These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
Viewing entries tagged
Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit has determined that a Kentucky conviction for first-degree burglary is not a crime of violence because it encompasses flight from a scene while armed, which does not necessarily involve the threat of physical force against others.
The full text of United States v. Reed can be found here: https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0357p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that even with the demise of Chevron deference and the extension of federal court jurisdiction as laid out in Wilikinson, it still does not have jurisdiction to review the denial of a sua sponte motion to reopen.
The full text of Herrera v. Bondi can be found here: https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0338p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that it lacks jurisdiction to review if an asylum applicant has demonstrated extraordinary circumstances related to the delay in filing his asylum application.
The full text of Osabas-Rivera v. Bondi can be found here: https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0332p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has reversed the denial of an appeal for failure to file a brief, when the non-citizen did timely file a brief, but it contained an address for her attorney that was different than was provided on the Notice of Appearance. “[N]othing in the BIA Practice Manual, notice of appeal form, or regulations say that this address needed to match the address provided on the attorney’s notice of appearance or that failing to do so might result in rejection of the brief.”
The full text of Pineda-Guerra v. Bondi can be found here: https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0329p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has rejected “Salvadoran women” as a cognizable particular social group for asylum and withholding of removal purposes, finding the group because it encompasses “women across varied social, economic, religious, and cultural backgrounds.”
The full text of Cristales-de Linares v. Bondi can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0326p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that it has jurisdiction to review whether a VAWA self-petitioner has established extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to the applicant’s child, as required for a motion to reopen.
The full text of Sarkisov v. Bondi can be found here: https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0316p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that when a child is under 21 at the time an Immigration Judge grants cancellation of removal for nonlawful permanent residents, but ages out during the pendency on appeal filed by DHS, the child’s age remains the same as it was on the date of the judge’s decision. It appears this applicant was detained at the time of the cancellation grant, and thus, was not subject to the visa backlog for most cancellation applicants. As such, it is unclear what would happen if the child was under 21 on the day of the merits hearing, and the judge put the applicant in the queue for a cancellation number, and the child aged out before the number was issued.
The full text of Perez-Perez v. Bondi can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0315p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that a Kentucky conviction for second degree manslaughter is not a violent felony because it criminalizes reckless conduct. The court also implied that the same analysis would apply to Kentucky’s murder statute.
The full text of United States v. Tooley can be found here: https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0292p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that the crime of child abuse ground of deportability found at 8 USC 1227a2Ei does not apply to a denaturalized individual whose conviction was entered while he was still a U.S. citizen.
The full text of Gonzalez Castillo v. Bondi can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0160p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that a District Court has no jurisdiction to naturalize a non-citizen who is currently in removal proceedings. “In sum, when a noncitizen is concurrently subject to removal and naturalization proceedings, removal takes priority. “
The full text of Ebu v. USCIS can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0093p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that the agency’s hardship determinations related to an unlawful presence waiver (212(a)(9)(B)(v)) and a fraud waiver (212(i)) are not reviewable by a federal court. Unlike the hardship determination for a cancellation of removal case, which is a mixed question of fact and law, hardship determinations related to these waivers are committed exclusively to the Attorney General.
The full text of Rahman v. Bondi can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0058p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that an applicant who refused to answer questions related to marriage fraud at his I-751 interview, and whose conditional residency was terminated for constructive non-appearance at the interview, is not eligible to seek a waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) of the INA.
The full text of Seldon v. Garland can be found here:
The Sixth Circuit has determined that it lacks jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that an applicant for adjustment of status had not proven her manner of entry. That said, the Court took the opportunity to criticize the agency for making blatant and obvious errors in its determination.
“Although 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) forecloses review of the IJ’s decision, we do note that a significant error haunts this case. A visa, issued by a United States embassy or consulate, provides the holder a window of time in which she may travel to the United States and present herself to customs officials for entry into the country. It is not a guarantee of admission but does carry some weight because it bears the imprimatur of a United States government entity in the traveler’s home country. If the visa holder is allowed entry into the United States by customs officials, she is issued an I-94 form, her entry is logged, and her passport stamped. The I-94 sets forth the dates the traveler is allowed to stay in the United States. Thus, the dates on a visa and an I-94 will almost certainly never match. The date range on the visa sets forth the timeframe in which the holder may present herself at the border for admission. The I-94 indicates how long the holder may stay in the country, once admitted.
In his oral decision denying her adjustment of status, the IJ castigated Petitioner for presenting a visa that did not align with the government’s ‘visa.’ He even recommended that the government’s attorneys refer the matter to the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (‘FDNS’) for investigation. But this concern rests on a fundamental error: the government never entered a copy of Petitioner’s visa into the record. Instead, we have two government exhibits— the letter USCIS sent to Petitioner requesting that she clarify her manner of entry, and an I-797A form supplying Petitioner a replacement copy of her original I-94. Nothing else. The USCIS letter informs her that their ‘records demonstrate that on January 6, 2000, [she was] issued a visa as a non-immigrant visitor’ indicating she was ‘the domestic employee of Shanti Ray.’ The letter provides no information on the valid dates of the visa. The I-797A form and the attached replacement I-94 show that she entered on a B2 visa and was allowed to stay in the country from March 3, 2000, until September 2, 2000. Notably, however, the form contains no information about her visa beyond the fact that she presented a B2 visa, and even contains the warning that ‘this form is not a visa nor may it be used in place of a visa.’ The visa Petitioner offered shows that it was issued on January 6, 2000, and that she entered the country as the ‘domestic employee of Mrs Shanti Ray.’ Not only does Petitioner’s visa not contradict any government visa, it actually matches the USCIS letter in every respect.
The government, in its answering brief, and the IJ, in his oral decision, both conflate the I-797A and I-94 with a visa. The government cites to the above-mentioned USCIS exhibits for the proposition that ‘Petitioner was issued a tourist visa to the United States on January 6, 2000, that was valid from March 3, 2000 until September 2, 2000.’ This is not an accurate characterization of the evidence. That I-797A form shows the details of Petitioner’s I-94, not her visa. Therefore, the two notations ‘Valid from 03/03/2000 to 09/02/2000’ and ‘VALID FROM 03/03/2000 UNTIL 09/02/2000’ refer to the I-94’s dates she is allowed to stay in the country, not the visa, and the ‘B2’ notation simply marks the type of visa upon which she was admitted.
In summary, the IJ repeatedly expressed concern that Petitioner’s visa exhibit did not match up with the government’s visa exhibit when there was no government visa in evidence. It is more than a little disturbing that such sophisticated parties do not appear to know the difference between an I-94 and a visa, particularly when the forms are so visually different. Ultimately, however, this error was only part of the IJ’s reason for denying relief, and the decision was within his discretion on the grounds of Petitioner’s other falsehoods. We merely flag this error as guidance for future proceedings.”
The full text of Patel v. Garland can be found here: https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/24a0216p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has remanded a domestic violence and family-based asylum claim, noting the change in law governing these claims. “[T]o summarize, our decision to remand Marta’s application directly responds to: (1) the IJ’s near-exclusive reliance on A-B-I to broadly proclaim that victims of domestic violence do not qualify for asylum protection, and to ignore her factfinding obligations thereto; (2) the subsequent change in immigration authority that directs the agency to afford careful, case-by-case adjudication to asylum claims relating to domestic violence; (3) the Board’s disregard of immigration authority and Sixth Circuit precedent requiring the remand of pending applications in light of the glaring change in immigration authority here; and (4) the Board’s misapplication of the circularity rule in Marta’s case.”
The full text of Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip, et al. v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/24a0170p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that a Tennessee misdemeanor domestic assault is not a crime of violence because it includes inflict of mental harm.
The full text of Sanchez-Perez v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/24a0098p-06.pdf
Following the Seventh Circuit’s lead, the Sixth Circuit has adopted a holistic analysis - rather than a statistics-based one - for determining whether a non-citizen faces a clear probability of torture.
The full text of Saleh v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/24a0102p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has adopted the aggregate risk analysis in Convention Against Torture cases, requiring that adjudicators consider if the risk of torture from all possible sources exceeds fifty percent.
The full text of Abdulahad v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/24a0082p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has remanded the asylum claim of an indigenous Guatemalan woman to further analyze if she was persecuted on account of her membership in two social groups: 1) Guatemalan Chuj Women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave; and (2) Guatemalan Chuj Women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.
The full text of Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland can be found here:
The Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed that an individual subject to a reinstated removal order files a timely petition for review if it is filed within 30 days of the agency’s dismissal of his withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture claims.
The full text of Kolov v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/23a0186p-06.pdf
The Sixth Circuit has determined that an Arkansas conviction for third-degree assault on a family or household member is a crime of violence because it requires creating a purposefully creating an apprehension of imminent physical injury, which necessarily requires the threatened use of physical force.
The full text of Banuelos-Jimenez v. Garland can be found here: https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/23a0097p-06.pdf
