These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services has extended Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Somalis for an additional 18 months. The re-registration period continues until March 20, 2017, and the designation has been extended until September 17, 2018.
The TPS page for Somalia can be found here:
The Department of Homeland Security has rescinded the "wet foot, dry foot" policy for Cuban citizens. Cubans are now subject to expedited removal orders and will no longer be automatically granted parole upon arrival in the United States. The Cuban Medical Professionals Parole Program has also been cancelled:
The official announcement can be found here:
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20Fact%20Sheet%20FINAL.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has held that a conviction under section 136.1(a) of the California Penal Code (witness tampering) is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The court noted that "the statute does not require the intent to 'injure someone, an actual injury, or a protected class of victims,' such as children." In addition, it "does not require that an individual make false statements nor procure anything of value," and as such, is not a fraud-type crime involving moral turpitude. The court remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals to determine in the first instance if the statute is divisible.
The full text of Duran v. Lynch can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/01/20/12-70930.pdf
The Seventh Circuit has remanded a case in which the petitioner sought withholding of removal on account of his status as an HIV positive, unmarried male, who would be perceived by Honduran society as gay on account of his medical conditions. The court noted that the applicant's claim was corroborated by an expert witness, and that the Immigration Judge gave full credit to that expert's testimony. The court also reiterated that the "more likely than not standard" for withholding of removal cannot be taken literally to require a "greater than 50% chance" of persecution.
The full text of Velasquez-Banegas can be found here:
The Sixth Circuit has determined that a conviction in Ohio for aggravated assault is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because it necessarily entails in the infliction of serious physical injury on the victim.
The full text of Lovano v. Lynch can be found here:
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/17a0013p-06.pdf
Typically, a circuit court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to review the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) refusal to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen a case. However, the Third Circuit has now recognized that at times "the BIA has limited its discretion via a policy, rule, settled course of adjudication, or by some other method, such that the BIA’s discretion can be meaningfully reviewed for abuse. The petitioner’s showing must be persuasive enough to allow the reasonable inference that the BIA’s discretion has in fact been limited." "The key words in the above formulation are 'meaningfully' and 'reasonable.' A policy so broad as to merely redirect the BIA’s discretion, rather than limit it, will probably be insufficient. The same goes for a 'pattern' of dispositions whose contours are not clearly defined or which is not tailored to the petitioner’s circumstances." Published and unpublished BIA decisions can be reviewed when evaluating whether the BIA has created a policy, rule, or settled course of adjudication that limits its discretion. The court, however, disagreed with the petitioner's contention that the BIA has a practice or pattern of reopening cases sua sponte where the petitioner becomes eligible for relief from removal for which he was not eligible in the original removal proceedings.
The full text of Park v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has adopted the definition of a conviction contained in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality for determining whether a petitioner has been convicted of an offense against a minor for the purposes of the Adam Walsh Act. Thus, a conviction that was expunged under section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code remains a conviction for the purposes of the Adam Walsh Act.
The full text of Matter of Calcano de Millan can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has held that an applicant for withholding of removal need not prove that a protected ground (i.e. his political opinion, religion, membership in a particular social group, etc.) is one central reason for the persecution inflicted on him. The court noted that when Congress amended the asylum statute to include the "one central reason" requirement, it did not similarly amend the withholding of removal statute. Thus, an applicant for withholding of removal need only show that a protected ground is "a reason" for the harm inflicted on him, and not "one central reason." In so holding, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in Matter of C-T-L-, which extended the one central reason standard to withholding of removal.
With respect to the petitioner's application for protection under the Convention Against Torture, the Court noted that there is no "rogue official" exception to this protection. "Since the officers were apparently off duty when they tortured Barajas-Romero, they were evidently not acting 'in an official capacity,' but the regulation does not require that the public official be carrying out his official duties, so long as he is the actor or knowingly acquiesces in the acts."
The full text of Barajas-Romero v. Lynch can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/01/18/13-70520.pdf
In an unpublished decision, the Fifth Circuit determined that Arizona Revised Statute Section 13-3405(A)(4) (attempted transportation for sale of marijuana) is a divisible statute, laying out separate offenses for solicitation to transport for sale and transport for sale of marijuana. The court recognized that Arizona state case law on this issue was conflicting, but determined that because the charging document listed only transportation for sale, this narrowing language indicated that transportation for sale is a distinct offense from offer to transport for sale. The court also looked at the pattern jury instructions, which contained different instructions for transportation for sale and offering for sale. Thus, the court concluded the statute was divisible.
The full text of Ibanez-Beltran v. Lynch can be found here:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/15/15-60183.0.pdf
Jose Rivera sought protection from removal based on his fear that gangs in El Salvador would seek to kidnap or extort him because they would perceive him as wealthy, owing to his long residence in the United States. Though the Seventh Circuit ultimately determined that Rivera had not proven he would be targeted by gang members because of the perception that he is wealthy, the Court made the following observations that should give home for future applicants. "We are dubious . . . of the proposition announced in some cases that the status of being a member of a group made up of individuals deported from the United States who, having lived in this country for many years, either have money or are believed to have money and have long‐established ties to this country, and who for any of these reasons might be able to pay ransom, nevertheless can’t be deemed members of a 'social group' authorized to obtain relief from deportation because of threats to the life or safety of the group’s members." "We note finally, for its possible relevance in future cases, that what doesn’t matter in the case of an illegal immigrant resisting removal because of fear of persecution is whether gangs in El Salvador, or whatever the immigrant’s country of origin is, are wrong in thinking that anybody who’s lived in the United States is likely to be wealthy or have wealthy American connections. If thatʹs what the gangs think, and if (a big if, which requires evidence) as a result they hold deportees from the U.S. for ransom and kill them if it isnʹt paid, those deportees are being subjected to persecution. We don’t think either a court or the immigration agencies could rationally deny that. But it isn’t this case."
The full text of Rivera v. Lynch can be found here:
The Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished decision, has deemed a Florida conviction for armed robbery to be a categorical match to the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that the state crime must match the elements of the federal robbery statute in order to qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude.
The full text of Jaimes-Lopez v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/files/201515532.pdf
The petitioner had been convicted of several crimes involving moral turpitude and one controlled substance violation involving marijuana. He sought cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents, arguing that he could waive the disqualifying effects of the convictions with a 212(h) waiver. The agency disagreed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the statute provided no basis for combining these two forms of relief.
The full text of Guerrero-Roque v. Lynch can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/01/09/14-72082.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a conviction for second-degree battery with a deadly weapon other than a firearm in Arkansas qualifies as a violent felony. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that the infliction of injury does necessarily require the use of violent force. Given the similarity between the definition of a violent felony and a crime of violence aggravated felony in the immigration context, this decision could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of U.S. v. Winston can be found here:
Antonio Robledo-Soto is the parent of 3 U.S-citizen children. He has one conviction for driving under the influence, which has been expunged by the criminal court. He requested that ICE exercise its prosecutorial discretion to administratively close his removal proceedings, in light of his eligibility for benefits under the Deferred Action for Parental Accountability program put forward by President Obama. Unfortunately, that program was never implemented because it has been enjoined by a federal court. ICE has refused to administratively close his proceedings. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that it had no choice but to dismiss his petition for review, but not before analyzing the tragedy of circumstances that had befallen Robledo-Soto, and that could have been halted by ICE's exercise of discretion.
The full text of Robledo-Soto v. Lynch can be found here:
In the context of a naturalization case, the Sixth Circuit has determined that a non-citizen is not lawfully admitted to permanent residence if the the admission was not substantively valid. In the instant case, the petitioner was approved for an immigrant visa as a child accompanying or following to join a principal application parent. However, he entered the United States 24 days before his father (the principal applicant). Thus, his lawful permanent residence was accorded in error and he is not eligible for naturalization.
The full text of Turjah v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services can be found here:
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/17a0001p-06.pdf
The Seventh Circuit has determined that review of a section 13 adjustment of status application - available to certain foreign officials performing diplomatic and semi-diplomatic duties - is exclusively with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. As such, the denial of such an application is reviewable only by the Administrative Appeals Office, and not the Board of Immigration Appeals. The court also determined that providing interpretation services to the leader of a terrorist organization constitutes the provision of material support to that organization.
The full text of Jabateh v. Lynch can be found here:
The First Circuit has permitted the use of a Record of Sworn Statement, taken by a Customs & Border Protection (CBP) agent when he first encountered an undocumented immigration, to impeach an asylum applicant's credibility. The court noted that the applicant testified that he understood the questions asked to him in the Record of Sworn Statement, that the interpreter read the answers back to him to verify their accuracy, and that he signed the interview attesting to its accuracy and truthfulness. Thus, the fact that he stated to the CBP agent that he did not have a fear of returning to his country could be used to find his asylum-related testimony in court not credible.
The full text of Ye v. Lynch can be found here:
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services has extended the designation of Yemen as a country whose citizens are eligible for temporary protected status. The 18-month extension will run from March 4, 2017 to September 3, 2018.
The full announcement can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has amended its decision in Lkhasgvasuren v. Lynch. Initially, the Court deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals framework for whistleblower asylum cases, as articulated in Matter of N-M-. In the amended decision, the Court assumed, without deciding, that the N-M- framework would apply to whistleblowing claims.
The amended decision in Lkhasgvasuren v. Lynch can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2016/12/30/13-71778.pdf
In a criminal sentencing case, the Eighth Circuit determined that an Iowa conviction for domestic abuse - strangulation is a crime of violence. "The elements of Domestic Abuse–Strangulation are:(1) committing a domestic assault in violation of Iowa Code § 708.1, and (2) knowingly causing impaired breathing or blood circulation by either means in the statute. Knowingly strangulating another is categorically capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person because it requires proof that the victim’s breathing or blood circulation was impaired by the defendant. The offense here includes the use of violent force as an element ‘since its impossible to cause bodily injury without using force capable of producing that result." Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence in the sentencing context and in the immigration context, this decision may have persuasive value in immigration cases.
The full text of United States v. Parrow can be found here:
