Fourth Circuit Affirms Habeas Jurisdiction Over Georgetown Scholar's Detention Challenge

The Fourth Circuit has affirmed a district court's exercise of habeas jurisdiction over the detention challenge brought by Dr. Badar Khan Suri, a Georgetown postdoctoral scholar detained by ICE and rapidly transferred across four detention facilities in multiple states after the Secretary of State determined that his social media activity concerning Gaza posed foreign policy consequences.

The Court held that the unknown-custodian exception and the exception drawn from Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Rumsfeld v. Padilla both independently supported jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Virginia, given the government's rapid and largely undisclosed movement of Suri and the district court's unchallenged findings of forum manipulation. The Court further held that none of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), 1252(b)(9), or 1252(a)(5) stripped the district court of jurisdiction, reasoning that Suri's detention and due process claims were legally distinct from, and did not arise from, the government's decision to commence removal proceedings, and expressly declining to follow the Third Circuit's contrary approach in Khalil v. President, United States.

The full text of Suri v. Trump can be found here: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/251560.P.pdf

Fourth Circuit Holds Deferred Enforced Departure Is Not an Admission "In Any Status"

The Fourth Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a Salvadoran woman seeking cancellation of removal, holding that her 1994 reentry as a beneficiary of Deferred Enforced Departure did not count as an admission "in any status" for purposes of the seven-year continuous residence requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2), even though the immigration officer stamped her passport "Admitted."

The Court held that "status" in the INA is a term of art denoting membership in a congressionally defined immigration classification, and that DED, a purely discretionary act of executive forbearance, creates no such classification. Splitting from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the majority reasoned that "any status" broadens the range of qualifying statuses but does not dispense with the requirement that some status exist at all, and that her earlier Temporary Protected Status had already expired by the time of her 1994 reentry.

The full text of Montesinos Cisneros v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/231090.P.pdf

Fourth Circuit Denies Asylum Where Gang Extorted Petitioner as Part of Generalized Recruitment

The Fourth Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a Guatemalan man who fled after MS-13 members assaulted him and demanded extortion payments, threatening to recruit him because he could not pay. He sought asylum based on membership in social groups of Guatemalan youths and youths who resist gang recruitment.

The Court held that substantial evidence supported the agency's finding that the gang targeted the petitioner for money and to grow its ranks generally, not because of his age or his resistance to recruitment specifically, since his own testimony described an indiscriminate extortion scheme applied to everyone in the gang's territory. The Court explained that a general country-conditions report on gang recruitment of youth could not compel a contrary, petitioner-specific finding of nexus, and separately upheld the denial of CAT protection based on evidence that Guatemalan police make genuine efforts to combat gang violence.

The full text of Flores-Turcios v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/241338.P.pdf

Fourth Circuit Finds Due Process Violation Where Immigration Court Refused Timely VAWA Filing

The Fourth Circuit has granted a petition for review filed by a Jamaican domestic violence survivor whose motion to reopen removal proceedings under VAWA was denied as untimely, even though his attorney had tried to file it on the deadline both electronically and in person, only to be turned away each time by the immigration court itself.

The Court held that the INA's grant of a statutory right to file a motion to reopen creates a protected liberty interest, and that the record compelled the conclusion that the immigration court's own refusal to accept a timely filing rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair and prejudiced the outcome. The Court rejected the BIA's reasoning that the petitioner's failure to return to the courthouse the next day, or to have already filed his VAWA self-petition with USCIS, undermined his claim, since neither was required to establish timeliness or prejudice. The Court reversed and remanded, noting that filing a motion "should not be a game of gotcha."

The full text of Burey v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/251869.P.pdf

Second Circuit Grants Bail Pending Appeal to Detainee with End-Stage Renal Disease

The Second Circuit has granted bail pending appeal to Raheem Fulton, a Jamaican national subject to a final removal order who has End Stage Renal Disease and has been detained by ICE for over two years while litigating what medical arrangements the government must make before removing him to Jamaica for dialysis treatment.

Applying the standard from Mapp v. Reno, the Court held that Fulton raised a substantial claim regarding medical-discharge planning and that extraordinary circumstances, including a prior near-fatal missed dialysis appointment in custody and the risks of prolonged detention, made bail necessary to make habeas relief effective. A dissenting judge argued that Fulton himself was responsible for the length of his detention by litigating the manner of his removal rather than accepting it, that he receives adequate dialysis in custody, and that his petition sought relief resembling an injunction rather than the release habeas is meant to secure.

The full text of Fulton v. Mullin can be found here: https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/OPN/25-194_complete_opn.pdf

Second Circuit Holds Zipper Clause Strips Jurisdiction Over Detained Columbia Activist's Habeas Petition

The Second Circuit has vacated a district court order releasing Mohsen Mahdawi, a lawful permanent resident and Columbia University student detained after the Secretary of State determined that his pro-Palestinian activism posed foreign policy consequences warranting removal. Mahdawi's habeas petition alleged that his detention and targeting for removal violated the First Amendment and due process.

The Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), the INA's "zipper clause," channels Mahdawi's claims into the petition-for-review process because his challenge to detention was, in substance, a challenge to the government's basis for removing him. Following the Third Circuit's reasoning in Khalil v. President, United States, the Court concluded that Mahdawi's detention and removal arguments were identical, that he could have sought release through an administrative Joseph hearing, and that channeling his claims did not foreclose meaningful review since he could raise them in his now-pending petition for review. The Court remanded with instructions to dismiss the habeas petition.

The full text of Mahdawi v. Trump can be found here: https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/OPN/25-1113_complete_opn.pdf

First Circuit Denies Stay of Order Vacating $100,000 H-1B Payment Requirement

The First Circuit has denied the government's motion to stay a district court order vacating DHS and State Department actions implementing a presidential proclamation that required a $100,000 payment to accompany H-1B visa petitions. A coalition of twenty states had challenged the payment requirement as exceeding the executive's statutory authority under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The Court held that the government failed to make the strong showing of likely success on the merits needed for a stay, agreeing with the states that the $100,000 payment functions like a fee or tax requiring a clear congressional delegation under Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., and that neither the statutory provisions invoked by the President nor Congress's pattern of explicitly authorizing fees elsewhere in the immigration code supplied that clear statement. The Court also rejected the government's argument that the implementing actions were not final agency action subject to review, and found the remaining stay factors did not favor the government either.

The full text of California v. Mullin can be found here: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/26-1699O-01A.pdf

First Circuit Grants Petition Where Record Compelled Finding of Indicia of Incompetency

The First Circuit has granted a petition for review filed by a Nepalese asylum applicant whose immigration judge denied relief after finding him not credible, without ever addressing whether he showed signs of incompetency requiring further inquiry. The applicant had suffered a head injury from a political assault years earlier and, during his hearing, gave confused answers that led the judge to order a mental health evaluation.

The evaluation found that the applicant's ability to assist his own attorney was compromised by attention and concentration deficits, but the judge treated the report only as an unsuccessful attempt to rehabilitate credibility and never made any competency finding. The Court held that the combination of the applicant's head trauma and the psychologist's report compelled a finding of indicia of incompetency under Matter of M-A-M-, triggering the immigration judge's affirmative duty to inquire further, regardless of the applicant's positive demeanor or representation by counsel. The Court remanded for the agency to conduct the required competency inquiry in the first instance.

The full text of Rana v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/25-1862P-01A.pdf

Supreme Court Holds Fourteenth Amendment Guarantees Birthright Citizenship Regardless of Parents' Immigration Status

The Supreme Court has affirmed the unlawfulness of Executive Order 14160, which sought to deny citizenship to children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or only temporarily present in the country. The order had argued that such children are not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause.

The Court held that the Citizenship Clause codified the common-law rule of jus soli, under which any child born on American soil and not exempted by the narrow historical exceptions for children of foreign diplomats or members of sovereign Indian tribes is a citizen at birth, regardless of the parents' domicile or immigration status. Tracing the Clause's history from English common law through its adoption as a repudiation of Dred Scott, and relying on the Court's 1898 decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the majority rejected the government's argument that only noncitizens domiciled in the United States could transmit "sufficient allegiance" to their children.

The full text of Trump v. Barbara can be found here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-365_diff_ed9g.pdf

BIA Holds Candor About Past Lies Does Not Alone Establish Credibility

The Board of Immigration Appeals has sustained DHS's appeal from a grant of asylum to a family from Burkina Faso, whose claim rested on the lead respondent's account of his service in the presidential security regiment. The respondent had twice denied any military service on visa applications years earlier, and the immigration judge found this indicative of a propensity for dishonesty but nonetheless deemed him credible because he was forthright in admitting he had lied.

The Board held that this reasoning was clearly erroneous, since candor about a documented history of lying to obtain immigration benefits does not, by itself, establish present credibility. The Board also found that the immigration judge did not adequately address inconsistencies undermining the respondent's explanation for the earlier falsehoods, failed to make an explicit credibility finding as to a corroborating witness who gave false testimony about a pending arrest warrant, and did not sufficiently analyze whether the documentary evidence corroborated the specific details of the claimed persecution. The case was remanded for a fuller credibility and corroboration analysis.

The full text of Matter of T-D-E- can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1450076/dl?inline

BIA Holds Bond Venue Follows Detainee's Location, Not Where Removal Case Is Pending

The Board of Immigration Appeals has sustained DHS's appeal from an immigration judge's decision releasing a respondent on an $8,000 bond, after the respondent had already been transferred from Massachusetts to a detention facility in Texas before the bond hearing took place. The immigration judge in Massachusetts reasoned that venue for the bond request remained proper there because the respondent's removal case was still administratively pending in that court.

The Board held that bond proceedings are separate from removal proceedings, and that the controlling regulation ties bond venue to the respondent's place of detention, not to which immigration court is handling the underlying removal case. Because the respondent had already been transferred to Texas by the time he filed his second custody redetermination request, the Massachusetts immigration court was not the proper venue, and the Board vacated the bond decision without reaching the merits of dangerousness or flight risk.

The full text of Matter of Vizcaino Aybar can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1450581/dl?inline

BIA Clarifies That Forced Conscription Claims Require Nexus to a Protected Ground

The Board of Immigration Appeals has sustained DHS's appeal from a grant of asylum to a Russian respondent who feared forced conscription into the military amid the war against Ukraine. The immigration judge found no nexus between the respondent's fear and a protected ground, but nonetheless granted asylum on the theory that conscription into an internationally condemned military is itself persecutory.

The Board held that conscription is not a standalone, sixth protected ground under the INA and clarified that the narrow exceptions recognized in Matter of A-G-, for disproportionate punishment or conscription requiring inhuman conduct, must still be tied to one of the five statutorily protected grounds. The Board found that international condemnation of the Russian military's conduct generally is insufficient; the respondent must show that he himself would necessarily be required to engage in inhuman conduct on account of a protected ground. The case was remanded for the immigration judge to consider the respondent's separate CAT claim.

The full text of Matter of R-A-N- can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1451396/dl?inline

BIA Holds Oral Motion to Pretermit Provides Sufficient Notice of Intent to Remove Under Asylum Cooperative Agreement

The Board of Immigration Appeals has sustained an interlocutory appeal by DHS after an immigration judge denied its motion to pretermit asylum applications filed by a Venezuelan and Colombian family, again based on the safe third country bar under the asylum cooperative agreement with Ecuador. The immigration judge had found that DHS's oral motion to pretermit did not provide adequate notice of its intent to remove the family to Ecuador and, alternatively, that the agreement did not apply absent an implementation plan.

The Board held that an oral motion to pretermit filed at a hearing is sufficient notice of DHS's intent to remove the family under the agreement, and reaffirmed that an immigration judge lacks authority to require proof of an implementation plan, proof that the third country is willing to accept the family, or an assessment of whether the third country offers full and fair procedures. The Board also held that the immigration judge erred in declining to designate Ecuador as the country of removal once DHS indicated its intent to do so. The case was remanded for an expeditious determination of the safe third country bar.

The full text of Matter of E-A-R-M- can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1451996/dl?inline

BIA Holds DHS Need Not Produce Implementation Instrument to Establish Asylum Cooperative Agreement Applies

The Board of Immigration Appeals has sustained an interlocutory appeal by DHS after an immigration judge denied its motion to pretermit asylum applications filed by a Venezuelan family, based on the safe third country bar under the asylum cooperative agreement with Ecuador. The immigration judge had concluded that DHS failed to produce a separate implementing instrument describing the operating procedures for transfers under the agreement.

The Board held that any subsequent implementation plan contemplated by the agreement is not part of the agreement itself, is not published in the Federal Register notice establishing the ACA and is therefore not a permissible basis for an immigration judge to find the agreement inapplicable. The Board vacated the immigration judge's decision and remanded for an expeditious determination of whether the safe third country bar applies.

The full text of Matter of N-E-R-S- can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1452016/dl?inline

Eleventh Circuit Affirms ACCA Enhancement, Rejects Argument That Georgia's Cocaine Definition Is Overbroad

The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act for a defendant with four prior Georgia cocaine distribution convictions. The defendant argued, with the support of an expert chemistry declaration, that Georgia's definition of cocaine sweeps in certain "conformational isomers" not covered by the federal definition, making his state convictions categorically too broad to serve as ACCA predicates.

The Court held that the argument failed regardless of any definitional mismatch, because the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that a substance is a "controlled substance" under Georgia's own statute only if it appears on both the Georgia and federal drug schedules. As a result, any cocaine isomer excluded from the federal schedule was, by the terms of Georgia law itself, never a controlled substance there either, meaning the defendant could not have been convicted based on such a substance in the first place.

The full text of United States v. Carter can be found here: https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202313430.pdf

Tenth Circuit Holds Interior Detention Under Section 1225 Limited to the Border, Requires Bond Eligibility

The Tenth Circuit has reversed the denial of habeas relief for a long-term Oklahoma resident detained for over eight months without a bond hearing after the government reinterpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply to unadmitted noncitizens arrested anywhere in the country, departing from nearly thirty years of contrary practice. The petitioner, married to a lawful permanent resident and stepfather to a U.S. citizen, has no criminal history apart from a single DUI.

Joining the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits and splitting from the Fifth and Eighth, the Court held that the statutory phrase "seeking admission" independently limits § 1225(b)(2)(A) to noncitizens at the border, since a person who has already entered the country can no longer be said to have an ongoing, present request for admission pending. The Court also found that reading § 1225(b)(2)(A) to reach the interior would render portions of § 1226(c) superfluous and would raise serious constitutional concerns under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. The petitioner remains detainable under § 1226(a), which requires a bond hearing.

The full text of Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin can be found here: https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010111461009.pdf

Ninth Circuit Denies Withholding of Removal to Drug Trafficker, Declines to Revisit Chevron-Era Precedent

The Ninth Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a Gambian lawful permanent resident convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, holding that his conviction was a particularly serious crime barring withholding of removal. The petitioner separately feared persecution in The Gambia based on a fatwa allegedly issued against him after a radio interview in which he described unorthodox religious views.

The Court held that the strong presumption from Matter of Y-L- that drug trafficking aggravated felonies are particularly serious crimes also triggers the regulatory presumption that the person is a danger to the community, without requiring a separate dangerousness finding. The Court declined to overrule its own precedent deferring to that presumption under the now-abrogated Chevron framework, explaining that Loper Bright's overruling of Chevron does not itself unsettle prior decisions that relied on it, under the doctrine of statutory stare decisis.

The full text of Sarr v. Blanche can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/07/07/24-5264.pdf

Ninth Circuit Grants Reopening Where Prior Counsel Failed to Notify Clients of BIA Decision

The Ninth Circuit has granted a petition for review filed by a Honduran family after the BIA denied their motion to reopen and reissue its prior decision affirming the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The family's former attorney did not read the BIA's emailed decision for months and failed to timely advise them of the thirty-day deadline to seek judicial review, causing them to miss it entirely.

The Court held that the BIA erred in concluding it lacked authority to consider an ineffective assistance claim based on counsel's failure to advise about proceedings before a different tribunal, reaffirming that the Board has long had discretion to consider such claims. The Court also held that mailing a courtesy copy of the decision directly to the family did not rebut the presumption of prejudice from counsel's error, since it was unreasonable to expect non-English-speaking petitioners with limited education to independently decipher the filing deadline. The case was remanded for the BIA to apply the presumption of prejudice and address the merits of the ineffective assistance claim.

The full text of Menjivar-Ayala v. Blanche can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/07/09/24-4562.pdf

Eighth Circuit Denies Review Where Cancellation of Removal Arguments Were Not Exhausted

The Eighth Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a Guatemalan woman found ineligible for cancellation of removal based on a Nebraska conviction for negligent child abuse of her stepdaughter. Before the agency, she argued only that her conviction did not match the generic federal definition of a crime of child abuse; before the court, she raised entirely new arguments, including that the agency relied on the wrong statutory provision and overlooked a petty-offense exception.

The Court held that these new arguments were unexhausted because the petitioner never raised them in her adversarial, counseled proceedings before the immigration judge and the Board. Since a reviewing court is one of review and not first view, the Court declined to consider arguments the agency never had the opportunity to address and denied the petition.

The full text of Lopez-Lopez v. Blanche can be found here: https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/26/07/251924P.pdf

Eighth Circuit Holds Minnesota Third-Degree Murder Is a Crime of Violence Under the Guidelines

The Eighth Circuit has affirmed a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence for a felon-in-possession defendant whose prior Minnesota conviction for third-degree murder was used to enhance his Sentencing Guidelines range. The defendant argued the district court erred in treating his 2012 conviction as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).

Adopting the Third Circuit's definition of generic murder as encompassing intentional killing, killing during a dangerous felony, or killing through reckless and depraved indifference to human life, the Court held that Minnesota's third-degree murder statute, which criminalizes causing death through an act "eminently dangerous to others" showing a "depraved mind," substantially corresponds to that generic definition. Because the conviction qualified as murder under the enumerated offenses clause, the Court did not need to consider whether it also satisfied the Guidelines' separate force clause.

Although this is a criminal sentencing matter, it is likely to be persuasive when analyzing whether convictions qualify as aggravated felonies related to murder in the immigration context.

The full text of United States v. Hayden can be found here: https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/26/07/251880P.pdf