The Ninth Circuit addressed a conviction under section 217.26 of the California Peal Code for unlawful laser activity.  The court determined that the statute at issue criminalized the use of a laser pointer.  In rejecting the Board of Immigration Appeals' finding that the conviction qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude, the court stated that "such handheld laser demonstration devices are certainly not associated with 'deadly weapons.'”  

"Not only do other Cal. Penal Code provisions show that using a laser pointer is not equivalent to terrorizing someone with a laser targeting device, but § 417.26 does not include any 'appears-to-be-a-deadly-weapon' element.  If California wanted § 417.26 to include such an element, it could have done so, as it did in § 417.4, which prohibits drawing an 'imitation firearm . . . in such a way as to cause a reasonable person apprehension or fear of bodily harm.'”  As such, the court concluded that " § 417.26 has more in common with non-turpitudinous simple assault than with the morally turpitudinous 'threats with intent to terrorize' of § 422," and it is not a categorical match to the definition of a CIMT.  As the Government did not ask the Court to apply the modified categorical approach, the Court did not consider whether the statute was divisible and subject to a modified categorical inquiry.

The full text of Coquico v. Lynch can be found here: