These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
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The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that the language of a state conviction and an asserted ground of deportability (in this case, a controlled substance violation) should be compared as they were written at the time of the non-citizen’s conviction. Thus, any post-conviction revisions to the Controlled Substance Act were not relevant to whether the non-citizen was deportable.
The full text of Matter of Dor can be found here:
https://www.justice.gov/d9/2025-03/4088.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that a declaration is not a required component of an asylum application, and as such, an Immigration Judge may not deem an asylum application abandoned for failure to file a declaration.
“This does not mean that Immigration Judges cannot require an applicant to submit a declaration, or that an applicant can disregard a directive from an Immigration Judge to file one. Immigration Judges may require applicants to submit declarations in support of asylum applications, and to do so within a specified time, just as they have the authority to direct submission of briefs, evidence, and other papers, and to set and enforce deadlines for doing so. However, a declaration supplements an asylum application without forming a constituent part of it. Therefore, the remedy for failing to file one when so directed is limited to the declaration (or other supplemental document) itself. If a supplemental document is not timely filed, the opportunity to file it is waived. In some instances, the failure to file a document may be dispositive. But the effect of an absent declaration or other supplemental document goes to the merits of the application, not its completeness.”
The full text of Matter of C-A-R-R- can be found here:
The Eleventh Circuit has found that federal courts lack jursidiction to review USCIS’s policy of deferring adjudication of an adjustment of application when the underlying visa category has retrogressed. “We conclude that the challenged USCIS action here—delaying the grant of Form I-485 applications when the Department of State indicates that annual visa limits have been reached—falls within § 1255(a)’s statutory grant of discretion. And challenges to that delay are barred by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).”
The full text of Kanapuram v. Director, USCIS can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202312826.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that the agency may permissibly render an adverse credibility determination when an asylum claim presents not only similar factual circumstances to multiple other cases, but nearly identifical word choice and narrative structure. “The upshot is that the linguistic, narrative, and factual similarities between Singh’s declaration and the declarations presented by DHS go beyond mere coincidence and cannot be explained away by the fact that these petitioners lived in similar situations in India. At a minimum, the IJ could so reasonably conclude. The narratives are nearly identical and, in some instances, are delivered with word-for-word repetition.”
The full text of Singh v. Bondi can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/17/23-1247.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has rejected a non-citizen’s argument that she is not deportable for a controlled substance violation because the North Dakota statute in effect at the time of her conviction included hemp in the definition of marijuana while the federal definition in effect at the time of her removal proceedings excluded hemp. The Court also rejected the argument that the North Dakota definition of marijuana is overbroad as compared to the federal definition because the federal definition includes only “all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L.,” while the North Dakota definition is not limited to a specific species, finding that the federal definition of cannabis extended to all “marihuana-producing Cannabis.”
The full text of Salinas v. Bondi can be found here: https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/25/03/232779P.pdf
The First Circuit has remanded a cancellation of removal case, finding that the agency failed to evaluate how the qualifying relative’s specific learning disabilities would influence the hardship he would suffer if his parents were deported.
The full text of Duarte de Martinez v. Bondi can be found here:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/24-1057P-01A.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a Washington conviction for first-degree child molestation is a categorical match to the definition of abusive sexual conduct involving a minor for federal sentencing purposes because it involves sexual touching with minors under twelve years old. Given the alignment between the definition of abusive sexual conduct for sentencing purposes and a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony, this case will have impact on immigration proceedings as well.
The full text of U.S. v. Thompson can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/02/10/23-2288.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a petitioner’s A number is sufficient identification in a petition for review to comply with the federal rules of appellate procedure. “These ‘A’ numbers are not generic terms referencing unknown and potentially unidentifiable individuals, such as the procedural titles listed in the text of Rule 15, but rather correspond to specific persons who have raised claims before the agency for adjudication and whose names are readily available in the government’s own records, including BIA orders which must be submitted to this court with the petition for review under Ninth Circuit Rule 15-4. “
The full text of Perez-Perez v. Bondi can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/02/10/23-4240.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that the Roma are a disfavored ethnic group in Romania for asylum and withholding of removal purposes. The Court also reaffirmed that shootings, attempted kidnappings, and attempted rapes are all forms of physical harm that almost always rise to the level of persecution.
The full text of Lapadat v. Bondi can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/02/12/23-1745.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that an Oregon conviction for first degree criminal mistreatment is a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires knowingly depriving a dependent of basic care.
The Court also found that an Oregon conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon is overbroad as compared to a deportable firearms offense because the statute criminalizes possession of antique firearms. However, the statute is divisible between various subsections, some of which do not involve antique firearms. These subsections match the definition of a deportabel firearms offense.
The Court also overruled its prior precedent that a grant of SIJS constitutes an admission for cancellation of removal purposes.
The full text of Murillo-Chavez v. Bondi can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/02/13/21-1422.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that the agency’s hardship determinations related to an unlawful presence waiver (212(a)(9)(B)(v)) and a fraud waiver (212(i)) are not reviewable by a federal court. Unlike the hardship determination for a cancellation of removal case, which is a mixed question of fact and law, hardship determinations related to these waivers are committed exclusively to the Attorney General.
The full text of Rahman v. Bondi can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0058p-06.pdf
The Third Circuit has determined that the substantial evidence standard applies to a federal court’s review of the agency’s hardship finding in a cancellation of removal case.
The full text of Wilkinson v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Second Circuit has determined that Homeland Security may not parole a returning lawful permanent resident based solely on pending charges for a crime involving moral turpitude. “Here, we are presented with the question of whether DHS may parole an LPR at the border who has been charged with – but not yet convicted of – a CIMT. In analyzing this question, we heed Centurion’s holding that an LPR becomes an alien applying for admission for purposes of section 1101(a)(13)(C) upon the commission, rather than the conviction, of a crime. But we are also cognizant of the reality that, without a conviction, DHS will be hard pressed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the LPR actually committed the crime in question at the time of reentry. If DHS fails to sustain its burden of proving otherwise, the default presumption governs that an LPR is not an applicant for admission”
“Critically, the INA does not provide that an LPR may be treated as seeking admission when he has been ‘charged with a crime’ or is ‘believed to have committed a crime;’ it permits such treatment only when an LPR ‘has committed’ a crime. And because DHS bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a returning [LPR] is to be regarded as seeking an admission, we do not see how charging documents alone – without more – could carry DHS’s burden of demonstrating that a crime had been committed at the time of an LPR’s reentry.”
The full text of Lau v. Bondi can be found here:
The Second Circuit has remanded the asylum claim of a Chinese national who was detained and beaten for protesting government housing demolition policies. The Court was unpersuaded by the agency’s conclusion that the petitioner was the target of a legitimate prosecution, rather prosecution, when he had not been charged with any crime.
The full text of Tian v. Bondi can be found here:
The Second Circuit has determined that a New York conviction for second degree attempted assault under NYPL 120.05(7) is a crime of violence because it requires physical force causing injury to another person. Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence for immigration and criminal sentencing purposes, this case will likely be treated as precedential for immigration purposes as well.
The full text of U.S. v. Cooper can be found here:
The Second Circuit has determined that an Immigration Judge must “explain the adequacy of the safeguards implemented with reference to the character, scope, and severity of the noncitizen’s disabilities.” “Without reference to the character, scope, and severity of the incompetency to proceed absent safeguards, a [reviewing] court is stymied in its ability to evaluate the adequacy of the chosen safeguards.”
“Faced with substantial evidence of disabilities supporting the possibility that Reid was incompetent to continue without safeguards, the IJ did implement a number of safeguards. But the BIA erred in accepting her conclusory assertion, without supporting discussion, that the adopted safeguards were adequate. The record provides no support for that conclusion; it may well have been that additional safeguards to protect Reid’s rights and privileges should have been considered. For our purposes, because the IJ gave no consideration to the character, scope, and severity of Reid’s disabilities, she deprived a reviewing court of the ability to assess the adequacy of the chosen safeguards.”
The full text of Reid v. Bondi can be found here:
The First Circuit has determined that Homeland Security must prove alienage by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence, and that this standard is higher than “clear and convincing” evidence.
The full text of Rosa v. Bondi can be found here:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/24-1240P-01A.pdf
The First Circuit has determined that the Board of Immigration Appeals does not have a settled course of granting motions to reopen filed by former lawful permanent residents who have successful vacated the convictions that underpined their removal orders.
The full text of Phimmady v. Bondi can be found here:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/24-1330P-01A.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has issued what I can only characterize as an absurd decision regarding a California vacatur order. The order cited California Penal Code sections 1016.5 and 1473.7 as the basis for the plea withdraw. Penal Code section 1016.5 is the code section that requires criminal courts to provide immigration warnings to defendants taking plea deals. I have never heard a single immigration official question that vacaturs under this code section are viable for immigration purposes. Penal Code section 1473.7, as the BIA noted, has three bases for vacatur: 1) an error resulting in a failure to meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of a plea; 2) evidence of actual innocence; and 3) a plea or sentence entered as a result of racial, ethnic, or national origin discrimination. The BIA complained that the respondent in this matter obtained an order that specified vacatur under sections 1016.5 and 1473.7, but did not specify which subsection of 1473.7. Though it acknowledged that subsection (a)(1) (failure to understand the immigration consequences) is cognizable for immigration purposes, it implied that vacaturs for actual innocence or racial discrimination might not be vacaturs due to “legal or procedural errors.” The BIA wholesale ignored the reference to section 1016.5 in the vacatur order.
It’s overall a bad decision, with very poor legal analysis. I am hopeful it will be overturned on appeal. In the meantime, lawyer friends, make sure you add that “(a)(1)” to the end of your vacatur orders.
The full text of Matter of de Jesus-Platon can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/d9/2025-02/4086_0.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has narrowed the instances in which two crimes involving moral turpitude will be considered part of the same scheme. The BIA has said that crimes that immediately follow one another are not necessarily part of the same scheme - in this case, the non-citizen was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and failure to render aid when he hit pedestrians with his car and kept driving. Rather, crimes will only be arising out of a single scheme if: 1) one crime is a lesser offense of the other; 2) he defendant performs a single act that concurrently harms multiple victims in essentially the same way (i.e., robbing multiple people at once); or 3) are acts that occur within a comparatively short time of each other, involve the same parties, and the first act or acts are committed for the purpose of making possible the specific criminal objective accomplished by the last of the criminal acts (i.e., assaulting a guard to commit a larceny).
The full text of Matter of Baeza-Galindo can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/d9/2025-02/4085.pdf
