Ninth Circuit Reaffirms That the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule Conflicts With the Asylum Statute

The Ninth Circuit has granted a petition for review filed by a Guatemalan family denied asylum under the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule, which presumed them ineligible for asylum because they entered the United States between ports of entry, holding that the Rule conflicts with the statutory guarantee that noncitizens may apply for asylum regardless of manner of entry.

Reaffirming its decisions in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden and East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Garland, the Court held that conditioning asylum eligibility, rather than merely the exercise of discretion, on whether a noncitizen entered at a port of entry renders the statutory right to apply for asylum a dead letter, and that the Rule's narrow exceptions for parole, port-of-entry appointments, or a denial of protection in a transit country do not cure this conflict because each exception is itself legally invalid or practically illusory. The Court also held the agency committed legal error by failing to apply the circuit's complete two-part framework for analyzing mixed-motive persecution claims and remanded for the agency to reconsider whether gang violence against the family was centrally motivated by their status as taxi business owners who resisted extortion.

The full text of Garcia Morales v. Blanche can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/08/31/25-1760.pdf

Eighth Circuit Holds Felony Assault of a Federal Officer Involving Only Offensive Contact Is Not a Crime of Violence

The Eighth Circuit has vacated a felon-in-possession sentence enhanced based on prior felony convictions for forcibly assaulting federal officers, holding that a felony conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) does not categorically require the violent physical force needed to qualify as a Sentencing Guidelines crime of violence.

The Court held that the statute's felony tier can be satisfied by mere intentional and offensive physical contact that a reasonable person would find objectionable, without any showing that the contact was capable of causing pain or injury, distinguishing the offense from other assault statutes requiring proof that the victim was placed in fear of imminent bodily harm. The Court remanded for resentencing under a corrected Guidelines range.

The full text of United States v. McIntosh can be found here: https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/26/08/252394P.pdf

Fourth Circuit Holds a Vacated Conviction Does Not Establish Inadmissibility

The Fourth Circuit has granted in part a petition for review filed by a Mexican lawful permanent resident denied a waiver of inadmissibility because a state court vacated her marijuana conviction only after the immigration judge's decision, holding that a vacated conviction no longer renders a noncitizen an "alien convicted of" a controlled-substance offense.

Declining to follow the BIA's longstanding framework distinguishing convictions vacated for substantive defects from those vacated for other reasons, the Court held that the statutory phrase describes a person's current legal status, not a mere historical fact, and that the background principle that vacated judgments are void ab initio confirms that a vacated conviction no longer counts against a noncitizen. The Court separately upheld as reasonable the regulations governing the timing of voluntary departure after a petition for review is filed, rejecting the petitioner's argument that they arbitrarily reward noncitizens who wait longer to seek review.

The full text of Yanez Piedra v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/251258.P.pdf

Third Circuit Dismisses CAT-Only Petition as Moot After Petitioner's Removal and Foreign Detention

The Third Circuit has dismissed as moot a petition for review filed by a Salvadoran man seeking deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, after the government removed him following the court's earlier denial of a stay and Salvadoran authorities then detained him on suspicion of gang activity.

The Court held that because the petitioner never challenged his underlying removal order, any success on his CAT-only claim could not relieve him of the reentry bar that independently follows from that order, distinguishing cases where a live challenge to removability itself keeps a controversy alive. The Court also held that a policy allowing ICE to facilitate the return of some removed noncitizens did not save the case from mootness given the government's representation that extraordinary circumstances, including his suspected membership in a designated foreign terrorist organization, would preclude its application, and that in any event a U.S. court cannot secure a petitioner's release from foreign criminal custody.

The full text of Mejia-Henriquez v. Attorney General can be found here: https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/252184p.pdf

Second Circuit Holds Conspiracy to Retaliate Against a Witness Is a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude

The Second Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a Polish lawful permanent resident convicted of conspiring to retaliate against employees who sued his construction company for wage violations, holding that the offense is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude and that the moral turpitude removability ground is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.

The Court held that even the least culpable conduct covered by the statute, threatening property damage in retaliation for someone's participation in official proceedings, involves both the requisite culpable intent and reprehensible conduct because it strikes at the administration of justice itself. The Court also rejected the petitioner's argument that the removability ground does not reach inchoate conspiracy offenses, and declined to revisit several other arguments already rejected in an earlier petition under the law of the case doctrine.

The full text of Dziedziach v. Blanche can be found here: https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/OPN/23-6837_opn.pdf

First Circuit Holds Family's Immediate Members Resisting Gangs Is Not a Cognizable Social Group

The First Circuit has dismissed in part and denied in part a petition for review filed by a Jamaican man whose brother's work as a police officer investigating gangs allegedly made the family a target, holding that it lacks jurisdiction over the agency's discretionary denials of adjustment of status and untimely asylum, and separately upholding the denial of withholding of removal.

The Court held that the petitioner's proposed social group of the immediate family of police officers who have resisted corruption and gang activity lacked the required particularity, since the concept of "resisting" corruption is too amorphous to delineate group membership, drawing on the Court's rejection of similarly vague resistance-based groups in prior cases. The Court also upheld the agency's adverse credibility finding based on multiple inconsistencies in the petitioner's and his brother's testimony, and rejected his argument that the agency applied the wrong circuit's law, since the immigration judge had analyzed the claims under First Circuit precedent in the alternative.

The full text of Bromfield v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/25-1556P-01A.pdf

First Circuit Denies Asylum Where Family Was Only Indirectly Harmed at a Relative's House

The First Circuit has denied petitions for review filed by a Brazilian family who were denied asylum after military police repeatedly harassed and threatened relatives at the maternal grandmother's house, which the family visited but did not live in, because the mother's brother was a wanted gang leader who had once lived there.

The Court held that substantial evidence supported the agency's conclusion that the petitioners themselves were never physically harmed and that the harm inflicted on their relatives was only limited and indirect, since the police appeared to be targeting the grandmother's house as the suspected locus of the brother's criminal activity rather than the family as such. The Court also upheld the agency's rejection of the petitioners' argument that they were similarly situated to an aunt who was separately granted asylum, since that aunt had been physically arrested and lived at the targeted house, unlike the petitioners.

The full text of Pereira Alves v. Blanche can be found here: https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/24-1686P-01A.pdf

BIA Declines to Recognize Late-Filed State Sentence "Clarification" That Contradicts the Original Order

The Board of Immigration Appeals has sustained DHS's appeal from an order terminating proceedings against a Ghanaian respondent, holding that a Georgia state court order purporting to "clarify" his twelve-month sentence for family violence battery, issued by a different judge more than six years later, is not valid for immigration purposes.

The Board held the clarification order did not correct a scrivener's error and was issued outside any statutory window for modifying a Georgia sentence, and that an order flatly contradicting rather than clarifying the original sentencing order is entitled to no deference under Matter of Thomas and Thompson. Because a term of imprisonment of one year still applied, the respondent's conviction remains an aggravated felony, and the Board remanded for the immigration judge to also assess the independent domestic-violence removability ground.

The full text of Matter of Boye can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1457656/dl?inline

BIA Holds a Departure Under Advance Parole Triggers the Unlawful-Presence Inadmissibility Bar

The Board of Immigration Appeals has denied a motion to reopen filed by a Salvadoran respondent seeking adjustment of status, and in doing so overruled its own precedent in Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, holding that a temporary trip abroad under a grant of advance parole is a "departure" that can trigger the ten-year unlawful-presence inadmissibility bar.

The Board held the plain meaning of "departure" contains no exception for advance parolees, that Congress has shown elsewhere in the INA it knows how to draft such exceptions when intended, and that the government's own advance-parole documents have long warned applicants of this exact consequence. Because the new rule departs from decades-old precedent, the Board applied it only prospectively and denied the respondent's motion as untimely and number-barred without reaching the merits of her inadmissibility.

The full text of Matter of Delcarmen-Lara can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1457741/dl?inline

BIA Clarifies the Statutory Minimum Time to Secure Counsel Before Ordering Removal

The Board of Immigration Appeals has dismissed the appeal of a detained Indian respondent ordered removed after failing to timely file an application for relief, holding that the only statutory or regulatory time requirement protecting the right to seek counsel is that the first hearing not be scheduled earlier than ten days after service of the notice to appear.

The Board withdrew from language in Matter of C-B- suggesting immigration judges must afford a "reasonable and realistic" period to seek counsel beyond that statutory minimum, calling the language unsupported dicta that departed from the text of the INA. Because the respondent's first hearing occurred twenty-six days after service and he received two continuances thereafter without showing any imminent prospect of retaining counsel, the Board held the immigration judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a third continuance.

The full text of Matter of A-K-R- can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1458041/dl?inline

BIA Holds the Motion-to-Reopen Number Bar Is Not Subject to Equitable Tolling

The Board of Immigration Appeals has denied a fourth motion to reopen filed by a Jordanian respondent, holding that the INA's limitation to a single motion to reopen, subject only to the narrow battered-spouse exception, cannot be equitably tolled based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Adopting the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Garcia Morin v. Bondi, the Board held that a numerical cap functions as a substantive res judicata rule rather than an ordinary limitations period, and that Congress's choice to write in only one express exception forecloses any judicially created equitable exception. The Board declined to treat the motion as warranting sua sponte reopening, noting the respondent's newly acquired marital equities arose years after his removal order became final.

The full text of Matter of M-M-L-J- can be found here: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1458296/dl?inline

D.C. Circuit Vacates Stay of DHS Parolee Expedited Removal Policies for Lack of Standing

The D.C. Circuit has vacated a district court order staying two DHS actions that directed immigration officers to consider expedited removal for parolees, holding that immigrant-rights organizations lacked standing to seek that relief because a regulation independently authorizing the same expedited removal of parolees remained unchallenged and in full effect.

The Court held that even if the challenged memorandum and email caused an increase in expedited removals, staying only those two documents would not likely reduce the rate of expedited removal given the government's continued reliance on the separate, unchallenged regulation, so the organizations failed to show the redressability required for standing. The Court also held it had appellate jurisdiction over the stay order and that the government itself had standing to appeal despite the practical overlap in authorities.

The full text of Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. Mullin can be found here: https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2026/08/25-5289-2187613.pdf

Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms Florida Felony Battery Remains a Sentencing Guidelines Crime of Violence

The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed a felon-in-possession sentence enhanced based on a prior Florida felony battery conviction, holding that its en banc decision in United States v. Vail-Bailon survives the Supreme Court's later plurality decision in Borden v. United States.

The Court held that only Justice Thomas's separate opinion in Borden, which commanded four votes short of a majority, would require that a defendant have specifically intended the resulting harm, whereas the controlling plurality opinion asked only whether the offense requires a purposeful or knowing act directed at another person. Because Florida felony battery requires an intentional touch or strike, it remains a categorical match regardless of whether the resulting "great bodily harm" was itself intended or merely negligently caused.

The full text of United States v. Sheely can be found here: https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202413967.pdf

Eleventh Circuit Holds Florida Robbery by Sudden Snatching Is a Categorical Theft Offense

The Eleventh Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a Trinidadian lawful permanent resident found ineligible for cancellation of removal based on a Florida robbery-by-sudden-snatching conviction, holding the offense categorically matches generic theft as an aggravated felony.

The Court held that generic theft requires only an intent to deprive someone with a superior possessory interest, not a title-owner, and that Florida's statute and standard jury instructions require exactly the same showing even where the direct victim is not the property's ultimate owner. The Court also held the statute's coverage of temporary as well as permanent deprivations does not create a mismatch, since generic theft likewise reaches less-than-permanent deprivations, and that the statute's requirement that the victim be unaware of or unwilling to permit the taking supplies the functional equivalent of a lack-of-consent element.

The full text of Ramdial v. U.S. Attorney General can be found here: https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202510093.pdf

Ninth Circuit Holds Oregon's Child Sexual-Display Offense Is a Categorical Crime of Child Abuse

The Ninth Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a lawful permanent resident removable for a conviction under Oregon's statute criminalizing using a child in a display of sexually explicit content, holding the offense is categorically a crime of child abuse under the same framework applied the same day in a companion California case.

The Court held Oregon courts have consistently required a mens rea of intent or knowledge for the offense, and that the actus reus categorically creates a likelihood of physical or emotional harm to the child regardless of the age gap between defendant and victim or whether physical touching occurred, distinguishing the petitioner's reliance on a narrower California statute previously found not to qualify.

The full text of Gonzalez-Godinez v. Blanche can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/08/10/19-71322.pdf

Ninth Circuit Holds California Minor-Seduction Offense Is a Categorical Crime of Child Abuse

The Ninth Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a lawful permanent resident found ineligible for cancellation of removal based on a conviction for distributing harmful matter to a minor for purposes of seduction, holding the offense categorically qualifies as a crime of child abuse under the framework recently announced in Leon-Briviesca v. Blanche.

The Court rejected each of the petitioner's overbreadth arguments, holding that California law treats such conduct as inherently harmful to minors regardless of actual injury, that the statute's "harmful matter" requirement forecloses any realistic probability of prosecuting purely consensual communications between older minors, and that the petitioner identified no realistic probability the statute is applied where the purported minor victim is actually an adult or never received the communication.

The full text of Adame Garcia v. Blanche can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/08/10/16-71147.pdf

Ninth Circuit Denies Relief to Former Police Officer, Judges Urge En Banc Review of Nexus Rule

The Ninth Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a former Salvadoran police officer threatened by an MS-13 leader for interfering with gang activity, holding that under circuit precedent only threats received after he left the police force are relevant to whether he was targeted on account of his status as a "former" officer, and that no such post-departure threats occurred.

Both members of the panel wrote separately to criticize the rule they felt bound to apply. One judge called it illogical that a petitioner explicitly told to quit the police and leave the country cannot rely on the very threats that drove him to comply, and the other urged the full court to rehear the case en banc to adopt a more nuanced nexus test recognizing that a former officer's status is often inseparable from the actions he took while serving.

The full text of Gonzalez-Argueta v. Blanche can be found here: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/08/13/25-557.pdf

Eighth Circuit Denies Asylum Where Domestic Abuser's Violence Was Not Shown to Target Gender

The Eighth Circuit has denied a petition for review filed by a Guatemalan mother and son fleeing a violently abusive partner, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency's finding that the partner's abuse was not shown to be centrally motivated by the petitioner's membership in proposed social groups of Guatemalan women.

The Court held the record instead supported that the partner's violence correlated with his substance abuse and jealousy-driven accusations of infidelity, patterns the court had previously found insufficient to establish nexus in a similar case, and that Guatemala's establishment of victim service centers, femicide criminalization, and specialized courts undercut the petitioner's claim that the government would acquiesce in any future torture.

The full text of Matias-Pablo v. Blanche can be found here: https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/26/08/252021P.pdf

Eighth Circuit Reaffirms Missouri Weapon-Exhibition Offense Is a Guidelines Crime of Violence

The Eighth Circuit has affirmed a felon-in-possession sentence enhanced based on a prior Missouri conviction for unlawfully exhibiting a weapon in an angry or threatening manner, rejecting the defendant's argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Delligatti v. United States undermined circuit precedent holding the offense a crime of violence.

The Court held that its prior decision in United States v. Pulliam already recognized, consistent with Delligatti, that the object of the required force must be a person, and that Missouri's own courts have equated exhibiting a weapon in the presence of others with an assault against those bystanders. The Court also found no clear error in the district court's identification of the specific subdivision of the divisible Missouri statute underlying the defendant's plea.

The full text of United States v. Verges can be found here: https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/26/08/252033P.pdf

Seventh Circuit Holds Indiana's Unilateral Conspiracy Statute Does Not Match Generic Guidelines Conspiracy

The Seventh Circuit has vacated a felon-in-possession sentence enhanced based on a prior Indiana conspiracy-to-commit-armed-robbery conviction, holding that Indiana's conspiracy statute, which permits conviction even where the only other "conspirator" is an undercover agent, sweeps more broadly than the generic conspiracy offense incorporated into the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of a crime of violence.

Resolving a question left open in its earlier decision in United States v. Pemberton, the Court held that the generic meaning of "conspiring" must be assessed as of 1989, when the Sentencing Commission first added inchoate offenses to the crime-of-violence definition, and that federal law, a majority of states, and contemporaneous legal dictionaries all required a genuine, bilateral agreement at that time despite the Model Penal Code's earlier shift toward a unilateral approach. Because Indiana's statute does not require a genuine co-conspirator, the defendant's conviction cannot serve as a Guidelines crime-of-violence predicate.

The full text of United States v. Lloyd can be found here: https://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/OpinionsWeb/processWebInputExternal.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2026/D08-12/C:25-1967:J:Taibleson:aut:T:fnOp:N:3590005:S:0