The Seventh Circuit has rejected a challenge to term "crime involving moral turpitude," finding that it is not unconstitutionally vague.  The Court noted that this phrase has been part of the immigration laws dating back to 1891 and that no case has been decided holding that the phrase is vague, or that it is so meaningless as to be a deprivation of due process.

The Court also determined that a felony burglary conviction in Illinois qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude, at least under the modified categorical approach.  The statute of conviction stated that "a person commits burglary when without authority he or she knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building, housetrailer, watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle, railroad car, or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft.”

The full text of Dominguez-Pulido v. Lynch can be found here: