These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
The Third Circuit has deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals' definition of a crime of child abuse. In addition, the Court found that a Pennsylvania conviction for unlawful contact with a minor meets this definition, even though it criminalizes mere communication with a minor, because the communication must be for the purpose of an illicit sexual act, and thus, poses a significant risk of harm to the child.
The full text of Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Fifth Circuit has determined that whether a petitioner has acted with due diligence, such as would toll equitably toll the filing deadline for a motion to reopen, is a question of fact. As such, when a petitioner is subject to the jurisdictional limitations applicable to certain criminal convictions, the court has no jurisdiction to review whether the petitioner has acted with the requisite diligence.
The full text of Penalva v. Sessions can be found here:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/16/16-60286-CV0.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a Washington conviction for attempted first degree murder is a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines. In so doing, the court affirmed that even a "slight, nonviolent act with the intent to cause another’s death" would pose a threat of violent force sufficient to satisfy the definition of a crime of violence. Given the similar definitions of a crime of violence in the sentencing guidelines and the Immigration and Nationality Act, this decision could have persuasive impact in immigration proceedings.
The full text of US v. Studhorse II can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/03/02/16-30299.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California conviction for sodomy of a victim who is unable to consent is a rape aggravated felony.
The full text of Elmakhzoumi v. Sessions can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/03/01/16-16232.pdf
The Supreme Court has determined that immigrants detained as arriving aliens or as mandatory detainees due to certain criminal convictions are not entitled to bond hearings under the statutory language which authorizes their detention. In addition, discretionary detainees who are not granted bond because they cannot prove they are not a flight risk or danger to the community are not entitled to periodic reviews of their detention. The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to address whether the due process protections of the Constitution mandate bond hearings for these detainees.
The decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez can be found here:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/15-1204_f29g.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Florida drug statute criminalizing the possession, sale, purchase, manufacture, delivery, or bringing into the state certain controlled substances to be both overbroad and indivisible when compared to the definition of a drug trafficking aggravated felony. The least of the acts it criminalized—mere possession of a listed narcotic—is not a felony under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The court further determined that the various acts criminalized under the statute are alternative means, and not alternative elements, because a jury need not determine which of the six acts was involved in order to convict a defendant.
The full text of Cintron v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201512344.pdf
The Second Circuit has deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in Matter of L-A-C-, finding that the REAL ID Act does not require the IJ to identify the specific evidence necessary to meet the applicant's burden of proof and to provide an automatic continuance for the applicant to obtain that evidence prior to rendering a decision on the application. In so doing, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ren v. Holder.
The full text of Wei v. Sessions can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a District Court maintains the authority to naturalize an applicant, even if removal proceedings are pending. According to the government, 8 U.S.C. § 1429 precluded a court from considering a naturalization application when the applicant had been placed in removal proceedings. "Because the USCIS did not issue final decisions on the Yiths’ naturalization applications within 120 days after their examinations, the district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate their naturalization applications under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) and correctly rejected the government’s argument that the commencement of removal proceedings stripped the district court of subject matter jurisdiction." Moreover, § 1447(b) applies only to the Attorney General, and thus, the existence of an on-going removal proceeding does not strip the District Court of authority to adjudicate a naturalization application.
The court distinguished the instant scenario from one in which the agency denies a naturalization application because removal proceedings are pending. "Unlike § 1421(c), which applies when an agency denies an application, § 1447(b) applies when the government fails to make a determination within a 120-day period and gives the district court jurisdiction over the entire 'matter.' Here, the USCIS did not deny the Yiths’ naturalization applications, and so the district court’s review is not limited to the reason for the agency’s denial, but extends to the entire matter (i.e., the application for naturalization) that was pending before the agency.” "[W]e adopt the straightforward reading of the statute that the USCIS fails to make a determination under § 1447(b) when it fails to deny the applications before the statutory deadline."
The Court also considered the language in § 1429 that the government may not consider an applicant’s naturalization application “if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this chapter or any other Act.” The Yiths argued that § 1429 does not apply to them by its terms because their removal proceeding was not pursuant to a warrant of arrest. The government argued that the Court should defer to the DHS’s regulatory interpretation of “warrant,” which states that for the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1429, "a notice to appear issued under 8 CFR part 239 (including a charging document issued to commence proceedings under sections 236 or 242 of the Act prior to April 1, 1997) shall be regarded as a warrant of arrest.”
The Court disagreed, finding that the meaning of “warrant of arrest” in § 1429 is unambiguous. Specifically, a warrant of arrest is is a writ issued under § 1226 authorizing law enforcement personnel to arrest and detain an alien pending the results of removal proceedings. This document is distinct from a Notice to Appear. "Although the Yiths received a notice to appear, they were not subject to 'a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions' of Chapter 12 of the INA. Accordingly, their removal proceedings were not pursuant to such a warrant of arrest, and this portion of § 1429 was inapplicable to their case." "By its terms, § 1429 precludes only the executive branch from considering an applicant’s naturalization application, and only when there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest."
The full text of Yith v. Nielsen can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/02/07/16-15858.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has reaffirmed its prior determination that a conviction for misprision of a felony is a crime involving moral turpitude. "Considering the language of the misprision statute, we conclude that the affirmative act of concealing a known felony is deceitful and dishonest and is therefore reprehensible conduct that involves moral turpitude, regardless of whether the underlying felony is also a crime involving moral turpitude."
IThe BIA recognized that its decision was contrary to the Ninth Circuit's caselaw on the topic, and indicated that it would apply the Ninth Circuits decision in Robles-Urrea v. Holder to any cases arising within the Ninth Circuit.
The full text of Matter of Mendez can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has determined that a judge may take into account statements made during border and airport interviews when assessing an applicant's credibility. However, the BIA recognized certain limitations on the reliability of these interviews. "The import of the case law regarding these DHS interviews is that, as a preliminary issue, it is necessary to consider whether there are persuasive reasons to doubt the alien’s understanding of the interviewer’s questions. The most basic consideration is whether an interpreter was provided if one was requested. If the alien’s statements from the interview are being contrasted with his or her subsequent testimony, it is important to have a detailed and reliable recitation of the questions and answers from the interview. Further, to support a finding that the statements are actually inconsistent, the questions asked during the interview should be designed “to elicit the details of an asylum claim,” and the interviewer should ask follow-up questions to develop the alien’s account." Despite recognizing these limitations, the BIA determined that under the REAL ID Act, there is a presumption that interviews of this nature are proper to consider in an adverse credibility determination.
The full text of Matter of J-C-H-F- can be found here:
The Seventh Circuit has once again clarified the standard of proof for protection under the Convention Against Torture. It again that it had previously held that standard does not call for a literal calculation of a greater than 50% chance of harm, but rather, a qualitative assessment that here is a substantial risk of harm to the petitioner. "Does the risk exceed 50%? What if there is a 20% risk of death and a 40% risk of bodily injury? Is that 'more likely than not' when neither risk exceeds 50%? Does a 20% risk of death exceed a 60% risk of losing a limb? Similar questions are easy to spin out. The panel in Rodriguez-Molinero stated that a statistical requirement cannot be taken seriously and that the best an agency or court can do is look for substantial risk. 'More likely than not' is the standard burden in civil litigation and does not impose a statistical or quantitative requirement in a tort or contract suit any more than in a removal proceeding. Our opinion in Rodriguez-Molinero did not suggest that 'substantial risk' means something more than the 'more likely than not' standard. It was designed, rather, as a non-quantitative restatement of that standard. If there is any gap between the two, it is in the direction of lenience to aliens, potentially treating (say) a moderate risk of death as equivalent to a much greater risk of being beaten up, and treating either as enough to allow the agency to permit an alien to stay in this nation."
The full text of Perez-Montes v. Sessions can be found here:
The Seventh Circuit has affirmed a determination by the Department of Homeland Security that an Indiana conviction for attempted sexual misconduct with a minor is a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony. The Court noted that sexual intercourse between a child under sixteen years of age and an eighteen-year-old adult involves a inherent risk of exploitation, if not coercion.
The full text of Correa-Diaz v. Sessions can be found here:
The Secretary of Homeland Security has extended the Temporary Protected Status designation for Syria for another 18 months, or through September 30, 2019.
The official announcement can be read here:
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Florida child abuse conviction, which criminalizes the battery of a child by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling blood, seminal fluid, urine, or feces, is both a crime of child abuse and crime involving moral turpitude. With respect to the crime of child abuse, the Court noted that a child who has had blood or urine thrown at her by an adult is at substantial risk of mental or emotional harm, in addition to the possibility of physical injury through exposure to fluid-borne or fecal pathogens. With respect to the crime involving moral turpitude, the Court found that the acts criminalized under the statute were base and vile.
The full text of Pierre v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201615898.pdf
The court held that the definition of conspiracy within the Washington Criminal Code allows for a conviction when the other party to the conspiracy is a law enforcement officer or other government agent who did not intend that a crime be committed – applies to a conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Thus, the statute criminalizes conduct not criminalized by the federal conspiracy statute, and as such, is overbroad as compared to generic definition of a controlled substance offense.
The decision in US v. Brown can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/01/16/16-30218.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California carjacking conviction is not a crime of violence because it does not require the use of violent force. The Court overruled its prior decision in Nieves-Medrano v. Holder that had held a carjacking conviction is a crime of violence. The case was remanded to allow the Board of Immigration Appeals to decide in the first instance if the conviction qualified as a theft offense aggravated felony.
The full text of Solorio-Ruiz v. Sessions can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/01/29/16-73085.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that the federal bank robbery statute, which requires the use force, violence, and intimidation, is a crime of violence under federal sentencing guidelines. With respect to the possible use of intimidation, the Court noted that intimidation requires that the defendant take property in such a way that would put an ordinary, reasonable person in fear of bodily harm and that a defendant cannot put a reasonable person in fear of bodily harm without threatening to use force capable of causing physical pain or injury.
Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines and in the immigration context, this case could have persuasive impact in immigration proceedings.
The full text of US v. Watson can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/02/01/16-15357.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that an Alabama conviction for first-degree robbery is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the statute only requires a minimal use of force. Given the similarity between the definition of a violent felony and a crime of violence in the immigration context, this decision could have persuasive value in immigration proceedings.
The full text of US v. Walton can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/02/01/15-50358.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a beneficiary of a second-preference family-based petition (child of a lawful permanent resident) whose age is calculated to be under the age of 21 by the Child Status Protection Act on the date of his father's naturalization remains under age 21 for visa purposes, and thus, becomes eligible for adjustment of status as an immediate relative. "We conclude that anyone who under the relevant statutes is considered a minor child of an LPR on the date of the parent’s naturalization (and who is the beneficiary of a valid petition for an immigrant visa based on that status) can obtain a visa as the minor child of a citizen following his parent’s naturalization."
The full text of Rodriguez Tovar v. Sessions can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/02/14/14-73376.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that it has jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to administratively close removal proceedings because the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in Matter of Avetisyan provides a meaningful standard for review of the agency's decision.
The full text of Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/02/14/14-72472.pdf
