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BIA Construes Firearm Deportability Ground

The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) has determined that a conviction in Oklahoma for transporting a firearm qualifies as a firearms offense under section 212(a)(2)(C) of the INA.  Even though this section of the INA does not explicitly encompass transportation of a firearm (but rather includes possession, sale, use, ownership, purchase, and exchanging of a firearm), the Board determined that the broad wording indicated an intent to encompass all convictions related to firearms.

The full text of Matter of Flores-Abarca can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/944441/download

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Fourth Circuit Defers to BIA's Decision in Matter of C-J-H-

The Fourth Circuit has deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in Matter of C-J-H- and determined that the Department of Homeland Security can deport an asylee who adjusted status to lawful permanent residence without first terminating the asylum status.  The court emphasized that the resident can still assert an asylum claim as a defense to removal if appropriate.

The full text of Mahmood v. Sessions can be found here:
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/161438.P.pdf

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Fourth Circuit Address Proper Standard of Review for Good Faith Marriage Waiver

Upatcha received conditional residency through her marriage to a US citizen.  Their marriage subsequently ended in a divorce.  She applied for a waiver of the requirement of the joint petition to remove conditions on her residency, on the basis that her marriage was entered into good faith.  The Immigration Judge denied the waiver, finding that she did not enter into her marriage in good faith.  The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding no clear error in the Immigration Judge's decision.  The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the Board of Immigration Appeals should have applied a de novo standard of review to this question of law (i.e., whether the evidence in the record established a good faith marriage).  

The full text of Upatcha v. Sessions can be found here:

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/151270.P.pdf

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Eighth Circuit Construes Missouri Conviction for Violence Against an Inmate

The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Missouri conviction is a violent felony for federal sentencing purposes.  The court consulted state court interpretations to determine that the conviction required the use of violent force.  Because the definition of a violent felony is very similar to the definition of a crime of violence for immigration purposes, this decision may have persuasive value in immigration proceedings.

The decision in US v. Irons can be found here:

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/17/02/161998P.pdf

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Eleventh Circuit Addresses Jurisdiction to Reopen Proceedings for Deported Individual

In an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the Board of Immigration Appeals cannot deny a motion to reopen for the purpose of applying for asylum and withholding of removal solely because the petitioner has been physically deported from the United States.

The full text of Linton v. Attorney General can be found here:

http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/files/201513378.pdf

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Fifth Circuit Construes Louisiana First Time Offender Pardon

The Fifth Circuit has held that Louisiana's automatic pardon for first time offenders does not qualify as a full and unconditional pardon, such as would eliminate an aggravated felony and its implications on good moral character for naturalization purposes.  The court noted that Louisiana distinguishes between an automatic pardon - which does not restore a person to a "status of innocence" - and a gubernatorial pardon - which does restore a person to a status of innocence.  

The full text of Nguyen v. USCIS can be found here:

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/16/16-30904-CV0.pdf

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Seventh Circuit Construes Deportability for Violating a Protective Order

Section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the INA renders deportable any alien who at any time after admission is en‐joined under a protection order issued by a court and whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued.  The Seventh Circuit has determined that because the statute references a criminal court's determination, an immigration court is not confined to categorical approach when determining if a non-citizen violated the portion of an order designed to protect against threats, harassment, and injury.

The full text of Garcia-Hernandez v. Boente can be found here:

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2017/D02-07/C:15-2835:J:Hamilton:aut:T:fnOp:N:1908757:S:0

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Ninth Circuit Finds no Right to Counsel in Expedited Removal

The Ninth Circuit has held that an individual expeditiously removed by Customs and Border Protection has no right to counsel during the expedited removal process.  This analysis focuses heavily on the idea that expedited orders of removal only apply to individuals who cannot prove they have been present in the United States for 14 days, and thus, not to individuals with strong ties to the United States.  In light of the Trump administration's proposal to expand expedited orders of removal to individuals who cannot prove 2 years of presence in the United States, this finding may be up for review again quite soon.

The court declined to determine if a failure to advise an individual of their right to withdraw their application for admission in expedited removal proceedings violates due process, finding that the petitioner could not prove that it was plausible that such relief would have been granted.  

The full text of US v. Peralta-Sanchez can be found here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/02/07/14-50393.pdf

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Seventh Circuit Finds Lawful Permanent Resident Removable for Voting

Margarita Del Pilar Fitzpatrick, a lawful permanent resident, contends that when filling out the forms at the Department of Motor Vehicles she displayed her green card and her Peruvian passport—but she admits that she also checked a box claiming to be a citizen of the United States.  Fitzpatrick maintains that the desk clerk asked whether she wanted to register, and when she inquired “Am I supposed to?” he replied: “It’s up to you.” She checked that box, was duly registered, and in 2006 twice voted in elections for federal officials.

In light of these facts, the Seventh Circuit would not allow her to take advantage of the “official authorization" defense.  The defense is available to someone who makes complete and accurate representations to a public official and then receives permission from that official, when acting within the scope of his or her authority.  Because Fitzpatrick did not give accurate info to the DMV by virtue of claiming in writing to be a citizen, and because the clerk did not explicitly tell her it was permissible for her to vote, she could not take advantage of the defense.

The full text of Fitzpatrick v. Sessions can be found here: 

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2017/D02-13/C:15-2204:J:Easterbrook:aut:T:fnOp:N:1911733:S:0

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Eighth Circuit Rejects Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claim

The Eighth Circuit has affirmed the denial of asylum to an applicant (Fuentes) who testified she was unable to leave an abusive domestic relationship in Honduras.  The court noted that Fuentes was able to live safely in Honduras away from her abuser for 5 years before leaving the country, engage in a relationship with another man, and have a child with that other man.  Thus, she had demonstrated that she was unable to leave a relationship with her abuser.

The full text of Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions can be found here: 

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/17/02/153149P.pdf

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First Circuit Applies IMMACT Amendments to 212(c)

The First Circuit has determined that the IMMACT amendments to section 212(c), which barred a person convicted of an aggravated felony who served five years or more in prison from seeking a 212(c) waiver, applied to a person whose criminal conduct pre-dated IMMACT but whose conviction post-dated IMMACT.

The full text of Holder v. Sessions can be found here: 

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-1864P-01A.pdf

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Eighth Circuit Determines that Wisconsin Burglary Statute is Divisible

The Eighth Circuit has determined that Wisconsin's burglary statute is divisible in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Mathis v. United States.  The court further determined that subsection a of the statute, which criminalized burglary of any building or dwelling, is a match to the generic definition of burglary.  Although this determination arose in the context of a federal sentencing case, given the similarity between the definition of a burglary offense under sentencing law and the definition of a burglary aggravated felony in the immigration context, this decision could be persuasive in the immigration context.

The full text of U.S. v. Lamb can be found here: 

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/17/02/152399P.pdf

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Fourth Circuit Defers to BIA Interpretation Regarding Date of Admission for CIMT Charge

Sijapati first entered and was admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant L-2 visa on January 25, 2001. On December 31, 2002, Sijapati departed the United States for a two-and-a-half week vacation to Nepal, reentering the United States on January 18, 2003, pursuant to his existing L-2 visa. On March 16, 2005, federal immigration officials approved Sijapati’s application for adjustment of status as a lawful permanent resident. On December 12, 2007—more than five years after Sijapati was first admitted into the United States on January 25, 2001, under the L-2 visa, but less than five years after his most recent admission on January 18, 2003, under that visa—a circuit court in Virginia convicted Sijapati of felony embezzlement and imposed an eighteen-month suspended sentence. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security issued to Sijapati a Notice to Appear before the immigration court to face the charge of removability from the United States under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA for having been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude within five years of the date of admission. 

Sijapati argued that the plain language of the statute unambiguously establishes that Congress intended "the date of admission" to correspond to the entry marking the commencement of an alien’s current or most recent period of admission.  The Fourth Circuit disagreed, deferring to the Board of Immigration Appeals' (Board) decision in Matter of Alyazjiin which the Board held that  "the most natural reading of section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) is that the phrase ‘the date of admission’ refers to the date of 10 admission by virtue of which the alien was present in the United States when he committed his crime."  As such, the relevant date of admission for Sijapati was January 18, 2003 entry on the L-2 visa; by virtue of this admission, he was present in the United States when he committed the embezzlement offense.

The full text o Sijapati v. Boente can be found here: 

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/151204.P.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Finds that Oregon Conviction for Delivery of a Controlled Substance is not an Aggravated Felony

The Ninth Circuit has determined that an Oregon conviction for delivery of a controlled substance is not an aggravated felony.  A drug-related offense will constitute an aggravated felony if it matches the definition of a drug trafficking crime (which are any crimes that would be punishable as felonies under the Controlled Substances Act) or an illicit trafficking offense (which requires a commercial dealing to underpin the conviction).  The Oregon statute criminalizes mere solicitation, or an offer to deliver a controlled substance.  The Controlled Substance Act does not include solicitation offenses, and thus, the Oregon statute does not match the definition of a drug trafficking crime.  In addition, there is no commercial dealing required by the statute, and thus, it does not match the definition of an illicit trafficking offense.  Finally, because the definition of attempt within the statute is indivisible with respect to solicitation offenses, the modified categorical approach should not be employed.

The full text of Sandoval v. Yates can be found here: 

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/01/27/13-71784.pdf

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BIA Determines that a California Conviction for Mayhem is Categorically a Crime of Violence

The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) has determined that a conviction in California for mayhem is categorically under a crime of violence under 18 USC 16(a).  The Board noted that that the statute required the infliction of great bodily injury, such as the poking out of an eye, and that such injury necessarily required the use of violent force.

The full text of Matter of Kim can be found here: 

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/933996/download

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USCIS Announces Final Rule for Parole for International Entrepreneurs

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services has issued a final regulation governing the use of parole on a case-by-case basis with respect to entrepreneurs of start-up entities who can demonstrate through evidence of substantial and demonstrated potential for rapid business growth and job creation that they would provide a significant public benefit to the United States. Such potential would be indicated by, among other things, the receipt of significant capital investment from U.S. investors with established records of successful investments, or obtaining significant awards or grants from certain Federal, State or local government entities. If granted, parole would provide a temporary initial stay of up to 30 months (which may be extended by up to an additional 30 months) to facilitate the applicant's ability to oversee and grow his or her start-up entity in the United States.

The full rule can be found here:

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/17/2017-00481/international-entrepreneur-rule

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DHS Eliminated "Wet Foot, Dry Foot" Policy

The Department of Homeland Security has rescinded the "wet foot, dry foot" policy for Cuban citizens.  Cubans are now subject to expedited removal orders and will no longer be automatically granted parole upon arrival in the United States.  The Cuban Medical Professionals Parole Program has also been cancelled:

The official announcement can be found here:

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20Fact%20Sheet%20FINAL.pdf

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Ninth Circuit Finds that a California Conviction for Witness Tampering is not a Categorical Crime Involving Moral Turpitude

The Ninth Circuit has held that a conviction under section 136.1(a) of the California Penal Code (witness tampering) is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.  The court noted that "the statute does not require the intent to 'injure someone, an actual injury, or a protected class of victims,' such as children."  In addition, it "does not require that an individual make false statements nor procure anything of value," and as such, is not a fraud-type crime involving moral turpitude.  The court remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals to determine in the first instance if the statute is divisible.

The full text of Duran v. Lynch can be found here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/01/20/12-70930.pdf

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