The Fourth Circuit has determined that the illicit trafficking in firearms aggravated felony ground requires “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms.”
The full text of Alvarez Ronquillo v. Bondi can be found here:
Viewing entries tagged
aggravated felony
The Second Circuit has reaffirmed that a New York conviction for second-degree sexual abuse is a child sexual abuse aggravated felony.
The full text of Garcia Pinach v. Bondi can be found here: https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/117ad671-34e9-4aaf-96ca-50888f6f73f9/42/doc/22-6421_opn
The Third Circuit has determined that a federal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 287 (false, fictitious or fraudulent claims) categorically involves deceit, and thus is an aggravated felony if it causes a loss to the U.S. government in excess of $10,000. “The action is submitting a false claim for the government to pay. The mental state requires lying because the claimant must know the claim is false. That is exactly what ‘deceit means: ‘the act of intentionally giving a false impression by ‘falsification, concealment, or cheating.’”
The full text of Lanoue v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for inducing a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity is a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony and a crime of child abuse. In so holding, the court determined that “Esquivel-Quintana’s holding is narrow, applying only to a strict liability statute, and that it does not inform the broader question of whether an offense with a criminal mens rea constitutes sexual abuse of a minor.”
The full text of Hsieh v. Bondi can be found here: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/241013.P.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a Massachusetts conviction for unarmed assault with intent to rob or steal is an attempted theft-related aggravated felony. The court rejected the argument that a conviction could be obtained when a defendant stole property with the victim’s fraudulently obtained consent. “The [jury] instruction states that the taking of property must be against the victim’s will for a defendant to be convicted of robbery. In other words, a person can’t commit robbery in Massachusetts through fraud or embezzlement.” “We find that the force element of Massachusetts’s unarmed assault statute excludes the possibility that a person may be convicted of that offense for a taking committed with the victim’s consent.”'
The full text of Baptista v. Bondi can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California conviction for dissuading a witness by force or fear qualifies an obstruction of justice aggravated felony if accompanied by a sentence of at least one year of incarceration. In so doing, the Court analyzed the conduct criminalized by all three subsections of California Penal Code section 136.1, and found they all match the generic definition of obstruction of justice.
The full text of Godoy-Aguilar v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/01/13/19-70960.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a Washington conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle qualifies as an aggravated felony if accompanied by a sentence of at least one year of imprisonment.
“Washington’s stolen vehicle statute also requires actual knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. The statute requires not only that the defendant ‘knowingly’ possess the stolen property but also have a state of mind of ‘knowing that it has been stolen.’” “And since actual knowledge requires an intent to deprive the owner of his property, the state statute also matches the generic offense’s intent requirement.”
The full text of Chmukh v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/12/23/21-1096.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has determined that Minnesota’s crime of third-degree criminal sexual conduct does not match the generic definition of rape because the Minnesota crime includes digital or mechanical penetration, which are outside the generic definition of rape.
The full text of Quito-Guachichulca v. Garland can be found here:
The Fifth Circuit has determined that a Louisiana conviction for accessory after the fact is not an obstruction of justice aggravated felony because the state offense is a general intent crime, while the generic definition of obstruction of justice requires a specific intent to interfere with the process of justice.
The full text of Lopez Orellano v. Garland can be found here:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/23/23-60248-CV0.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California conviction for assault with a deadly weapon is not a crime of violence because it includes reckless use of force. In so doing, the Court recognized that the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden states that a crime is not a crime of violence if it encompasses a mens rea in which the defendant acts deliberately, but consciously disregards an unjustifiable—though not practically certain— risk.”
The rationale of the decision should be equally applicable to assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, assault with a firearm, and assault on a police officer or firefighter.
The full text of US v. Gomez can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/09/04/23-435.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that has a California conviction for carjacking is not a crime of violence aggravated felony. “On a plain reading, section 215 defines carjacking more broadly than section 16(a) by not requiring the use of force.” The court further concluded that the use of fear required by the statute does not necessarily include the use of force. The court additionally concluded that the statute requires only a reckless mens rea, which is less than is necessary to match the definition of a crime of violence. “In sum, section 215 criminalizes carjacking committed through fear and without the use of force, as well as carjacking committed through the unintentional use of force.” The court further determined the statute is not divisible.
The full of Gutierrez v. Garland can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/07/02/21-130.pdf
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit reversed its precedent, and concluded that a California conviction for dissuading a witness matches the definition of an obstruction of justice aggravated felony. In so doing, the court rejected an argument that the California mens rea is broader than the federal mens rea.
The full text of Cordero-Garcia v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/27/19-72779.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a Nevada conviction for attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14 is an attempted sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony. In so doing, the court confirmed that its Medina-Villa definition of sexual abuse (involving abusive contact with a minor) is not irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s decision in Esquivel-Quintana (addressing when statutory rape crimes qualify as sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felonies).
The full text of Leon Perez v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/28/23-204.pdf
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Florida conviction under the 2008 version of the state’s lewd lascivious battery statute is a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony. “The least culpable conduct under § 800.04(4) is consensual sexual activity between adolescents who are 12 to 15 years old, with no minimum age required for the perpetrator. The statute therefore sweeps more broadly than the generic federal definition of ‘sexual abuse of a minor,’ which in the statutory rape context before us requires an age difference of at least one year between the perpetrator and the victim.”
The full text of Leger v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202210971.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Iowa conviction for possession or purchase of a visual depiction that shows a person under the age of 18 engaging in a prohibited sexual act or the simulation of a prohibited sexual act is not a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony. The Court observed that federal law requires “the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in” the sexually explicit conduct, while Iowa Code § 728.12(3) does not. The Court remanded the case for further consideration of the petitioner’s argument that the conviction is also not a crime involving moral turpitude because it does not require that the defendant know the person in the image is underage.
The full text of Huynh v. Garland can be found here:
The Second Circuit has determined that a New Jersey conviction for distribution a controlled substance near a school is not an aggravated felony. The Court noted that the New Jersey statute criminalizes dispensing a controlled substance near a school, while the federal school zone prohibition does not. In addition, New Jersey criminalizes conduct on school buses, while the federal statute only criminalizes conduct within 1000 feet of a school’s real property. Third, the general federal distribution statute exempts distribution of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, while the New Jersey statute does not. The Court determined the statute was not divisible, and as such, was not an aggravated felony.
The full text of Stankiewicz v. Garland can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California conviction for carjacking does not include the requisite intent to steal to be considered a theft aggravated felony. “[A]n individual can be convicted of violating California’s carjacking statute even if they take a car from someone who has an inferior possessory interest in the car—or none at all.” The court also concluded that the statute is not divisible.
The full text of US v. Orozco-Orozco can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/03/12/22-50146.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that an Arizona conviction for armed robbery is a theft-related aggravated felony. The court concluded that “to establish armed robbery, the state must prove that the defendant, while armed with a real or simulated deadly weapon, (1) took property from a person or his immediate presence (2) against that person’s will (3) using or threatening force with the coexistent intent to take the property.”
The full text of Guzman-Maldonado v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/02/14/23-9.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Minnesota conviction for intentionally hiring or offering or agreeing to hire an individual who the defendant reasonably believed to be under the age of 16 years but at least 13 years to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact is a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony.
The full text of Aguilar-Sanchez v. Garland can be found here:
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a Massachusetts robbery conviction is a theft related aggravated felony. The offense of armed robbery under entails a number of elements. The prosecution must prove that (1) the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon (though it need not be used); (2) the defendant either applied actual force or violence to the body of the person identified in the indictment, or by words or gestures put him in fear (i.e., the defendant committed an assault on that person); and (3) the defendant took the money or the property of another with intent to steal it.
“These elements, under the categorical approach, match the generic definition of theft. Generic theft requires taking the property of another without consent and with intent to steal. The third element of armed robbery under § 17— the taking of property with the intent to steal—matches two of the requirements of a generic theft offense—i.e., the taking of property with the criminal intent to deprive the victim of the rights and benefits of ownership. And the second element of armed robbery under § 17—the taking of property by the use of force or by putting the victim in fear—matches the generic theft requirement that the taking be without the consent of the victim. Massachusetts law teaches that ‘[t]he essence of robbery is the exertion of force, actual or constructive, against another in order to take personal property . . . which is so within his reach . . . that he could, if not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession of it. This understanding satisfies the ‘without consent’ requirement of generic theft.”
The full text of Kemokai v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202112743.pdf