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The Fourth Circuit Confronts Whether False Testimony Bar to GMC Applies to Concealments or Omissions

The Fourth has determined that the applicability of the false testimony good moral character bar to omissions or concealments is a mixed question of fact and law that a federal court maintains jurisdiction to review. “Martinez-Martinez argues that the Board: (1) improperly reviewed the IJ’s legal determination that his omission of aliases constituted testimony under § 1101(f)(6) for clear error, and (2) committed legal error by applying the false testimony bar based on an omission, rather than an oral statement. We agree the Board applied an incorrect standard of review and will therefore grant the petition for review and remand to the Board to apply the correct standard. Consequently, we need not reach Martinez-Martinez’s argument about the application of the false testimony bar. “

“[T}he application of the false testimony bar is a legal determination necessitating de novo review. Thus, the Board improperly reviewed the legal question of whether Martinez-Martinez’s testimony as to aliases constituted “testimony” under the false testimony bar for clear error. This error alone is sufficient to grant the petition for review and remand to the Board for application of the proper standard.”

The full text of Martinez-Martinez v. Bondi can be found here:

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/241464.P.pdf

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Fourth Circuit Affirms that VA Receipt of Stolen Property is a CIMT

The Fourth Circuit has affirmed that a Virginia conviction for receipt of stolen property is a crime involving moral turpitude. “What makes Virginia’s receipt offense morally culpable is the receiver’s knowledge that the property he possesses was stolen from its rightful owner and his dishonest intent to continue acting adversely to the owner’s property interest.”

The full text of Solis-Flores v. Bondi can be found here: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/221147A.P.pdf

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Second Circuit Finds that Child Must Remain under 21 on Date of Adjudication of Cancellation of Removal Application

The Second Circuit has affirmed the denial of a motion to reopen, filed by an applicant for cancellation of removal, because his daughter had reached the age of 21 during the pendency of the motion to reopen. “Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), a qualifying ‘child’ must be under the age of 21 at the time an application for cancellation of removal is adjudicated.”

The full text of Yupangui-Yunga v. Bondi can be found here: https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/a63f27ea-ec10-481a-8b77-097dadbbc82f/12/doc/23-6522_opn.pdf

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BIA Says IJs are not Required to Accept Stipulations

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that immigration judges are not required to accept stipulations by the parties. “Immigration Judges have broad discretion in conducting immigration proceedings and admitting and considering evidence. While an Immigration Judge may accept the parties’ stipulations in lieu of evidence, he or she is not required to do so. Nor is an Immigration Judge bound by parties’ stipulations as to the legal issue of whether a respondent has satisfied his or her burden of proof for relief or protection because legal stipulations cannot be binding.”

The full text of Matter of J-H-M-H can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1415986/dl?inline

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BIA Rejects Perceived Group Membership as a Basis for Asylum

The Board of Immigration Appeals has rejected the concept of perceived membership as a particular social group, finding that there were be no circumstances in which the perceived members of a group would be socially distinct from the actual members of the group. “[P]erceived membership in a group cannot itself be a cognizable particular social group. Rather, the underlying group is the true particular social group, and where that underlying group as defined is not cognizable, the perceived group is also not cognizable.”

The full text of Matter of L-A-L-T- can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1415356/dl?inline

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BIA Reverses Bond Grant to Non-Citizen Recently Convicted of Statutory Rape

The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the grant of bond to a non-citizen recently convicted of statutory rape and oral copulation with a 14-year-old girl. “The respondent’s behavior reflects a willingness and ability to manipulate vulnerable persons into engaging in unlawful conduct to meet his own desires and to do so at great harm to them.”

The full text of Matter of Cotrufo can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1415166/dl?inline

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BIA Overturns CAT Grant to Uzbek National

The Board of Immigration Appeals has overturned a grant of protection under the Convention Against Torture to an Uzbek national despite evidence that he is likely to be detained upon arrival in Uzbekistan, finding that evidence of “ill treatment” and anecdotes of torture in Uzbek prisons were insufficient to show a clear probability of torture.

The full text of Matter of J-A- can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1415011/dl?inline

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BIA Finds that IJ Exceeded his Authority in Discretionary Grant of LPR Cancellation of Removal

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that an Immigration Judge exceeded his authority when he determined that the two children who accused the respondent of the indecent acts were actually not credible. The Board then overturned the discretionary grant, starting that the respondent had not admitted his wrongdoing and thus, had not established rehabilitation.

The full text of Matter of Garcia-Flores can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1413661/dl?inline

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BIA Finds IJs Lack Jurisdiction to Grant Bond to Non-Citizens who are not Admitted

The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that Immigration Judges lack jurisdiction to consider the bond request of a non-citizen who entered the United States without admission and who has been present in the United States for at least two years. “Under section 235, Congress created three different categories of applicants for admission. The first two categories are covered by section 235(b)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A). They include: (1) arriving aliens inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7), and (2) aliens not admitted or paroled into the United States who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7), and “who ha[ve] not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that [they] ha[ve] been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of determination of inadmissibility.” “The third category of applicants for admission subject to the inspection, detention, and removal procedures set forth in section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, are those aliens who are seeking admission and who an immigration officer has determined are ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’ INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). This category is a ‘catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by [section 235(b)(1)].’”

“The respondent provides no legal authority for the proposition that after some undefined period of time residing in the interior of the United States without lawful status, the INA provides that an applicant for admission is no longer ‘seeking admission,’ and has somehow converted to a status that renders him or her eligible for a bond hearing under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a).”

“Aliens, like the respondent, who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer. Remaining in the United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not constitute an ‘admission.’ Likewise, being arrested pursuant to a warrant and placed into removal proceedings does not constitute an admission. Therefore, just as Immigration Judges have no authority to redetermine the custody of arriving aliens who present themselves at a port of entry, they likewise have no authority to redetermine the custody conditions of an alien who crossed the border unlawfully without inspection, even if that alien has avoided apprehension for more than 2 years.”

The full text of Matter of Yajure Hurtado can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1413311/dl?inline

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BIA Denies Bond due to Absence of Letter from Sponsor

The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that the Department of Homeland Security met its burden of proving a non-citizen was a flight risk because the non-citizen submitted contradictory proof of the residence of his sponsor and did not submit a statement from the sponsor. “The Immigration Judge also clearly erred in finding that the proposed sponsor has a fixed address in Hallandale, Florida. The documents provide three different addresses for the sponsor, two in Hallandale, Florida, and another in Hopatcong, New Jersey. The documentation for a residential lease in Hallandale, Florida, provides a different address than the bill for electric services in the same location. There is no explanation from either the respondent or the sponsor as to which of the multiple addresses, if any, is Mr. G-’s fixed address, and whether the respondent will be residing with him at the address upon release from custody. Further complicating this factual analysis is the submission of a different address in New Jersey, without clarification by the respondent or Mr. G-. Thus, the Immigration Judge clearly erred in finding that the sponsorship documents reflected that the sponsor has a fixed address in Hallandale, Florida, and that the respondent would reside with him there.”

The full text of Matter of Dobrotvorskii can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1413266/dl?inline

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Attorney General Again Overrules Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of A-B- III

The Attorney General has again overruled Matter of A-R-C-G-, as well as Matter of A-B- III, undercutting protections for survivors of domestic violence. “Although there may be circumstances when a government’s failure to control private conduct itself amounts to persecution, A-B- I was entirely correct to treat those circumstances as few and far between.

The full text of Matter of S-S-F-M- can be found here:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1412696/dl?inline

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Ninth Circuit Remands CAT Claim for Mexican National, Declines to Apply Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

The Ninth Circuit has remanded an application for protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing the “extreme violence against individuals on the basis of perceived gang affiliation, deportee status, indigenous heritage, mental illness, and substance abuse. Petitioner has all of these characteristics, each of which would independently place him at risk of torture if he were removed to Mexico.” In addition, the Court declined to dismiss the petition for review under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, citing the government’s delay of over two years from the petitioner’s missed appointment with ICE to the filing of the motion to dismiss and the government’s own evidence that the petitioner was likely in criminal custody, and thus, his whereabouts were likely known to the parties and the Court.

The full text of Uc Encarcion v. Bondi can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/09/30/22-1601.pdf

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