These summaries are not intended as legal advice. Please contact a licensed attorney to discuss the specifics of your case.
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Illinois conviction for attempted robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under federal sentencing guidelines. Because the definition of a crime of violence in the immigration law is similar to the definition of a crime of violence in the sentencing law, this decision may have persuasive impact in immigration cases.
The full text of U.S. v. Brown can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a withdrawal of a guilty plea under Iowa Code chapter 822 can be rehabilitative in nature, and thus, not recognized by the immigration authorities.
The full text of Zazueta v. Barr can be found here:
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Missouri statute criminalizing the passing of bad checks is divisible, and subdivision one, which includes an intent to defraud, is a crime involving moral turpitude.
The full text of Dolic v. Barr can be found here:
The Sixth Circuit has affirmed the denial of a motion to continue by a pro se litigant when his attorney advised him 6 weeks prior to the merits hearing that if he did not pay the balance owed, his attorney would withdraw; the attorney moved to withdraw one week prior to the merits; and the judge granted the motion to withdraw on the day of the merits. Thought the court dismissed the petition for review, it noted that, “[w]e do not hereby endorse the practices employed by either the withdrawing attorney or the IJ. “
The full text of Mendoza-Garcia v. Barr can be found here:
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/19a0044p-06.pdf
The Fifth Circuit has determined that Matter of Diaz Lizarraga, which significantly widened the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude for theft offenses, cannot be applied retroactively applied to convictions entered before the date of publication of Diaz Lizarraga.
The full text of Monteon-Camargo v. Barr can be found here:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-60345-CV0.pdf
The Fifth Circuit has determined that a respondent, who had been served with an NTA, but whose NTA had not yet been filed with the Court, met her obligation to change her address by notifying ICE of the new address. “Because ICE is now responsible for providing the alien’s address to the immigration court when it files the NTA, we read 8 U.S.C. §1229, through the lens of 6 U.S.C. § 557, to require the alien to provide a change of address to ICE at least until the NTA has been filed with the immigration court.”
The full text of Fuentes-Pena v. Barr can be found at:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-60637-CV0.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that whether a child is residing the in the physical custody of a U.S.-citizen parent, as it relates to citizenship under the Child Citizenship Act, is a mixed question of fact and law, with the factual determinations reviewable by the Board of Immigration Appeals for clear error, and the legal questions reviewable under a de novo standard.
The full text of Duncan v. Barr can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit remanded a claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture based on gang violence in El Salvador. The Court reprimanded the agency for selectively relying on the Department of State report to find that the Salvadoran government does not acquiescence to gang violence, even though the applicant had credibly testified that she twice had sought police protection, and twice had been turned away by the Salvadoran police.
The full text of Cabrera Vasquez v. Barr can be found here:
The Second Circuit has addressed the federal statute criminalizing conspiracy to commit money laundering, and has determined that a conviction under 18 USC 1956(h) can properly qualify as a money laundering-related aggravated felony under INA section 101(a)(43)(D). The court rejected the argument that a conspiracy conviction, such as the one at issue in this case, must be charged under INA section 101(a)(43)(U). In addition, the court determined that a forfeiture order was sufficient to establish that the offense involved more than $10,000 in laundered funds, even though a forfeiture order may include legitimately obtained funds, and need only been proven by the prosecution by a preponderance of the evidence, while the Department of Homeland Security must prove the offense involved more than $10,000 in laundered funds by clear and convincing evidence.
The full text of Barikyan v. Barr can be found here:
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that Flunitrazepam is a substance regulated in the Controlled Substances Act. As such, a conviction involving Flunitrazepam is a controlled substance offense.
The full text of Bula Lopez v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201715179.op2.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of Islam, construing the exception to deportability for two crimes involving moral turpitude arising out of the same scheme of conduct. The Ninth Circuit also found that retroactive application of this standard to the petitioner is permissible because at the time of the petitioner’s plea, the Board had not yet stated that it would apply contrary circuit case law.
The full text of Szonyi v. Whitaker can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/02/13/15-73514.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed that a Washington conviction for communication with a minor for immoral purposes is a crime involving moral turpitude, citing its prior decision in Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007) as binding precedent on the issue. The court also determined that it is bound by its own precedent to reject the argument that the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is unconstitutionally vague.
Judge Fletcher wrote a lengthy concurrence on why, absent the precedent relied on, the court should find that term is unconstitutionally vague.
The full text of Islas-Veloz v. Whitaker can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/02/04/15-73120.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has determined that a Washington conviction for second-degree murder is not a crime of violence because Washington law imposes liability for negligent or even accidental felony murder. Thus, the statute is overbroad with respect to the generic definition of a crime of violence, which requires the intentional use of force. The court also determined that the statute is indivisible, and thus, the modified categorical approach cannot be used.
The full text of United States v. Vederoff can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/02/01/17-30096.pdf
The Ninth Circuit has deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of Bermudez Cota and determined that the filing of a Notice to Appear that lacks the time and location of the first hearing still vests jurisdiction in the Immigration Court over the removal proceeding, so long as a subsequent hearing notice is served on the individual. In so doing, the court confined the Supreme Court’s decision in Periera v. Sessions to the cancellation of removal context only.
The court declined to determine whether jurisdiction would have vested if the individual had not received information about the time and place of her hearing in a timely fashion.
The full text of Karingithi v. Whitaker can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/01/28/16-70885.pdf
The Eighth Circuit has determined that an Illinois conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking is a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines because the statute requires the defendant to use force sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance.
The full text of United States v. Sykes can be found here:
The Seventh Circuit has remanded for the Board of Immigration Appeals to further analyze the inadmissibility provision in section 212(a)(2)(B) of the INA. The petitioner had been convicted of a DUI offense, for which he received no sentence of incarceration. Subsequently, he was convicted of negligent vehicular homicide, for which he was sentenced to 5 years of incarceration. The petitioner argued that section 212(a)(2)(B) of the INA, which renders inadmissible anyone convicted of “2 or more offenses … for which the aggregate sentences to confinement were 5 years or more,” requires at least two sentences of confinement.
The full text of Ruderman v. Whitaker can be found here:
The Fifth Circuit has deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that the personal use of marijuana exception to controlled substance deportability is subject to the circumstance specific analysis. Specifically, if the statute of conviction does not specify that the conviction involved less than 30 grams of marijuana, the adjudicator may consult other documents, such as the arrest report, to determine how much marijuana was involved in the offense.
The full text of Cardoso de Flores v. Whitaker can be found here:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-60744-CV0.pdf
The Fourth Circuit has determined that Convention Against Torture claims must be evaluated based on the aggregate risk of torture from all possible sources of harm.
The full text of Rodriguez-Arias v. Whitaker can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has determined that whether “how public officials will likely act” qualifies as “acquiescence” under the Convention Against Torture regulations is a question fo law that must be reviewed de novo by the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The full text of Cruz-Quintanilla v. Whitaker can be found here:
The Fourth Circuit has affirmed an agency determination that a temporary custody order issued by a North Carolina state court is insufficient to establish SIJS eligibility.
The full tex of Perez Perez v. Cissna can be found here:
