and implored Dimova to use certain documents to get their child across the border where she could pick them up.  Dimova refused, and left all three Mihaylovs in Canada, before driving the car across the border.  After re-entering the United States, she became concerned for the well-being of Mihaylov's small child, and proceeded to the rendezvous point on the United States side of the border.  Subsequently, they were all apprehended by Border Patrol officers, and Dimova was charged with removability for alien smuggling.  Though recognizing the untenable position that MIhaylov placed Dimova in with respect to the safety of the small child, and recognizing that Dimova did not intend to engage in alien smuggling while in Canada, the Immigration Judge found that Dimova's act of picking the Mihaylovs up at the rendezvous point constituted encouragement, inducement, or assistance in alien smuggling.  The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, concluding that by returning for and picking up the Mihaylovs, all the while knowing they had entered the United States illegally, Dimova affirmatively assisted the Mihaylovs' illegal entry.

On appeal, the First Circuit agreed that Dimova did nothing in Canada to encourage, induce, assist, aid, or abet the Mihaylovs' crossing.  Nevertheless, the Court found that the Mihaylovs had not completed their entry into the United States at the time Dimova picked them up.  "Although there is no evidence showing the Mihaylovs were under surveillance from the time they crossed the border to the moment of their arrest mere hours later, the record demonstrates the Mihaylovs did not exercise their free will in any meaningful way after their physical crossing. The only thing the Mihaylovs did in the United States was wait overnight, in a remote wooded area, for Dimova to pick them up. All told, they were in the United States for a matter of hours, just a walk from the border, before Dimova rendered the assistance necessary for them to move forward with their effort to enter the country without apprehension.  Moreover, the group's apprehension occurred in Vermont, long before they arrived at their planned end-destination in North Carolina. Accordingly, we can not say on these facts that the Mihaylovs' entry was complete at the time Dimova came back for them."

The court declined to establish any bright-line rules for when an entry is complete, instead confining its ruling to the facts before it.  

The full text of Dimova v. Holder can be found here: http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/13-1550P-01A.pdf

 

 

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Second Circuit Dismisses Petition for Review of Denied CAT Claim; Finds that Petitioner did not Raise Colorable Constitutional Claim or Question of Law

Ortiz-Franco requested protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on the ground that members of La Mara Salvatrucha street gang (“MS‐13”) would torture and kill him because of information he provided to federal prosecutors.  The Immigration Judge denied his application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed.  On appeal to the Second Circuit, Ortiz-Franco argued that the Board erred in concluding that he did not show the requisite likelihood of torture or that any torture by gang members would occur with the acquiescence of Salvadoran government.  

Unfortunately, because Ortiz-Franco had been found removable based on criminal grounds, the Second Circuit's jurisdiction was limited to review of constitutional claims and questions of law.  The court noted that its past case law on this jurisdictional issue was unclear, but firmly concluded (for the first time) that its jurisdiction was circumscribed to constitutional issues and questions of law because of Ortiz-Franco's crime-based removability.  The court then concluded that Ortiz-Franco's appeal was merely a challenge to the Immigration Judge's fact-finding, and did not raise a constitutional claim or a question of law.

The full text of Ortiz-Franco v. Holder can be found here: http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/8520df4d-9fbc-42ec-8620-41b090e80b0a/2/doc/13-3610_complete_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/8520df4d-9fbc-42ec-8620-41b090e80b0a/2/hilite/ 

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Seventh Circuit Reverses Denial of a Motion to Reopen based on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner Chen applied for asylum on the basis of the harm he had suffered for violating China's One Child Policy.  At issue (among other things) was whether Chen, in fact, had two children.  At the request of his first attorney, Ming, he requested  birth certificates from china for both children.  A forensic document analysis determined that his son's birth certificate was fraudulent.  According to Chen, Ming did not inform him of his, but instead told him that certificate was useless and he needed another one.  Though he knew that a genuine certificate was not available in China for his son because his illegal birth was never registered, Chen asked his father in China to send another birth certificate for his son.  A forensic analysis determined that this certificate, too, was fraudulent.  At that point, Chen hired a new attorney (Zhang).  The Immigration Judge denied Chen's application.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed that decision.

Chen then retained new counsel and moved the Board to reopen based on Ming and Zhang’s ineffective assistance.  In a detailed brief, Chen methodically argued that each inconsistency or deficiency identified by the IJ could be attributed to his counsel’s incompetence, including a translation error in his application that Ming acknowledged making.  Chen also argued that Ming’s negligence misled him into submitting the fraudulent birth certificates because she never explained to him that the government was questioning the authenticity of his son’s birth certificate.  The Board denied the motion.  Although it agreed that the attorneys had behaved in a substandard manner and that Chen had complied with all of the procedural requirements to support a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel, it determined that he could not establish the requisite prejudice.  It focused exclusively on the submission of the two fraudulent birth certificates, essentially concluding that Chen had doomed himself by submitting them.  

On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Chen prevailed.  The court recognized that the Board's decision could be interpreted in two ways, both of which required remand.  

One possibility was that the Board "ruled that because [Chen] knew that his son’s birth certificates were fraudulent, his claim necessarily fails regardless of his attorneys’ representation.  If that is the correct reading of the Board’s decision, then its reasoning is erroneous.  A finding that an applicant knowingly offered fraudulent evidence allows an IJ to find an applicant not credible, but it does not require an adverse credibility ruling or compel the IJ to deny the claim solely based on the fraudulent submission."  Notably, the IJ had not actually rendered an adverse credibility determination in Chen's case!

The second possibility is that the "Board ruled that because Chen knowingly submitted false birth certificates, he did not corroborate the heart of his claim, and therefore, lacking this essential corroboration, Chen would have lost even with competent counsel.  But if the Board ruled that Chen must lose because he lacks corroboration, its ruling is procedurally flawed because it ignores Chen’s main argument in his motion to reopen: the IJ required corroboration only because his attorneys ineptly caused the IJ to find Chen’s testimony inconsistent.  If his attorneys had properly presented his testimony, Chen explains, any inconsistencies might have vanished, and the IJ might have found his testimony, standing alone, sufficient to carry his burden without the need for corroboration."  The Seventh Circuit deemed this a potentially meritorious argument, and found that the Board failed to adequately consider it.

The full text of Chen v. Holder can be found here: http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2015/D04-01/C:14-2411:J:PerCuriam:aut:T:fnOp:N:1527153:S:0

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Third Circuit Reverses BIA's CAT Denial for Indian Woman who Engaged in an Inter-caste Marriage

The Third Circuit was on a roll this week with interesting unpublished cases.  Rita Bhatt, a citizen of Indian, sought protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) based on the torture she feared at the hands of her family because she had married a man from another caste.  The Immigration Judge granted her application, but the BIA reversed, finding insufficient evidence that the Indian government would acquiescence in any torture.  The BIA noted that Bhatt had never reported her family's abuse to the police (she testified that to do so would be fruitless because she could afford to bribe the police and the police would not get involved in what they considered to be a family dispute).  The BIA cited country conditions reports noting the Indian government's attempts to mitigate the stigma of the caste system, but ignored the Immigration Judge's determination that India had a long history of failing to protect women and that the Indian government remains “apathetic to the point of maintaining a de facto policy of discrimination and violence against women.” 

The Third Circuit reversed, criticizing the BIA for applying the wrong legal standard.  "The BIA here appears simply to have ignored the evidence that was before the IJ.  In reviewing the country conditions, the BIA focused on the government’s official policies—as set forth in India’s Constitution, and the 'instructions' of the Supreme Court—while largely ignoring the IJ’s findings regarding the evidence of actual country conditions . . . And in reviewing Bhatt’s testimony, the BIA concluded that Bhatt’s failure to give the police the opportunity to respond to her past torture materially undermined her case but did not address Bhatt’s testimony explaining her reasons for declining to report her abuse, which the IJ found credible.  The BIA’s conclusions are in conflict with what we and other courts have said are appropriate considerations in determining whether a government will likely acquiesce in a petitioner’s torture . . . While evidence that a petitioner did notify police, and they did nothing, can support the claim, specific knowledge by the government need not be shown.  Rather, willful blindness may be proven by other evidence, which may include testimony like petitioner offered here as to her reasons for declining to report. The BIA did not take issue with the IJ’s credibility finding concerning this or other aspects of the petitioner’s testimony, yet it failed to acknowledge, much less discuss, that evidence before concluding the IJ clearly erred.  Perhaps the more fundamental flaw in the BIA’s analysis was its focus on government efforts rather than actual conduct, i.e., the results of those efforts . . . A government’s policies to root out torturous activity are also not dispositive of the issue of whether such torturous activity occurs with acquiescence.  We conclude that the BIA misapplied the clear evidence standard of review and misconstrued what determines “acquiescence”—i.e., actual conditions and conduct that would be present and occur rather than dogma or court “instructions” that amount to no more than the government’s position or efforts—and, thus, erred in applying the law to the facts."

This insightful analysis may be useful to practitioners facing seemingly positive government steps to protect citizens that are starkly different than the actual country conditions reported by a client.

The full text of Bhatt v. Att'y General can be found here: http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/141485np.pdf

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