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Viewing entries tagged
crimmigration
The Fifth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for influencing a federal official by threatening assault is a crime of violence because it involves threats of physical force.
The full text of McLean v. Bondi can be found here: https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-61098-CV0.pdf
The First Circuit has determined that when looking at whether a non-citizen has been convicted of a controlled substance violation, an immigration court should look at the Controlled Substances Act as it was written at the time of the conviction.
The full text of Dor v. Bondi can be found here: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/25-1278P-01A.pdf
On remand from the Supreme Court, a panel of Eleventh Circuit judges has determined that a Florida conviction prohibiting “willfully or by culpable negligence neglect[ing] a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child.” The three judges - each issuing their own opinion - agreed on little other than that the appeal should be denied.
The first judge believed that the panel remained bound by its prior decision in Pierre v. Attorney General, because when “the Supreme Court said it meant to preserve the ‘holdings’ of Chevron-era cases, it was referring not, as Bastias seems to suggest, only to a court’s case-specific application of a judicially approved agency interpretation to a particular set of facts, but rather, and more broadly, to that court’s antecedent determination that the agency’s reading of the governing statute was ‘lawful.’” Nonetheless, the judge favored rehearing this case en banc, for two reasons. “First, the Board’s definition of ‘crime of child abuse,’ which we approved in Pierre, is exceedingly broad—it arguably sweeps in all manner of conduct that might not square with the ordinary understanding of that phrase. At the very least, I think that Bastias has presented substantial arguments that the Board’s reading of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) isn’t the best one. Which leads me to the second, and more fundamental, reason that I favor en banc rehearing: It would permit the full Court to carefully consider and decide (1) how Loper Bright’s recognition of “statutory stare decisis” principles interacts—if at all—with our own prior-panel-precedent rule, (2) how we ought to deal with Chevron-era precedents on a goingforward basis, and (3) whether (depending on the answers to those questions) we should continue to consider ourselves bound by Pierre.”
The second judge concluded that they were not bound by our decision in Pierre, but rather were required to analyze de novo the basic substantive question at issue -- whether Bastias’s state crime conviction for child neglect qualifies as a crime under Section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the INA. “Pierre was tasked with matching the federal crime of child abuse in the INA with a different state crime -- battery of a child involving bodily fluids. As I see it, nothing in its holding, nothing in its reasoning, and nothing necessary to reaching its holding answers the basic question we face today.” Turning to the question of what caselaw survives the demise of Chevron, the judge indicated that “[t]o the extent, then, that a Chevron-era decision found an agency’s definition to be reasonable, and to the extent that finding was necessary to resolve the case, that finding is part of the holding and remains good law.” As to the extend of deportable offenses under the statute, the opinion noted that “although a definition of a ‘crime of child abuse’ might encompass the crime of child neglect and more, we have no occasion to make that comparison because in this case, we find the same words enumerating the same crime -- the crime of child neglect -- on both sides of the ledger.” “In short, the generic federal crime of child neglect requires a mens rea of recklessness and conduct creating a risk of harm to a child, which matches the mens rea and conduct needed for the “least culpable conduct” criminalized under Bastias’s Florida statute of conviction.”
The third judge concluded that “no matter how we might classify ‘culpable negligence’ within the traditional hierarchy of culpable mental states, we must conclude that as used in Florida law, culpable negligence captures a category of conduct that is so egregious as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference, which rises to a level of seriousness matching those acts of abuse, neglect, and abandonment Congress meant to render deportable in 1996.” “Having established that the generic federal offense of child abuse is not confined to injurious conduct, embraces culpably negligent acts, and may extend to those who are not parents nor guardians of the victim, it is a fairly straightforward matter to conclude Florida Statute § 827.03(2) is a categorical fit. Under Florida Statute § 827.03(2), the least culpable conduct criminalizes ‘neglect’ by a caregiver, taken either willfully or with culpable negligence—even if said neglect does not result in injury.”
The full text of Bastias v. Attorney General can be found here: https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202111416.rem.pdf
The Fifth Circuit has determined that the agency may rely on an uncontested forfeiture order to determine how much money was involved in a money laundering offense. “[W]e hold that an unrebutted forfeiture order entered solely against an alien that finds a specific amount of laundered funds attributable to the alien’s conduct of conviction can constitute clear and convincing evidence of the amount of funds required to be proven during a § 1101(a)(43)(D) circumstance-specific inquiry.”
The full text of Dominguez Reyes v. Bondi can be found here:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/25/25-60016-CV0.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that New Jersey’s possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance statute is divisible with respect to the identity of the controlled substance.
The full text of Matter of Frias Ulloa can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that “[a] statute’s textual overbreadth does not always unambiguously establish that there is a realistic probability that the State would apply the statute to conduct falling outside the Federal definition of an offense.” “Thus, we conclude that once DHS establishes the existence of a State drug conviction by clear and convincing evidence, a respondent who argues that a State conviction is categorically overbroad based on differing substance or isomer definitions has the burden of demonstrating a realistic probability that the State prosecutes substances falling outside the Federal definition of a controlled substance.”
This decision turns burdens of proof on their head, forcing a lawful permanent to prove he’s not deportable, rather than forcing the Department of Homeland Security to prove he is.
The full text of Matter of Felix-Figueroa can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that the illicit trafficking in firearms aggravated felony ground requires “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms.”
The full text of Alvarez Ronquillo v. Bondi can be found here:
The Second Circuit has reaffirmed that a New York conviction for second-degree sexual abuse is a child sexual abuse aggravated felony.
The full text of Garcia Pinach v. Bondi can be found here: https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/117ad671-34e9-4aaf-96ca-50888f6f73f9/42/doc/22-6421_opn
The Third Circuit has determined that a federal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 287 (false, fictitious or fraudulent claims) categorically involves deceit, and thus is an aggravated felony if it causes a loss to the U.S. government in excess of $10,000. “The action is submitting a false claim for the government to pay. The mental state requires lying because the claimant must know the claim is false. That is exactly what ‘deceit means: ‘the act of intentionally giving a false impression by ‘falsification, concealment, or cheating.’”
The full text of Lanoue v. Attorney General can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that a Virginia conviction for indecent exposure is a crime involving moral turpitude. “For indecent exposure to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, the statute prohibiting the conduct must require not only the willful exposure of private parts but also a lewd intent. Although section 18.2-387 of the Virginia Code does not include the word ‘lewd,’ it requires an ‘obscene display or exposure.’” “The Board has previously defined ‘lewd’ in the context of a lewd intent as ‘obscene or indecent.’ Thus, ‘lewd’ and ‘obscene’ have the same meaning.”
The full text of Matter of Mayorga Ipina can be found here:
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California conviction for shooting an inhabited dwelling is a crime involving moral turpitude. “California Penal Code section 246 requires an intentional shooting of a firearm, that is, the use of a deadly weapon, in circumstances that necessarily pose a significant risk of bodily harm to another. We hold that the BIA correctly concluded that section 246 categorically qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude.”
In addition, the Court determined that whether evidence is “new” for the purposes of a motion to reopen is a legal question over which the federals court have jurisdiction to review. The Court similarly concluded that it had jurisdiction to review whether an applicant has established a prima facie case for relief.
The decision also contained a detailed analysis regarding the petitioner’s competency and eligibility for protection under the Convention Against Torture.
The full text of Lemus-Escobar v. Bondi can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/16/18-73423.pdf
An amended decision can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/11/10/18-73423.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that a federal conviction for inducing a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity is a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony and a crime of child abuse. In so holding, the court determined that “Esquivel-Quintana’s holding is narrow, applying only to a strict liability statute, and that it does not inform the broader question of whether an offense with a criminal mens rea constitutes sexual abuse of a minor.”
The full text of Hsieh v. Bondi can be found here: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/241013.P.pdf
The Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that the language of a state conviction and an asserted ground of deportability (in this case, a controlled substance violation) should be compared as they were written at the time of the non-citizen’s conviction. Thus, any post-conviction revisions to the Controlled Substance Act were not relevant to whether the non-citizen was deportable.
The full text of Matter of Dor can be found here:
https://www.justice.gov/d9/2025-03/4088.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has rejected a non-citizen’s argument that she is not deportable for a controlled substance violation because the North Dakota statute in effect at the time of her conviction included hemp in the definition of marijuana while the federal definition in effect at the time of her removal proceedings excluded hemp. The Court also rejected the argument that the North Dakota definition of marijuana is overbroad as compared to the federal definition because the federal definition includes only “all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L.,” while the North Dakota definition is not limited to a specific species, finding that the federal definition of cannabis extended to all “marihuana-producing Cannabis.”
The full text of Salinas v. Bondi can be found here: https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/25/03/232779P.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that an Oregon conviction for first degree criminal mistreatment is a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires knowingly depriving a dependent of basic care.
The Court also found that an Oregon conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon is overbroad as compared to a deportable firearms offense because the statute criminalizes possession of antique firearms. However, the statute is divisible between various subsections, some of which do not involve antique firearms. These subsections match the definition of a deportabel firearms offense.
The Court also overruled its prior precedent that a grant of SIJS constitutes an admission for cancellation of removal purposes.
The full text of Murillo-Chavez v. Bondi can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/02/13/21-1422.pdf
The Second Circuit has determined that Homeland Security may not parole a returning lawful permanent resident based solely on pending charges for a crime involving moral turpitude. “Here, we are presented with the question of whether DHS may parole an LPR at the border who has been charged with – but not yet convicted of – a CIMT. In analyzing this question, we heed Centurion’s holding that an LPR becomes an alien applying for admission for purposes of section 1101(a)(13)(C) upon the commission, rather than the conviction, of a crime. But we are also cognizant of the reality that, without a conviction, DHS will be hard pressed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the LPR actually committed the crime in question at the time of reentry. If DHS fails to sustain its burden of proving otherwise, the default presumption governs that an LPR is not an applicant for admission”
“Critically, the INA does not provide that an LPR may be treated as seeking admission when he has been ‘charged with a crime’ or is ‘believed to have committed a crime;’ it permits such treatment only when an LPR ‘has committed’ a crime. And because DHS bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a returning [LPR] is to be regarded as seeking an admission, we do not see how charging documents alone – without more – could carry DHS’s burden of demonstrating that a crime had been committed at the time of an LPR’s reentry.”
The full text of Lau v. Bondi can be found here:
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has narrowed the instances in which two crimes involving moral turpitude will be considered part of the same scheme. The BIA has said that crimes that immediately follow one another are not necessarily part of the same scheme - in this case, the non-citizen was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and failure to render aid when he hit pedestrians with his car and kept driving. Rather, crimes will only be arising out of a single scheme if: 1) one crime is a lesser offense of the other; 2) he defendant performs a single act that concurrently harms multiple victims in essentially the same way (i.e., robbing multiple people at once); or 3) are acts that occur within a comparatively short time of each other, involve the same parties, and the first act or acts are committed for the purpose of making possible the specific criminal objective accomplished by the last of the criminal acts (i.e., assaulting a guard to commit a larceny).
The full text of Matter of Baeza-Galindo can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/d9/2025-02/4085.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California conviction for dissuading a witness by force or fear qualifies an obstruction of justice aggravated felony if accompanied by a sentence of at least one year of incarceration. In so doing, the Court analyzed the conduct criminalized by all three subsections of California Penal Code section 136.1, and found they all match the generic definition of obstruction of justice.
The full text of Godoy-Aguilar v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/01/13/19-70960.pdf
The Third Circuit has determined that a Pennsylvania statute criminalizing eluding the police as a felony is divisible between three grading factors. The Court further found that the third grading factor could be violated by a driver who recklessly flees or attempts to elude law enforcement in an attempt to transport himself or another person to a hospital would still violate the statute. This conduct is not reprehensible, and thus, the statute is not a categorical match to the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The full text of Ndungu v. Attorney General can be found here: https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/202562p.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a Washington conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle qualifies as an aggravated felony if accompanied by a sentence of at least one year of imprisonment.
“Washington’s stolen vehicle statute also requires actual knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. The statute requires not only that the defendant ‘knowingly’ possess the stolen property but also have a state of mind of ‘knowing that it has been stolen.’” “And since actual knowledge requires an intent to deprive the owner of his property, the state statute also matches the generic offense’s intent requirement.”
The full text of Chmukh v. Garland can be found here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/12/23/21-1096.pdf
