The Third Circuit has held that Loper Bright did not unsettle its earlier decisions deferring to the Board of Immigration Appeals' interpretation of "sexual abuse of a minor" as an aggravated felony, and that a New York misdemeanor conviction for second-degree sexual abuse involving a child under 14 categorically qualifies. The petitioner, a Bangladeshi lawful permanent resident, was found removable on that basis and denied protection under the Convention Against Torture.
The court explained that Loper Bright ended prospective Chevron deference but preserved statutory stare decisis for prior holdings, so Restrepo and Cabeda remain binding absent en banc review or a contrary Supreme Court decision. It then held that the federal generic offense tracks 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8), that the New York statute's range of conduct falls within it, and, as a matter of first impression, that the generic offense requires no age differential between the participants. Relying on Borden, it also found the statute's mental state requirement matches the generic offense. The court dismissed the removability challenge for lack of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) and denied the CAT petition, finding substantial evidence that the petitioner, who had no high-profile role in the BNP, was unlikely to be tortured, and that any error in the Board's notice of changed conditions in Bangladesh was harmless.
The full text of Islam v. Attorney General can be found here: https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/251101p.pdf