The petitioner was convicted in 1995 of a shoplifting offense.  At the time, his conviction would not have posed a statutory bar to suspension of deportation.  However, when the Government ultimately initiated removal proceedings against him 2010, suspension of deportation had been replaced with cancellation of removal, and the conviction was a bar to cancellation of removal.  The Immigration Judge determined that the changes in the law brought about by AEDPA and IIRIRA that prevented him applying for suspension of removal (which had been abolished) and rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal applied retroactively.

On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, the petitioner requested a remand because his U.S. citizen daughter had turned 21 and filed a petition to immigrate him.  The Board denied his motion, finding that he did not merit remand as a matter of discretion, given his 4 DUI convictions and other criminal history.  The Board affirmed the Immigration Judge's retroactivity analysis.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the agency's decisions, finding the language of AEDPA to be clearly retroactive.  The Sixth Circuit also affirmed the Board's discretionary denial of the motion to remand, finding the petitioner had not presented sufficient evidence of equities or rehabilitation to the Board to compel an exercise of discretion.

The full text of Velasco-Tijero v. Lynch can be found here: